NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 71 | Number 2

Article 3

1-1-1993

Responding to the Litigation Explosion: The Plain
Meaning of Executive Branch Primary over
Immigration
Kevin R. Johnson

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the Litigation Explosion: The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primary over Immigration, 71 N.C. L.
Rev. 413 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol71/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

RESPONDING TO THE "LITIGATION
EXPLOSION": THE PLAIN MEANING OF
EXECUTIVE BRANCH PRIMACY OVER

IMMIGRATION
KEVIN R. JOHNSON*

In the October 1991 Term, the United States Supreme Court
handed down an unprecedentedfour immigration decisions. In
allfour, the Court decided in favor of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In this Article, Professor Kevin R. Johnson
explains and analyzes these recent decisions and considers their
implicationsfor future immigration cases. According to Professor Johnson, the Courtexhibited a strong but misplaced reliance
upon the deference and plain meaning doctrines in rendering
these decisions. Because the INS has demonstrated an anti-immigrant,pro-enforcement bias, and because the executive branch
has tremendous leeway in the foreign policy realm, deference is
ill-advised in the immigration context. Similarly, because of the

rich legislative history of the immigration laws, plain meaning
interpretationprovides an ineffective means of carrying out congressionalintent. ProfessorJohnson argues that the use of these

two doctrines, in immigration cases and elsewhere, is symptomatic of the Rehnquist Court's underlying agenda: docketclearing. In conjunction, deference andplain meaning tend both
to speed the disposition ofparticularcases and to discourage liti-

gation in immigration cases at the expense of immigrants seeking asylum or the witholding of deportation. In light of the
rigorous applications of these doctrines, Professor Johnson concludes, the prospectsfor immigrantsseeking fair treatmentin the
courts look quite dim.
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Delay is preferable to error.
Thomas Jefferson to George Washington,
May 16, 1792.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many in the legal profession have curious views of immigration law.
To them, it is nothing less than dull. A specialized series of statutory
provisions and regulations that are at best byzantine and at worst incom1. Reprinted in THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 99 (David S. Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds.,

1986).
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prehensible. Popular opinion has it that, because hundreds of thousands
of people attempt to immigrate to the United States each year, the system
is flooded with cases often raising recurrent, lackluster, and sometimes
esoteric, issues. Furthermore, many believe that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) possesses the expertise necessary to dispose
of the high volume of complex, yet trivial, matters, thereby relieving the
already overloaded federal courts of further time demands.
Many attorneys, federal judges, and academics share such misconceptions.2 The United States Supreme Court's most recent decisions on
the subject suggest that it does as well. That is problematic because the
Supreme Court decisions are often best remembered for the signals they
send.3 Despite accepting fewer cases for review than in the recent past,'
the Court in the October 1991 Term decided an unprecedented four im2. One may only wonder why immigration is relegated to the shadows of mainstream
legal discourse. It may be because immigration law often involves people of color from a
different culture who do not speak English. Cf Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2321-23 (1989) (noting that,
in evaluating constitutionality of restraints on racist speech, first amendment law traditionally
has failed to weigh impact of such speech on victims). Racism is part and parcel of the history
of immigration law and policy in the United States. See infra note 131 and accompanying text;
see, e.g., EDWIN HARWOOD, IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND IMMIGRATION

LAW ENFORCEMENT 224 (1986) (including index with following racist reference: "Wetbacks,
see Mexicans"); Douglas Jehl, Buchanan Raises Specter of Intolerance, Critics Say, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1992, at Al ("[I]f we had to take a million immigrants in say, Zulus, next
year, or Englishmen, and put them up in Virginia, what group would be easier to assimilate
and would cause less problems for the people of Virginia?"). See generally JOHN HIGHAM,
STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 passim (2d ed.

1963) (describing history of nativism underlying immigration laws and policies in the United
States). Whatever the cause, immigration law, like American Indian law, is buried in the
recesses of American jurisprudence. See generally Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the FederalCourts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 742-59 (1989) (discussing
the relationship between the federal courts and American Indian law).
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is probably the most famous example.
A more recent, less striking instance is Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
521 (1989), which, although expressly declining the invitation to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), was widely understood as giving state legislatures a green light to pass laws
restricting the right to an abortion. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2832-33 (1992) (upholding most of the restrictive Pennsylvania law passed in response to
Webster).
4. See Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 61
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Aug. 11, 1992) (showing that number of signed opinions dropped from
129 in 1989-90 to 107 in 1991-92 Term); Linda Greenhouse, Lightening Scales of Justice: High
Court Trims Its Docket, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 1992, at Al (reporting that, despite increase in
petitions for writs of certiorari, the Court will decide nearly one-third fewer cases than during
peak years of the 1980s); see also Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245, 1246
(1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (claiming that a "quick glance at
this Court's docket reveals not only that we have room to consider these issues, but that they
are at least as significant as any we have chosen to review today").
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migration cases.5 In each one, the Court ruled in favor of the INS and
against the immigrant.6 To many, those decisions exemplify the Rehnquist Court's views about immigrants' rights.7
5. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992); INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992);
INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 551 (1991); Ardestani v. INS,
112 S.Ct. 515 (1991). By comparison, the Court issued seven immigration decisions from
1971 to 1981. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court, The NationalLaw, and the Selection of Cases for the Plenary Docket, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 521, 631-32 & n.498 (1983).
6. For reasons previously explained, I prefer the term "immigrant," or other more neutral terms, to "alien," the somewhat pejorative referent of choice of the immigration laws. See
Kevin R. Johnson, A "'HardLook"at the Executive Branch'sAsylum Decisions, 1991 UTAH L.
REv. 279, 281 n.5.
7. Indeed, the Bush administration may well have understood the Court's decisions as
affording it a free hand in the treatment of persons fleeing the violent political turmoil of Haiti,
and thereby implicitly sanctioning the extraordinary program of interdiction on the high seas,
detention in Guantfinamo Bay in Cuba where the INS screened the persons to determine asylum eligibility, and repatriation of Haitians found inegilible. See McNary v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 3 (1992) (staying judgment of court of appeals pending filing of petition for writ of certiorari); McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 1714 (1992)
(staying preliminary injunction of program); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d
1498, 1515 (11th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's enjoining of program), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1245 (1992). In stark contrast, the Bush Administration during roughly the same period
treated Cubans fleeing Fidel Castro's Cuba as "political refugees" deserving of more sympathetic treatment. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, New Wave of CubansSails to Florida,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1992, at Al. In defending the Haitian interdiction program to the Supreme Court,
Solicitor General Kenneth Starr argued that Executive prerogative over immigration matters
barred judicial interference with these measures. See Barbara Crossette, White House Presses a
Ban on Haitians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1992, at A3. The Bush administration continued the
program despite widespread reports of rampant political persecution following the violent military coup in Haiti. See, e.g., Howard W. French, 16 HaitiansSlain in Week of Strife, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1992, at A3; see also DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991, at 633-34 (joint Comm. Print 1992)
("Following the coup ....
the [Haitian] army resorted to brutality and massacre to control the
population ....[T]he army employed violence on several occasions to intimidate opposition
political supporters, popular organizations, the urban poor, and the media, and otherwise to
discourage antiregime activity.... Hundreds were killed in political violence during 1991.").
To make matters worse, even though the INS determined that some of the interdicted persons
had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Haiti, deficient recordkeeping resulted in
the mistaken return of some of them. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REFUGEES: U.S.
PROCESSING OF HAITIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS 2-4 (1992).
After a series of victories in immigration cases in the Supreme Court, President Bush
increased the harshness of the interdiction program and issued an Executive Order authorizing
the Coast Guard to halt all boats carrying Haitians and to escort them back to Haiti, and
requiring Haitians seeking asylum in the United States to apply at the American Embassy in
Haiti. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992). The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the new policy was unlawful and enjoined it, an injunction that the
Supreme Court quickly stayed so that the challenged practice might continue. See McNary v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), stay granted, 113 S.Ct. 3, cert. granted,
113 S.Ct. 52 (1992). For a discussion of the factors, including the Supreme Court's deference
to the executive branch in immigration matters, see Kevin P. Johnson, The Judiciary'sAcquiesce to the Executive Branch'sPursuitof ForeignPolicy andDomestic Agendas: The Case of the
HaitianAsylum Seekers, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.I. (forthcoming 1993).
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Besides the fact that the INS prevailed in each case, two characteristics of the Court's decisions may increase their symbolic value. First, the
immigration decisions reflect the Supreme Court's increasing willingness
to defer to the judgment of the executive branch in immigration matters.
In reviewing the conduct of administrative agencies, the Court is heavily
influenced by a "strong" reading of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.8 requiring courts to generally avoid disturbing the judgments of administrative agencies.9 In the four
immigration decisions, the Court consistently deferred to the position of
the INS or another adjudicatory arm of the Department of Justice in
immigration matters, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In so
doing, it ignored the persistent claims that the INS is anti-immigrant and
focuses almost exclusively on its enforcement rather than its service functions, and that the INS has been found by lower courts to engage in
abusive and unlawful conduct toward immigrants, particularly persons

seeking asylum in the United States.' 0 Though not the subject of such
fervent criticism, the BIA often is charged with ordering the deportation
of persons based more on the enforcement emphasis of the Attorney
General than the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).11 The BIA specifically has been criticized for basing asylum decisions on the foreign policy desires of the President in violations of the
neutral aspirations of the law. 2 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court gave
decisions of the INS and BIA the deference afforded to the conduct of
any other agency.
Similarly, the Court reviewed orders to deport persons to countries
where they allegedly would face political persecution as no different in
principle from any other agency decision. 3 Despite the undisputed life
and liberty interests at stake, 4 the Court simply deferred to the agency
judgment because "agency decisions" warrant deferential review. Put
bluntly, in the view of the Rehnquist Court, a deportation order should
8. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 23-44; see also Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling
Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594 (1992) (stating that Chevron announced a "fundamental principle of
our law, one requiring judicial deference to a reasonable statutory interpretation by an administering agency").
10. See infra text accompanying notes 130-90 and 326-28.
11. See Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 130-90.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 130-90.
14. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) ("Deportation is always a
harsh measure; it is all the more replete with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or
she will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his or her home country.").
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receive no more scrutiny by a reviewing court than a rate-setting
decision.
The Court's deference to the INS and BIA extends the deference
principle to a body of law historically renowned for the tremendous leeway afforded the executive branch. Besides encouraging the President to
proceed arbitrarily in immigration matters, the decisions serve as a lesson
to the lower courts to review administrative rulings with great deference.
That development is ominously reminiscent of the so-called "plenary
power" doctrine, which the Court has invoked selectively over the last
century as a bar to meaningful judicial review of immigration decisions
by Congress and the executive branch.15
Second, the immigration decisions reflect the Court's growing adherence to the "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation and
the application of that doctrine to the immigration laws.' 6 Plain meaning tenets propounded by Justice Antonin Scalia require the federal
courts, when interpreting the meaning of a statutory text, to limit themselves to considering the plain meaning of the words of the law passed by
Congress to the exclusion of other sources, such as legislative history and
purpose.

17

In three of the four immigration cases decided during the most recent term, the Court used plain meaning methodology to construe literally the INA and regulations promulgated thereunder and defer to the
position of the INS or BIA. By so doing, the Court left the firm impression that the INA generally is to be interpreted just as any other statute.
That approach has devastating effects that may be peculiar to the immigration world. Most importantly, the INA and its many amendments

have a rich legislative history that reflects Congressional purpose and

18
illuminates the plain meaning of an often dense statutory text.
Although harsh results could have been avoided by interpreting the
INA in accordance with legislative history and Congressional purpose,
the Court adamantly refused to deviate from the most literal reading of
the law in three cases, 19 interpreting the intricate statute in a vacuum,

15. See infra text accompanying notes 130-35.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 213-449.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 46-78 and 213-449. Debate about the proper mode
of statutory interpretation, of course, predates Justice Scalia's arrival on the Court. Compare
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571-77 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.) (following
plain meaning approach) with id. at 577-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting inconsistency in
Court's method of interpreting statutes and advocating consideration of variety of factors to
avoid literal reading of statute). However, Justice Scalia's strongly held views on the subject
have rekindled and sharpened the debate. See infra text accompanying notes 46-78.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 191-212.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 213-379.
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without regard to its history or the realities of the immigrants' plight.
Yet, remarkably, when the plain meaning of the text tended to support
the immigrant's position, the Court considered a wealth of extra-textual
evidence, much of it of doubtful trustworthiness, to vindicate the INS
position.2 ° This suggests that the Rehnquist Court is willing to invoke
the plain meaning doctrine selectively in interpreting the INA to ensure
that the courts defer to the executive branch. Deference, though often
achieved by plain meaning interpretation of the law, appears to be the
Court's primary goal.
By mandating limited judicial review of immigration cases, often
through a plain meaning statutory interpretation, the Court has created a
doctrinal framework virtually mandating deference to the INS. As a result, one cannot be certain that an agency ruling, particularly one involving claims to relief from deportation, is consistent with the laws passed
by Congress and is unbiased, accurate, and fair.
This Article suggests that the deference and plain meaning doctrines
are merely symptomatic of the Court's approach to a number of substantive areas. The Rehnquist Court appears generally motivated by a desire
to respond to the so-called "litigation explosion." 2 1 To reduce a growing
judicial workload filled with a significant number of cases perceived to be
"marginal" or "trivial," and simply unworthy of the federal judiciary,
the Court has moved toward bright line rules and heavy presumptions
that strive to avoid time-consuming, case-specific inquiry. Because such
rules presuppose results in the individual case, they tend to reduce the
time and costs of decisionmaking, discourage litigation, and limit appeals.2 2 This is accomplished in two distinct ways. First, by employing
20. See infra text accompanying notes 380-449 (discussing INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 551 (1991)).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 79-129.
22. There is, of course, an ideological bent to these rules as well. The "new textualism,"
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 640-66 (1990)
[hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism], requires the courts to ignore legislative history and
statutory purpose endorsed by a Congress controlled by Democrats for most of recent memory. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 293 (1985)
(noting that "most 'strict constructionists' are political conservatives" who think legislation
often "goes too far and want the courts to rein the legislators in"); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 415-17
(1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Decisions] (discussing how plain
meaning interpretation shifts power from Congress to executive branch). The deference doctrine, when invoked during the 1980s and early 1990s, shielded the decisions of administrative

agencies controlled by a Republican President. See Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in
the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 430 n.91 (1989); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative
History and the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1373 (1990).
The political overtones might suggest why Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist, who
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these default principles, courts may easily and quickly decide certain categories of cases compromising a not insignificant portion of their docket.
Second, the rules necessitate that parties who must argue against their
presumptive effect (for example, that the court should not defer to an
agency decision or should look beyond the plain meaning of the statute)
will be discouraged from litigating the issue. By facilitating quick disposal of the ordinary, run-of-the-mill case, such default principles allow the
Supreme Court, as well as the lower courts, to manage an increasing
workload. The end result of such an approach, however, is that broad
concerns with judicial economy may well prevail over justice in the individual case.

In the immigration realm, the deference and plain meaning default
principles have implications that differ in salient respects from the substantive impact that application of the doctrines has on other bodies of
law. As a disenfranchised group, noncitizens lack the political clout to
check agency misconduct, including violation of the laws passed by Congress, and override the courts' plain meaning interpretations of the INA.
Thus, because the public is not directly affected by such events, protection of the immigrant is unlikely even when a majority of the voters agree
with the noncitizens. Consequently, the executive branch ordinarily will
prevail when challenged by the immigrant; challenges to INS practices,
procedures, and decisions, as well as BIA rulings, generally will be discouraged; and the Supreme Court and lower courts will have a device for
easily disposing of a group of "trivial" cases involving a complex statutory scheme.
This Article explores the distinct impact of the deference and plain
meaning doctrines on immigration law and suggests that these doctrines
share some common roots with the Rehnquist Court's approaches to
other substantive areas. Part I sketches the Court's recent pronouncements about deference to agency action. Part II outlines the movement
of the Supreme Court toward plain meaning interpretation. Part III argues that broader concerns, including a desire to quell the "litigation explosion," help explain the emergence of the deference and plain meaning
doctrines and more generally influence the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence. Part IV suggests that the executive branch's immigration deciadvocated revival of the non-delegation doctrine-the antithesis of deference to agency action-in reviewing administrative decisionmaking during Jimmy Carter's presidency, see
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672-76, 685-88

(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment), embraced deference to agency action under
Republican administrations. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767 (1991) (Rehnquist,
C.J.); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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sions should not necessarily be entitled to the same deference that the
actions of other administrative agencies are given and that a plain meaning interpretation of the INA has a special, and often irrevocable, impact
on noncitizens. Finally, Part V of this Article reviews, analyzes, and cri-

tiques the four recent immigration decisions and shows how the Court's
commitment to caseload reduction through deterring future litigation
and docket clearing affected the results.
II.

PRESUMPTIVE DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

The Supreme Court in Chevron USA., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. stressed that, because administrative agencies are
politically accountable, it is entirely appropriate to defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.2 3 The rationale is that
Congress implicitly delegated policymaking authority to the agency
through a statutory ambiguity 24 To remain faithful to the delegation

theory, courts should not defer to agency interpretation of unambiguous

laws or unreasonable interpretations of ambiguous ones. As American
constitutional tradition rooted in Marbury v. Madison

5

suggests, and as

Chevron acknowledged, the judiciary is the final arbiter of whether a law

is ambiguous or the agency interpretation is unreasonable.26
23. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984); see, eg., Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1767-69. The theory was laid out in Chevron as
follows:
Judges ... are not part of either political branch of the Government .... In contrast,
an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's
views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the ChiefExecutive is, and it is entirely appropriatefor this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices ....
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (emphasis added); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED
JUSTICE 11-13 (1990) (noting benefits of expertise and deference); Colin S. Diver, Statutory
Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 574-78 (1985) (same).
24. See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2533-34 (1991) (finding ambiguity in the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977); Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 110 S.
Ct. 1384, 1390 (1990) (suggesting that scope of Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act may be ambiguous).
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department, to say what the law is.").
26. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of
statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to
clear congressional intent" by "employing traditional tools of statutory construction.") (citations omitted). Despite that caveat, by requiring deference to agency legal interpretations in
certain instances, Chevron is in tension with Marbury. See Kenneth Starr, JudicialReview in
the Post-ChevronEra, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283 (1986); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
452, 457 (1989) (discussing how deference creates a new relationship between courts and agen-
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Chevron controls judicial review of an agency's interpretation of

law,27 and the Court commonly recites it for the broader principle of
deference to agency action of all sorts.2" Its logic extends beyond simple

legal interpretations to virtually all types of agency decisions, including
fact-finding and application of law to fact. 29 Despite Chevron's rise to

preeminence, not all the Justices are entirely comfortable with the extension of the deference principle. Justice Stevens, 30 Chevron's author, gen-

erally takes a decidedly more cautious view of the deference doctrine
than Justice Scalia often does. 3 The Court's inconsistency over whether
an agency interpretation of law is entitled to deference illustrates the doc-

trine's uncertainty. 32 Although simple in principle and the subject of an
cies); Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101

YALE L.J. 969, 9711003 (1992) (discussing the revolutionary potential of Chevron). That tension may help explain why the lower courts frequently appear confused about the appropriate scrutiny to afford
such interpretations. See, e.g., Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d
1292, 1296 (1lth Cir. 1990) (per curiam) ("Where the resolution of this matter involves a
question of statutory interpretation, we review the BIA's decision de novo.... We are also
obliged, however, to defer to the BIA's interpretation of the applicable statute if that interpretation is reasonable.") (citations omitted).
27. See, ag., United States v. Alaska, 112 S. Ct. 1606, 1610 (1992).
28. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1059 (1992) (deferring to EPA's
interpretation of water quality standard and emphasizing that "EPA's reasonable, consistently
held interpretation of those standards is entitled to substantial deference") (citing Chevron, 467
U.S. at 837).
29. See Farina, supra note 26, at 457.
30. See William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions
of Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1120-21; see, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.

421, 446 (1987).
31. See, eg., Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354,
380-83 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). More recent
opinions, however, hint that Justice Scalia is less wedded to the deference principle than his
earlier opinions suggested. See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1875 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (claiming that IRS interpretation of statute was undeserving of deference because it was "not within the range of reasonable interpretation of the statutory text");
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1237 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("[D]eference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ.");
see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (stating that, because plain meaning generally answers question, statutory
ambiguity triggering Chevron deference is relatively rare).
32. See Merrill, supra note 26, 971-1003 (concluding, based on empirical study of Court's
deference decisions, that Court has inconsistently applied Chevron). Compare Lechmere, Inc.
v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 847-48 (1992) (refusing to defer to NLRB's interpretation of statute)
with id. at 852-57 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of deference); compare Presley v.
Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 831 (1992) (refusing to defer to Attorney General's
construction of Voting Rights Act) with id. at 834 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that in
previous cases, the Court exhibited "considerable deference" and accepted Attorney General's
interpretation of the Act and should do so in this case).
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ever-growing body of Supreme Court decisions and academic commentary, 33 Chevron deference fails to answer definitively some fairly rudimentary questions. The most important of these is: under what

circumstances should a court defer to the agency?
The Court's unwillingness to adhere consistently to Chevron illustrates that other interests sometimes outweigh the perceived benefits

gained from the deference presumption.3 4 When the substantive issue at
stake becomes too significant or agency error is perceived, the deference

presumption gives way. Consequently, the Court at times deviates from
the presumption, and the Chevron caselaw has developed in a somewhat
"jagged" fashion.35
One recent example of the Court's deviation from the logic of Chev-

ron is Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB. 36 To avoid deferring to a National Labor
Relations Board rule arguably infringing on an employer's property
rights, the Court held that stare decisis required an agency to follow its

previous interpretation of the law.37 It is unclear, however, why the pru-

dential doctrine of stare decisis, often downplayed by the Rehnquist
Court,3 8 should trump the deference principle. Similarly, although Chevron favors deference,3 9 the Court refuses to defer to agency interpreta-

tions of law that it labels as "litigating positions," that is, positions
asserted by agencies in the course of litigation as opposed to during for-

mal adjudications or rulemakings.

°

Despite marginally increasing judicial workload, the Court might
ensure better, more accurate administrative decisionmaking by adopting
a careful case-specific analysis of the factors bearing on the propriety of
33. See, e.g., Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 843-44 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. Rav. 2071, 2119-20 (1990).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 36-40.
35. Cf MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 70-79 (1988) (explaining that courts overrule precedent when decisions applying it follow "jagged" path).
36. 112 S.Ct. 841 (1992).
37. See id. at 847-48 (relying upon Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S.
Ct. 2759, 2768 (1990)).
38. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609-11 (1991) (overruling two- and
four-year old precedents and emphasizing that "when governing decisions are unworkable or
are badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent'" in constitutional cases) (citation omitted). But cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-12
(1992) (plurality opinion) (refusing on stare decisis grounds to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)). Retired Justice Powell even felt it necessary at one time to lecture the Rehnquist
Court on the importance of adherence to precedent. See The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Stare Decisis and JudicialRestraint,44 REc. B.A. CITY OF N.Y. 813, 814-23 (1989).
39. See Scalia, supra note 31, at 519.
40. See, ag., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 111 S.Ct. 1171,
1179 (1991); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988).
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deference to an agency decision. The proper question is whether a particular decision by a specific agency merits deference. Agency decisions
may differ in a number of salient ways. Rather than adopt crude presumptions, the Court should look to the features of the particular statute
interpreted and applied by the agency in determining the proper degree
of deference to afford an agency decision. 4 1 Because impartial decisionmaking is a critical ingredient in ensuring procedural fairness to the individual affected, any traces of partiality should bear heavily on whether to
defer to an agency decision.4 2 In addition, the nature of the rights implicated by the decision, as well as the likelihood of harm caused by error in
decisionmaking, should be considered pertinent when determining the
scope of review.43 Common sense suggests that a decision affecting life
and liberty interests, such as deportation, should receive more scrutiny
that those involving more mundane matters, such as a rate-setting
decision.
By weighing such characteristics of the agency decision, rigorous
judicial review might be reserved for administrative action that demands
the most careful scrutiny. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, perhaps because of the time and costs of such review, and the litigation that might
result from the uncertainty generated about whether the particular
agency decision warrants deference," generally refuses to consider such
factors when determining the degree of review that an agency decision
deserves.
41. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.

607, 652-58 (1980) (plurality opinion).
42. See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-80
(1975); see, eg., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) ("Not only is a biased deci-

sionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but 'our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.' ") (citation omitted); see also Sunstein, supra note 33,
at 2101 (suggesting that the rule of deference to agency decisions should not apply when
agency bias is present).

43. See Friendly, supra note 42, at 1295-98 (proposing that individual interests at stake be
evaluated in determining due process hearing requirements and stating that a deportation deci-

sion raises interests of the highest magnitude); see also St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 38, 52 (1936) ("[To say that ...
[agency] findings of fact may be made
conclusive where constitutional rights of liberty and property are involved... is to place those

rights at the mercy of administrative officials and seriously to impair the security inherent in
our judicial safeguards."); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures,31 UCLA L.
REv. 1141, 1149-53 (1984) [hereinafter Verkuil, Immigration Procedures](discussing high val-

uation of individual interests implicated by immigration, specifically denaturalization, deportation, and refugee, decisions).

44. See infra text accompanying notes 79-129.
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SELECTIVE USE OF THE PLAIN MEANING APPROACH

45
Dean Guido Calabresi's A Common Law for the Age of Statutes
marked a renaissance in academic interest in the methods employed by
courts in the interpretation of statutes.46 The Supreme Court also has

shown a renewed interest in the subject. Without attempting to analyze
the voluminous commentary on the subject or articulate a general theory
of statutory interpretation, this section outlines the contours of the ongo-

ing debate within the Court.
In construing a statute, the Court in the past twenty years often has
not limited itself to scrutinizing the relevant language, but frequently has

delved into legislative history and purpose. 7 The stated hope often was
to discern the "Congressional intent" behind the law's enactment inorder to answer the interpretive question at hand.4 8 At other times, how-

ever, the Court has interpreted the language of the statute literally and
refused to explore further.49 The Justices generally have been inattentive
to whether the Court employed a consistent method of statutory
45. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
46. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Originalintent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 59, 64-66 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory

Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1544-55 (1987); Sunstein, supra note 22, at 405.
Indeed, a casebook,

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 569-828 (1988),
and a Department of Justice report, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL-USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A REEVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

(1989), have been released on the subject. The debate within the Supreme Court about the

proper mode of statutory interpretation even made the front page of the New York Times, see
Robert Pear, With Rights Act Comes Fight to Clarify Congress'sIntent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
1991, at Al, and was the subject of Congressional hearings, see Hearingbefore the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Property,and the Administrationof Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Statutory Interpretationand the Uses of Legislative History, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 333 (1988) ("Because Congress employed somewhat broad and open-ended language [in the statute], we turn briefly to the legislative history . . . ."); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-43 (1987) (employing

numerous devices, including legislative history, congressional purpose, and international law,
in interpreting Refugee Act).

48. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 1089 (1992) ("Turning first to congressional intent .... ); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738
(1985) ("[O]ur task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue.");
see also Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 52, 60 (1812) (Marshall, C.J.) ("In construing these laws, it ...[is] the duty of the court to effect the intention of
the legislature."); POSNER, supra note 22, at 286-93 (advocating similar intent theory). But see
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, StatutoryInterpretation as PracticalReasoning,
42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 325-32 (1990) (summarizing arguments challenging intentionalism).
Professor Aleinikoff aptly refers to this as the "archeological" approach. See T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21 (1988).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 109-10 (1985) (interpreting literally the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458
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interpretation. 50

Exhibiting similar ambivalence, the Rehnquist Court has argued
about the proper approach to statutory interpretation. Some Justices,
particularly Justices Stevens5 1 and Blackmun, 52 and sometimes Justice

White,

3

tend to follow the more traditional approach of considering the

law's legislative history as well as the purpose underlying its enactment.
Less inclined than other Justices to find the meaning of the text to be
"plain," this group weighs all available evidence in interpreting a statute.

In stark contrast, Justice Scalia is an outspoken advocate of the

"plain meaning" approach, a descendant of the literalist method. He interprets statutes by the plain meaning of the text, which may be clarified

by other provisions of the law.54 Justice Scalia rejects attempts to discern
Congressional "intent" through consideration of sources other than the
text of the statute.5 This view is consistent with his sometimes strict
U.S. 564, 574-77 (1982) (interpreting literally statute obligating owner of vessel to pay wages to
seaman).
50. See Eskridge, OverridingSupreme CourtDecisions, supra note 22, at 373-77 (concluding from empirical study that during 1977-83 Terms, Court took eclectic approach to statutory
interpretation with preference for plain meaning approach); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Statutory Obsolescence and the JudicialProcess: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal
Banking Regulation, 85 MIcH. L. Rav. 672, 730 (1987) ("[C]ourts do not adhere to a maxim
of literalism with enough consistency to grant it any sort of overriding legitimacy as a neutral
principle."); David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring StatutoryInterpretation
Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 388-95 (1992) (discussing Court decisions
reflecting inconsistent use of legislative history); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in
Statutory Interpretation,70 TEX. L. REv.1073, 1136 (1992) (empirical study covering period
of 1890 to 1990 reaching similar conclusion as Professor Eskridge).
51. See, eg., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2055 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (claiming that Court failed to "carefully examin[e] the language, structure, and
history" of statute); Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S.Ct. 820, 834 (1992) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (advocating interpretation of Voting Rights Act based on its "central purpose");
see infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
52. See, eg., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2604 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing plain meaning approach taken by majority and claiming
that Court should weigh "history, structure, and policies," as well as context of law in its
interpretation); see infra text accompanying notes 360-70 (discussing Justice Blackmun's dissent in Ardestani v. INS, 112 S.Ct. 515 (1991)).

53. See infra text accompanying notes 66-68 (discussing Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v,
Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991)).
54. See, e.g., Morales, 112 S.Ct. at 2036 (Scalia, J.); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123-27 (1989) (Scalia, J.); United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
55. See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 112 S.Ct. 683, 693-94 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (following plain meaning of statute even
though result was in conflict with federal Indian policy); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S.
174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("Committee reports, floor speeches,
and even colloquies between Congressmen are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text
of a law and its presentment to the President.") (citations omitted); see also Hirschey v. Fed-
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adherence to separation of powers principles:5 6 Congress passes laws,
not legislative history or purposes.5 7 Besides the absence of bicameral
approval, legislative history is subject to scorn from plain meaning adherents because it is easily manipulated for partisan ends. 58 Deviation from
the statutory text is appropriate only when a literal interpretation would
render an "absurd" result 5 9 Along with Justice Scalia, Chief Justice
eral Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (stating similar views); Scalia, supra note 31, at 517 (arguing that "quest for...
legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase [because] Congress [probably] didn't think
about the matter at all").
56. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 425-26 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 709-10 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. See, e.g., Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2168 (1992) (Scalia, J.);
West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (1991) (Scalia, J.); Green v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment);
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324-25 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); see also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment) ("[O]nly a small proportion of the Members of Congress read either
one of the Committee Reports in question .... [T]he cases were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst ... at the suggestion of a lawyerlobbyist ... ."); Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History, 12-18 (delivered between fall, 1985 and spring, 1986 at various law schools) (on file with North Carolina Law
Review Association) (arguing against use of legislative history in interpreting statutes).
Justice Scalia's rejection of legislative history has been much discussed and almost as

frequently questioned. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. Rv. 845, 861-74 (1992); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note
22, at 666-85; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REv. 423, 452-69 (1988); William D. Popkin, An "Internal"Critiqueof Justice Scalia's

Theory of Statutory Interpretation,76 MINN. L. REv. 1133, 1135-38 (1992); Patricia M. Wald,
The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use ofLegislative History in ConstruingStatutes in the 1988-89 Term
of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 282-86 (1990); Zeppos, supra note
22, at 1303-35; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 262-69

(1990) (discussing "the plain meaning fallacy"); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the
PrimaryOfficial with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretationand the Problem ofLegislative History, 66 CHL-KENT L. REV. 321, 322 (1990) (arguing that because some politics is a
desired part of administrative decisionmaking, legislative history should appropriately be considered by agencies interpreting statutes). For an interesting discussion of how Justice Scalia's
formalistic approach to the interpretation of texts may have been influenced by his father, a
Romance Linguistics professor, and by his Catholic upbringing, see George Kannar, The ConstitutionalCatechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1309-20 (1990).
58. See Slawson, supra note 50, at 383-84; see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations
on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214
(1982) (quoting Judge Leventhal's observation that use of legislative history is similar to "looking over a crowd and picking out your friends").
59. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989);
Green, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
The Supreme Court, after transmitting to Congress an amendment to a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure with an obviously erroneous cross reference to a non-existent subsection of a
rule, might find it necessary to invoke the absurdity canon to rescue its own handiwork. See
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63
62
Rehnquist,' Justices Kennedy,61 Thomas, and sometimes O'Connor
and Souter, 64 follow the plain meaning approach.
Of course, plain meaning interpretation is not the exclusive method
employed by the Rehnquist Court. For myriad reasons, including interest in, or importance of, the issues to the Court, some statutory issues
may not be relatively easily resolved through plain meaning interpretation. Consequently, one would expect there to be some inconsistency in
Gene R. Shreve, Eighteen Feet of Clay: Thoughts on Phantom Rule 4(m), 67 IND. L.J. 85, 8693 (1991) (describing error and correction).
60. See, eg., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982); Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 109 (1980).
61. See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2596-97 (1992);
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1401-02 (1992); Public
Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audobon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1413-14 (1992);
Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 112 S. Ct. 1021, 1025-27 (1992); Molzof v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
711, 715 (1992); see also United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329, 1341-42 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment) (criticizing plurality for considering legislative
history). For example, in disregarding a canon of statutory construction that "courts should
disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous" and refusing to consider
legislative history, Justice Thomas emphasized:
[Canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine
the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn
first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says there ....
When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
this first canon is also the last: "judicial inquiry is complete."
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (citations omitted); see also
infra text accompanying notes 371-76 (discussing selective use of canons by Rehnquist Court).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 337-59 (discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion for
Court in Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515 (1991)). But see Gade v. National Solid Wastes

Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2382 (1992) (O'Connor, J.) (" 'To discern Congress' intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute.' ") (citations omitted); infra notes 360-61 and accompanying text (discussing Sullivan v.
Hudson, 490 U.S. 877 (1989)).
64. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633-40 (1992).
Justice Souter, however, is willing in some circumstances to consider legislative history, see,
e.g., United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329, 1334-38 (1992) (Souter, J.) (plurality opinion),
and the common law, see, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 1349
(1992), in interpreting statutes. Indeed, he and Justice Scalia have debated the propriety of
looking to legislative history in a manner suggesting that Justice Souter may not belong in the
plain meaning camp at all. Compare United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct.
2102, 2109 n.8 (1992) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging Justice Scalia's criticism of use of
legislative history and claiming that many, including Justice Frankfurter, relied on it in interpreting statutes) with id. at 2111 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (criticizing reliance on
legislative history and noting that the plurality "resorts to that last hope of lost interpretive
causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction, legislative history"). For a
general examination of Justice Souter's opinions interpreting statutes as a New Hampshire
Supreme Court Justice, see William S. Jordan, III, Justice David Souter and StatutoryInterpretation, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 491, 495-530 (1992).
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the Court's interpretive approach, and there is.65 Consider two examples
from the October, 1990 term.
In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,66 the Court, in an opinion
by Justice White, held that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act does not preempt the regulation of pesticides by local governments. While finding the legislative history on the subject not to be
dispositive,6 7 Justice White emphasized that
[a]s for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common
sense suggests that inquiry benefitsfrom reviewing additionalinformation rather than ignoring it. As Chief Justice Marshall
put it, "[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the
legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived."
Legislative history materialsare not generally so misleading that
juristsshould never employ them in a goodfaith effort to discern
legislative intent. Our precedents demonstrate that the Court's
practice of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past.
We suspect
that the practice will likewise reach well into the
future. 68
Although agreeing that local law was not preempted, Justice Scalia
argued that the plain meaning of the statute answered the question,
thereby ending the inquiry. 69 It was irrelevant that the legislative history, in his view, clearly favored the conclusion that federal law did preempt local regulation.70 He further proclaimed that "extensive use [of
legislative history was] a very recent phenomenon." 7 1
65. See, e.g., Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2110 (sharply divided Court in
which no one opinion commanded majority, but five Justices agreed that statute was suffi-

ciently ambiguous to require application of "rule of lenity"); see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 815-32 (1982) (arguing that, as sug-

gested by Arrow's Theorem, inconsistency in Court's decisions is inevitable result of institutional nature of Court, particularly voting by Justices); supra text accompanying notes 34-40

(recognizing similar phenomenon with respect to Chevron deference). Compare INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 551, 555-58 (1991) (deviating from plain
meaning approach) with INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 814-17 (1992) (following plain
meaning approach)); compare Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520-21 (1991) (interpreting
literally the Equal Access to Justice Act) with Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 887-88 (1989)

(interpreting same act in light of statute's purpose).
66. 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991).
67. See id. at 2484.
68. Id. at 2484-85 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
69. See id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
70. See id. at 2487 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
71. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R.
Brann, Use of LegislativeHistories by the UnitedStates Supreme Court: A StatisticalAnalysis, 9

J.LEGIS. 282, 284-90 (1987) (showing increased use of legislative history in interpretation of
statutes over time through statistical study of Court's decisions from 1938 to 1979), and Wald,
supra note 58, at 196-97).

430

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

In contrast, the Court in West Virginia University Hospitals,Inc. v.
Casey,7 2 in an opinion by Justice Scalia, refused to consider legislative
history and statutory purpose and held that the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 73 which permits the award of "a reasonable
attorney's fee" in civil rights cases, did not permit the recovery of expert
witness fees. As one would expect in an opinion written by a plain meaning devotee, the majority emphasized that
[t]he best evidence of... purpose is the statutory text adopted
by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President.
Where that contains a phrase that is unambiguous-that has a
clearly accepted meaning in both legislative and judicial practice-we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the

statements of individual legislators
or committees during the
74

course of the enactment process.

Finding that the legislative history and statutory purpose mandated

a contrary result, Justice Stevens dissented. 75 He pointed out that Congress had been forced to "overrule" a number of the Court's plain meaning decisions" and further contended that
[i]n the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the
master. It obviously has the power to correct our mistakes, but
we do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress' actualpurpose and require it "to take
72. 111 S.Ct. 1138 (1991).
73. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991). Ironically, Congress passed the law in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240 (1975), which limited the federal courts' power, absent statutory authorization, to
award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5911.
74. Casey, 111 S.Ct. at 1147 (citations omitted).
75. See id. at 1149, 1151-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Blackmun
joined Justice Stevens in his dissent. Id. at 1149 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf John Paul Stevens,
The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 13, 21-38 (1992) (criticizing
original intent approach to constitutional interpretation).
76. See Casey, 111 S.Ct. at 1153-55 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (listing six instances); see also
Eskridge, OverridingSupreme Court Decisions, supra note 22, at 347 (empirical study showing
that in over 25% of cases in which Congress acted to "override" Supreme Court decisions
from 1967 to 1990, it was done to counter a plain meaning interpretation of statute). Indeed,
Congress "overruled" Casey in part. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 113,
105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs
of Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v.
Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 706-13 (1992)
(arguing that Casey incorrectly ignored context and purpose of statute). The Civil Rights Act
of 1991, as illustrated by its language and its legislative history, responded to a number of
Supreme Court civil rights decisions, particularly Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989), which overruled well-settled precedent. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-45
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 561-83.
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the time to revisit the matter" and to restate its purpose in more
precise English whenever its work product suffers from an
omission or inadvertent error."
In sum, although evidence of growing adherence to plain meaning
interpretation by the Rehnquist Court exists, the approach has been employed selectively. As we shall see, the Court continued this practice last
term.78
IV. DEFERENCE, PLAIN MEANING, AND OTHER RESPONSES OF THE
REHNQUIST COURT TO THE "CASELOAD CRISIS" IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS

The development of the deference and plain meaning doctrines is

emblematic of the Rehnquist Court's approach to bodies of law spanning
the legal spectrum. Besides increasing in number in recent years, agency
decisions frequently raise complex issues that, if carefully scrutinized by

a reviewing court, would require immersion in bulky records.7 9 Chevron
deference effectively creates a presumption in favor of the agency. The
presumption allows appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, to
dispose of complicated agency decisions easily. 0 By tending to ease the
rigors of judicial review, the presumption may reduce the heavy caseload
of the federal courts. As Justice Scalia has observed, "Chevron . . . replaced [a] statute-by-statute evaluation (which was assuredly a font of un77. Casey, l1l S. Ct. at 1155 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted);
see also Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1150 & n.1 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("Whenever there is some uncertainty about the meaning of a statute,
it is prudent to examine its legislative history" which "helps to illuminate [statutory] purposes.") (footnote omitted); John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. RaV. 1373, 1381 (1992) ("If you are desperate, or even if you just believe it
may shed some light on the issue, consult the legislative history.").
78. See infra text accompanying notes 213-449.
79. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of JudicialReview in England
and the United States, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 643 (1986) (noting "staggering volume
of claims decided by" administrative agencies causing "delay and expense" and adding
thousands of "cases to the workload of" federal courts); Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with
the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy,or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REv. 766,
770-71 (1983) (observing "increasingly technical, complex nature" of agency decisions reviewed by courts of appeals and that "[miany of these time-consuming cases involve records
with thousands of pages, multiple issues, and numerous parties").
80. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resourcesfor JudicialReview of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1121 (1987) ("Chevron ... can be seen as a device for managing the courts of appeals
that can reduce (although not eliminate) the Supreme Court's need to police their decisions for
accuracy."); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory, 80

GEo. L.J. 671, 680 (1992) ("[T]he standard of judicial deference reflected in Chevron may be
consistent with the public interest because it helps to limit the delays often associated with
judicial review of agency rulemakng.").
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certainty and litigation) with an across-the-board presumption that, in
case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant."8 1

Similarly, although plain meaning statutory interpretation arguably
creates clearer, more predictable rules,82 it may be attractive to the Rehnquist Court for other reasons infrequently articulated. In response to the

increase in the federal judicial workload, some Justices apparently desire
rules that not only discourage litigation, but also avoid requiring judges
to become experts in esoteric statutory schemes. By limiting inquiry to
the statutory language, a plain meaning rule expedites the Court's inter-

pretive process, reduces conflict among Justices, and facilitates decision
in a set of cases perceived to be mundane or trivial by the deci-

sionmakers.83 Consistent with this theory, Chief Justice Rehnquist, then

an Associate Justice, advocated that a separate court be established to
relieve an overworked
Supreme Court of the burden of interpreting fed84
statutes.
eral
81. Scalia, supra note 31, at 516 (emphasis added).
82. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 787-88 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia has emphasized, deviation from plain meaning interpretation "renders these principles less secure and the certainty they are designed to achieve less attainable. When a
seemingly clear provision can be pronounced 'ambiguous'... , and when the assumption of
uniform meaning is replaced by 'one-subsection-at-a-time' interpretation, innumerable statutory texts become worth litigating." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also City of Burlington v.
Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2643 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (rejecting multiplier in awarding attorneys'
fees under environmental statute in part to "avoid[ ] burdensome satellite litigation" in which
fee award would be "more unpredictable, and hence more litigable"); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins.
Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2180 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that legal "standard [adopted
by Court] will be a fertile source of uncertainty and (hence) litigation"); cf Doggett v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2700 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Our constitutional law has become
ever more complex in recent decades. That is, in itself, a regrettable development, for the law
draws force from the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application.").
83. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the CoordinatingFunction of Plain
Meaning, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 231, 254-55; Strauss, supra note 80, at 1095, 1117; see also
Scalia, supra note 57, at 14 (claiming that one "disadvantage of legislative history ... is the
inordinately high expense of its use" that "on a frequently amended statute can take hundreds
of hours of research"). This economy and efficiency argument sometimes shifts its focus to the
costs to lawyers and clients of reviewing legislative history in litigating a law's interpretation.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFCE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 46, at 52; Kenneth W.
Starr, ObservationsAbout the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 377.
84. See Justice William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1986) [hereinafter Rehnquist, Changing Role] (advocating that
Supreme Court surrender to national court of appeals jurisdiction over "run-of-the-mine statutory construction cases"). In a related vein, Justice Scalia lamented that, unlike the past, the
federal courts presently are filled with " 'minor' and 'routine' cases about 'mundane' matters of
'less import' or even 'overwhelming triviality.' " Marc S. Galanter, The Life and Times of the
Big Six; Or, The FederalCourtsSince the Good OldDays, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 921, 922 (quoting
Justice Scalia, Remarks Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the National

Bar Council of Bar Presidents, New Orleans, LA. (Feb. 15, 1987)); see also Robert H. Bork,
Dealing With the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 237 (1976) (referring to the
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As this explanation of the deference and plain meaning doctrines

might suggest, the Court often resorts to default principles that, over the
long run, operate to reduce the workload of the federal judiciary by eas-

ing disposal of, and sometimes eliminating, the "ordinary" and "trivial"
case. 5 Ideological forces, such as the individual Justice's views concerning federalism, separation of powers, and the federal judiciary as a poli-

cymaker, obviously influence its results.86 Nonetheless, the overall
impact of the Court's doctrinal approaches in a variety of substantive

areas should not be ignored. This is particularly true in light of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's long campaign to convince Congress to restrict federal jurisdiction in order to remedy the "crisis" of an increasingly un-

manageable caseload.8 7 This campaign and the concomitant ascendance

"enormous amount of litigation" in federal courts that raise issues which are "in large measure
legal trivia").
85. There is, of course, enough play in the joints so that the Court may remove a case
from the default category. That helps explain some of the inconsistencies in the Court's deference and plain meaning decisions. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40 and 66-77.
86. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 52-129 (1990) (discussing such ideological factors).
87.

See, eag., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1991 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JU-

DICIARY 3, 6-7 (1992) [hereinafter REHNQUIST, 1991 REPORT] (discussing "caseload crisis [in]

the federal courts" and advocating limitations on diversity and other jurisdiction, habeas
corpus "reforms" to "eliminat[e] repetitive and time-intensive demands on the federal courts,"
and "self-restraint in adding new federal causes of action"); Paul Marcotte, Rehnquist: Cut
Jurisdiction,A.B.A. J., April 1989; at 22 (reporting that in a speech to the ABA House of
Delegates, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that because the system is overloaded, Congress
should restrict federal jurisdiction); Rehnquist, ChangingRoles, supranote 84, at 1 (discussing
"crisis" of overcrowded Supreme Court docket); William H. Rehnquist, A Pleafor Help: Solutions to the Serious Problems Currently Experienced by the Federal JudicialSystem, 28 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1, 2 (1984) [hereinafter Rehnquist, A Pleafor Help] (expressing concern with
caseload of federal courts).
Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically has warned:
Unless actions are taken to reverse current trends, or slow them down considerably,
the federal courts of the future will be dramatically changed.... Judges will have less
time to spend on individual cases; bureaucratization and increased management
strictures will leave the judges less freedom to exercise personal judgment. These
circumstances will lead judges to have less of a sense of personal responsibility and
accountability for the work they produce. Unless checked, the result will be a degradation in the high quality of justice the nation has long expected of the federal courts.
REHNQUIST, 1991 REPORT, supra, at 3. Increasing workload is a consistent theme in Chief
Justice Rehnquist's annual reports on the federal judiciary. See id.; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,
1990 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC.
S1331 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1991) [hereinafter REHNQUIST, 1990 REPORT]; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1989 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3-4 (1990) [hereinafter REHNQUIST, 1989 REPORT]; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1988 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
JUDICIARY 1-3 (1989); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1987 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 4, 7 (1988); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1986 YEAR-END STATEMENT 5-6 (1987). He has
gone so far as to suggest a study of replacing mandatory review by courts of appeals of lower
court decisions with discretionary review similar to the system in place in the Supreme Court.
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of the deference and plain meaning doctrines hardly seem coincidental.

In addition to Chief Justice Rehnquist, prominent observers88 and
the executive branch

9

have been abuzz for a number of years about the

so-called "litigation explosion" and the need for reform. They claim
that, unless steps are taken to reduce significantly the workload, the quality of the federal judiciary and its work product inevitably will diminish.9" Such concerns stand in stark contrast to the one-time conventional

wisdom that easy access to the federal courts, 91 and the accompanying92
increase in litigation, particularly reform-minded public law litigation,

represented a positive evolution in the American judicial system. One
legacy of the Warren Court, which generally expanded the scope of con-

stitutional and other rights, was an increase in litigation. 93 On the other
hand, the Rehnquist Court generally has limited rights, thereby tending
See Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal
Courts, Kastenmeier Lecture at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 27-28 (Sept. 15, 1992)
(on file with North Carolina Law Review Association).
88. See, ag., REPORT OF THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMM. 4-10 (1990) (describing "crisis" in federal court system due to trebling in caseload between 1958 and 1988); POSNER, Supra

note 22, at 59-166 (claiming that absent improvements, rapid growth in federal court caseload
to "crisis" proportions will harm justice system). But see Galanter, supra note 84, at 946
(examining period 1960 to 1986 and explaining that while there has been an increase in court
filings of certain categories of lawsuits, filings in other categories have fallen significantly); Jack
B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to
Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1901, 1909 (1989) (asserting that "the truth about
the 'litigation explosion' is that it is a weapon of perception, not of substance").
Acknowledging some need for change, Congress passed the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 5089, which, among other changes,
implemented some relatively uncontroversial recommendations of the Federal Courts Study
Committee. See John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of FederalJurisdiction
and Venue: The JudicialImprovements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735,
748, 763, 774-75 (1991). Congress, however, has declined to enact more far-reaching recommendations, including a call to curtail significantly federal jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988), which some estimate would reduce the federal
caseload by as much as 25%. See REPORT OF THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra, at 3842.
89. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 1, 9 (1991) (report of committee chaired by Vice President Quayle) (concluding that increase in litigation adversely affected economy and proposing reforms to
"reduc[e] unnecessary burdens on federal courts").
90. See supra notes 88-89 (citing sources).
91. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark, J.) (noting
the liberal pleading requirements under the "new rules of civil procedure").
92. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (discussing rise in public law litigation).
93. See REPORT OF THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 88, at 5 ("The causes
[for the increase in federal court caseload] are not fully understood but certainly include the
continued growth of federal law and in particular the creation of many new federal rights both
by Congress and by judicial interpretation ....); POSNER, supra note 22, at 80-81 (noting that
part of "litigation explosion" in federal courts was due to judicial creation of "private rights of
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to reduce litigation. 94 One important distinction between these two
Courts, woven into more frequently discussed ideological differences, is

their respective views about the nature, value, and costs of litigation.
A separate and somewhat independent factor also may be at work in
moving the Rehnquist Court to default principles. As some commentators have posited, 95 the federal judiciary simply cannot understand with
sufficient detail the myriad, particularized statutory schemes passed in
the post-New Deal era's "orgy of statute making."96 In light of their
workload and the ever-growing number of laws, lower court judges may
lack the time or inclination to consult lengthy legislative histories to
learn in detail the policies and purposes underlying the teeming array of
complex, technical statutes passed by Congress.97
action under federal statutes" and the Supreme Court's "broad interpretations of" various
statutes and the Constitution).
94. See POSNER, supra note 57, at 218 (noting that the more liberal Warren Court generally expanded rights, while the more conservative Burger and Rehnquist Courts usually narrowed rights). The Rehnquist Court's pruning of civil rights claims under § 1983 is a good
example. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see, eg., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct.
1061, 1071 (1992) (refusing to allow § 1983 claim based on fatal injury to municipal employee); Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286, 289 (1991) (per curiam) (holding that immunity
protected state court judge who allegedly ordered police officers to assault public defender); see
also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 91 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The staggering effect
of § 1983 claims upon the workload of the federal courts has been decried time and again. The
torrent of frivolous [§ 1983] claims ... threatens to incapacitate the judicial system's resolution of claims where true injustice is involved; those claims ... are in a very real danger of
being lost in a sea of meritless suits.").
The concern with litigation may have influenced a relatively conservative Court to refuse
to extend property rights in a manner that might have given rise to increased claims based on
the "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522,
1534 (1992); cf Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (1992) (rejecting constitutional
challenge to California's Proposition 13, a potential source of many challenges to numerous
provisions of federal and state tax laws, despite resulting gross disparities in property taxes
paid on similar properties). But cf Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,
2890-92 (1992) (holding that absolute ban on development that makes real property worthless
might constitute a "taking").
95. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 83, at 253-54.
96. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977). It is therefore understandable why, as perusal of a recent issue of the Supreme Court Review indicates, academics
frequently find it easy to criticize the Court's interpretation of those laws. See, eg., John H.
Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 207, 208-09 (arguing that
Supreme Court grossly misapplied the law in ERISA litigation).
97. See Schauer, supra note 83, at 253-54 (arguing that increased complexity of law necessitates reliance on canons of construction); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REv. 647, 658-59
(1992) (The Court's "increasing reliance on the canons (of statutory construction] is an inevitable consequence of the increasing technical complexity of the law. The justices must justify
their decisions in some way. Their inability to master the details of every area of law that
comes before them makes reliance on a generic decision-generating device such as the canons
inevitable.").
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Similarly, the law and facts involved in reviewing agency action frequently are so complicated as to render it prohibitively difficult and timeconsuming to evaluate the agency's decision. While the statutes administered by agencies implicate the same costs presented in interpreting other

laws, the technical basis for many agency decisions further complicates
matters. Deference under such circumstances is roughly consistent with
the traditional view that judges should not substitute their judgment for
that of the "expert" agency.9 8
By establishing firm presumptions, the Supreme Court may be indirectly assisting in docket management. 99 Once a case is placed in the
"agency decision" category, Chevron's logic means that deference generally is warranted. Lengthy agency proceedings, as well as the complex,
technical basis for some rulings, may be given short shrift. The specifics
of the matter under scrutiny often are of marginal relevance. Time may
be saved and thus cases decided in an expeditious manner. Similarly, the
plain meaning rule obviates the need for the courts to delve deeper than
the black letter of the law in question. To decide a significant number of
cases, the lower courts must learn nothing more about a statute than the
literal language. Broader purposes and policies or lengthy legislative histories need not be consulted.
Judges concerned with efficiency prompted by the case management
movement 00 probably would be eager for a quick, yet apparently objective, method for disposing of the less interesting, less value-laden, and
often complicated portion of their docket. 1 ' Grand ideological debate
simply does not center, for example, on whether a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure allows a law firm to be sanctioned for a partner's misconduct, ' 2 or whether the Secretary of the Army may decline to issue a
permit to build an addition to a coastline unless a state agrees that construction will be deemed as not altering the location of the federal-state
98. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2524, 2534 (1991) (asserting
that deference to agency interpretations is the proper role of the judiciary); Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 645-47 (1990) (recognizing expertise of agencies); see
also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10-12 (1938) (claiming that govern-

mental regulation of industry should not be based on politics).
99. Bright line rules also tend to discourage judicial policymaking. See Nicholas S.Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "'New" Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1619
(1991).
100. See generally Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (discussing the propriety of case management by the federal judiciary).
101. See Macey & Miller, supra note 97, at 671 (noting that statutory "canons provide
useful tools for judges who have no views on a particular issue").
102. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123-24 (1989)
(interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in accordance with plain meaning principles).
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boundary. 11 3 One also might expect courts with fairly strong ideological
inclinations to pursue doctrines that facilitate quicker resolution of the
ordinary case. To focus on the cases raising significant ideological issues,
a judge must minimize time spent on the run-of-the-mill case.
Let us consider this hypothesis for a moment. The Supreme Court
accepted fewer cases for review in the October 1991 term than in the
recent past. 1 04 Some of these cases, such as the relatively large number of
bankruptcy 0 5 and immigration"0 6 decisions, clearly lack the ideological
spark generated by such volatile issues as First Amendment rights, abortion, and affirmative action. Assuming some rationality in case selection, 11 7 the Court's decision in these cases may represent an effort to
expand the deference and plain meaning doctrines to these isolated substantive areas in order to limit litigation and appeals, ease the decisionmaking process under complicated statutory and regulatory regimes, and
reduce judicial workload."0 8 If lower courts must presumptively defer to
administrative action, fewer individuals will pursue judicial review of
103. See United States v. Alaska, 112 S. Ct. 1606, 1610, 1619 (1992) (applying Chevron and
deferring to agency interpretation of Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899).
104. See supra text accompanying note 4. The Court generally has discretion to decide

which cases to review, see 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988), a power it often exercises to resolve a
conflict between decisions of the courts of appeals. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 277-79 (1991) (concluding that circuit split is a significant factor in determining whether Court grants certiorari).
Obviously, a conflict between courts does not necessarily mean that the issue raised is interesting or important.

105. See infra note 115 (citing bankruptcy cases). This may have something to do with the
Chief Justice's observations about the significant increase in bankruptcy filings in recent years.
See REHNQUIST, 1991 REPORT, supra note 87, at 11 (noting 23% increase in personal and 7%
increase in business bankruptcy filings in 1991); REHNQUIST, 1990 REPORT, supra note 87

(noting 14% increase in personal and 3% increase in business bankruptcy filings in 1990);
REHNQUIST, 1989 REPORT, supra note 8, at 3 ("The more complex and time-consuming civil

cases continued to increase. In bankruptcy courts, filings rose by more than 8 percent to a
record level . .

").

106. See infra text accompanying notes 213-449 (discussing Court's recent immigration
decisions). The Supreme Court also granted certiorari in two immigration cases to be decided
next term. See Catholic Social Servs., Inc. v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914, 921-23 (9th Cir.)
(rejecting the INS's interpretation of amnesty provisions of Immigration Reform and Control
Act), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2990 (1992); Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 942 F.2d
1352, 1362-64 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (invalidating INS regulation that required detention of
immigrant children unless adult relative or legal guardian assumed custody), cert.granted, 112
S. Ct. 1261 (1992).
107. For a recent study of the certiorari process that throws doubt on this assumption, see
PERRY, supra note 104, at 216-77 (noting difficulties in evaluating whether Court will grant
certiorari in an individual case and suggesting that Court may not pay as careful attention to
certiorari decisions as might be expected).
108. See Nancy Levit, The CaseloadConundrum, ConstitutionalRestraintand the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 321, 321-22 (1989) (arguing that some of
Court's decisions are influenced by quantity of litigation in federal courts).
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Similarly, if the language of the statute almost al-

ways dictates its interpretation, fewer litigants will file lawsuits, or base
appeals, on extra-textual materials. 110

In civil cases, the Rehnquist Court appears bent on establishing and
following rules that tend to discourage litigation. For example, the

Court has imposed limits on standing and other justiciability doctrines
that effectively reduce federal litigation.'

This is not an entirely new

phenomenon. For example, the Burger Court stressed that, under the
deferential clearly erroneous standard of review, district court fact find-

ings rarely should be reversed and thus are less likely to be appealed." 2
The Court's jurisprudence in particular substantive areas also shows
its inclination to reduce litigation. The Court, for example, recently narrowed the claims that plaintiffs may bring under certain federal securities

laws,"23 which some (including then-Justice Rehnquist) have claimed are
109. See supra text accompanying notes 23-44; see also Maurice Rosenberg, Standards of
Review, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 30, 30-31 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (assessing impact of review standards in deterring hopeless appeals to Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 45-78. Justice Scalia highlighted this point in concurring in the Court's unanimous rejection of legislative history and policy arguments that
conflicted with the bankruptcy code's "plain meaning":
It is regrettable that we have a legal culture in which such arguments have to be
addressed (and are indeed credited by a Court of Appeals), with respect to a statute
utterly devoid of language that could remotely be thought to [support the position
advocated]. Since there was here no contention of a "scrivener's error" producing an
absurd result, the plain text of the statuteshould have made this litigation unnecessary
and unmaintainable.
Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 534 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see
also Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250-51 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (making
similar comments).
111. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2146 (1992) (holding that
environmental organizations lacked standing); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct.
3177, 3185, 3194 (1990) (same); see also Abram Chayes, Foreword: PublicLaw Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56-60 (1982) (discussing how limits on standing and
other doctrines tend to reduce public law litigation); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and PublicLaw Litigation: Note on the Jurisprudenceof Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 74-75 (1984) (claiming that Burger Court misused standing and equitable restraint doctrines in effort to restrict public law litigation).
112. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-90 (1982) (holding that discriminatory intent is a finding of fact, not a legal conclusion, and is only to be disturbed if clearly
erroneous). But cf Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984) (holding that
the constitutional requirement of "actual malice" in libel cases was reviewable de novo).
113. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,
2782 (1991) (applying relatively short limitations period to implied right of action under
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of Securities Exchange Act); Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,
111 S. Ct. 2749, 2755, 2764-66 (1991) (holding that shareholder failed to establish causation of
damages by misrepresentations and omissions necessary to establish implied right of action
under § 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 of Securities Exchange Act).
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an abusive form of litigation instigated by plaintiffs' attorneys seeking to
secure fees from settlements.1 14 It also often has interpreted the bankruptcy code by focusing on the plain meaning of a hyper-technical statute, disregarding broader bankruptcy policies. 15 Similarly, ignoring the
broader purposes underlying the intricate web of regulation, the Court
has interpreted environmental laws by their plain meaning,116 invoked

Chevron to avoid the necessity of interpreting the law, 117 or limited envi-

118
ronmental groups' standing to sue.
A particularly telling example of an effort by the Court to reduce

litigation through procedural doctrine is its series of Rule 11 decisions
holding that district court judges have broad discretion in awarding sanctions and may be reversed only for abuse of that discretion. 9 Aside
114. See generallyJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Understandingthe Plaintiff'sAttorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 669-70 (1986) (describing how "private attorney generals"
enforce substantive law and how procedural rules that establish fee arrangements to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys foster this practice, which is especially common under federal antitrust and securities laws). Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged a number of years ago that,
because of the nuisance value of shareholder suits, a special potential exists for vexatious securities litigation. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J.).
115. See, eg., Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (1992); Taylor v. Freeland &
Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644, 1647-49 (1992); Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1391 (1992);
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992); United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1016 (1992); Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 531-33
(1991). But cf. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992) (noting that where text of statute
is ambiguous, basic bankruptcy policies become important). See generally Charles J. Tabb &
Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence
of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 823, 823-26 (1991) (discussing the Court's
unprecedented interest in bankruptcy cases-16 cases were decided in Rehnquist's first five
terms as Chief Justice-and arguing that plain meaning interpretation prevailed over bankruptcy policy).
116. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633-40 (1992).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 23-44.
118. See, eg., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2135-40, 2146 (1992).
119. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) ("[D]eference [to
district court Rule 11 decisions] will streamline the litigation process by freeing appellate
courts from the duty of reweighing evidence and reconsidering facts already weighed and considered by the district court; it will also discourage litigants from pursuing marginal appeals,
thus reducing the amount of satellite litigation."); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct.
1076, 1077-78 (1992) (holding that district court could impose Rule 11 sanctions in a case in
which it was later determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction); Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2136 (1991) (holding that district court had "inherent power"
to sanction litigant misconduct and that such sanctions are reviewed on appeal for abuse of
discretion); cf Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1730-32 (1992) (holding that court of
appeals incorrectly limited district court's power to dismiss complaint filed by prison inmates
alleging homosexual rape by inmates and prison officials); Zatko v. California, 112 S. Ct. 355,
356 (1991) (per curiam) (denying informa pauperisstatus to petitioners "who have repeatedly
abused the integrity of our process through frequent frivolous filings"). A desire to screen

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

from affording great power to the district courts to halt litigation abuse,

the deferential review standard necessarily reduces the number of appeals
because putative appellants realize that the chances for success are mini-

mal, thereby limiting "satellite litigation" over sanctions.12 Again, this
is consistent with the Berger Court's use of procedural doctrines to re-

duce litigation, such as the trilogy of decisions in 1986 that encouraged
use of summary judgment to screen factually insufficient claims before
trial. 121
The Rehnquist Court's criminal decisions reflect similar trends. It

has consistently limited the category of errors necessitating a new trial
for a criminal defendant.122 In severely restricting the right to habeas
corpus, the Court often emphasizes the need to reduce what it characterizes as frivolous, duplicative, and wasteful litigation. 2 3 In a much publifrivolous claims early in the process has led a number of courts to impose more exacting
pleading standards on certain categories of actions, including civil rights and securities fraud
suits. See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 440-44 (1986) (discussing this phenomenon), The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide the propriety of this practice in a civil
rights case. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
954 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2989 (1992).
120. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 404.
121. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); see also 10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2727, at 31 (Supp. 1992) ("Taken together the

three cases signal to the lower courts that summary judgment can be relied upon more so than
in the past to weed out frivolous lawsuits and avoid wasteful trials.") (footnote omitted). For a
thoughtful analysis of how so-called "procedural" developments such as the summary judgment decisions have reduced access to the courts for minorities under the guise of promoting
efficiency, see Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for
Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341 (1990).
122. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263-66 (1991) (holding that coerced confession was subject to harmless error rule on appeal and did not justify automatic
reversal of conviction); see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992)
(holding that federal agents' kidnapping of Mexican citizen in Mexico did not bar exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over person).
123. See, eg., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1718 (1992) (limiting habeas right
by overruling precedent and emphasizing that "[flederal habeas litigation ... places a heavy
burden on scarce judicial resources, may give litigants incentives to withhold claims for manipulative purposes, and may create disincentives to present claims when evidence is fresh") (citations omitted); id. at 1719 (arguing that judicial economy is well served by the Court's new
standard because "i]t is hardly a good use of scarce judicial resources to duplicate fact-finding
in federal court merely because a petitioner has negligently failed to take advantage of opportunities in state-court proceedings"); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991) (emphasizing that "[flederal collateral litigation places a heavy burden on scarce federal judicial
resources, and threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes").
Before the recent judicially crafted limitations, Chief Justice Rehnquist strongly urged
Congress to restrict the right to habeas corpus. See Neil A. Lewis, 4 Key Issues in Dispute on
Bill to Fight Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at B8; Paul Marcotte, Rehnquist: Cut Juris-
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cized death penalty case, the Court lifted a stay of a scheduled execution,
even though a colorable constitutional claim never thoroughly analyzed
or finally decided convinced lower court judges to issue numerous

stays. 124
Perhaps the best evidence supporting the docket-clearing thesis is
the fact that some recent decisions are at odds with the dominant ideological tenants of the Rehnquist Court, yet are entirely consistent with a
desire to curb so-called frivolous litigation. For example, in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp.,125 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
held that federal common law preempted state law and barred suits
against military contractors who manufactured products for the federal
government. Because the Court acted as a policymaker, displaced state
law, and "made" federal law, Boyle is seriously at odds with the Rehn-

quist Court's devotion to rigid federalism and separation of powers principles.12 6 The decision, however, is entirely consistent with concerns
diction, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 22, 22-23; see also Speedy Trial. Hearingson S. 895 Before the
Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,92d Cong., 1st Sess.
94-121 (1971) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist advocating restrictions on
federal habeas corpus). He went so far as to appoint a committee, headed by retired Justice
Powell, that recommended statutory amendments to deal with the "unnecessary delay and
repetition" and "last-minute litigation" in habeas corpus capital cases. See AD Hoc COMM.
ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES,Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45

Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239 (Sept. 27, 1989). Justice O'Connor has accused Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas of attempting to "reform" habeas corpus in a manner rejected by Congress on 13 occasions. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2493-98 (1992)
(O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment); see also DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE
MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 413-14 (1992) (observing that in McCleskey v.
Zant, Court "reformed" habeas corpus in manner previously rejected by Congress).
124. See Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam)
(The Court reversed the stay of execution of Robert Alton Harris issued to allow the district
court to decide the constitutionality of using lethal gas because the "claim could have been
brought more than a decade ago. There is no good reason for this abusive delay, which has
been compounded by last-minute attempts to manipulate the judicial process."); see also Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2520 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (affirming denial of habeas
corpus and stating that "[i]n the every day context of capital penalty proceedings, a federal
district judge typically will be presented with a successive or abusive habeas petition a few days
before, or even on the day of, a scheduled execution"); Coleman v. Thompson, 112 S.Ct. 1845,
1845 (1992) (per curiam) (denying stay of execution and emphasizing that "[a]s the District
Court below observed, this is now the twelfth round of judicial review in a murder case which
began eleven years ago" and that "[w]e are hardly well-positioned to second guess the District
Court's factual conclusion"); In re Blodgett, 112 S.Ct. 674, 676 (1992) (per curiam) (criticizing stay of execution by court of appeals for more than two years while federal habeas appeal
pending).
125. 487 U.S. 500 (1988); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 2209-15
(1992) (finding a domestic relations exception to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1988), and thus narrowing slightly the number of cases that may be filed in
federal courts, although the exception was not supported by plaln meaning of the statute).
126. See Kevin R. Johnson, Bridging the Gap: Some Thoughts About InterstitialLawmak-
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over increasing products liability litigation. 127 By creating a new immu-

nity out of whole cloth, the Court in Boyle eliminated an entire class of
lawsuits.
In the end, plain meaning statutory interpretation and Chevron deference illustrate a common decisionmaking approach of the Rehnquist

Court. The Court's decisions and reasoning tend to reduce litigation by
creating clear, virtually unimpeachable rules that attempt to minimize
the room for dispute about how litigation will be resolved. The focus is
not on whether the interpretation of a particular statute makes sense in

light of its legislative history, underlying policies, and purposes, or
whether the agency acted carefully, impartially, and lawfully. Rather, a
general interest in disposing of cases prevails over justice in the individual case. Put differently, the Rehnquist Court perhaps has an unusual
conception ofjustice: a result that reduces litigation in the long run, even
if patently unfair in the individual case, is pronounced "just."12' 8

The Court might feel that the caseload with more statutes, more
agencies, and a relatively static cadre of federal judges necessitates such
treatment.I 29 Whatever the explanation, recurring themes, and similarly
flawed results, resound from the Supreme Court's most recent immigra-

tion decisions.
V. THE SPECIAL IMPACT OF THE DEFERENCE AND PLAIN MEANING
DOCTRINES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE

IMMIGRATION LAWS

The Rehnquist Court appears interested in uniform rules rather

than carefully crafted ones well-suited to the particular case at hand.
ing and the FederalSecurities Laws, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 884-90 (1991) (discussing
Boyle).
127. See, eg., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 9-10 (1988); REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES,
EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY
AND AFFORDABILITY passim (1986). But see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: EXTENT OF "LITIGATION EXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED 2 (1988)

(excluding cases relating to Dalkon Shield, benedectin, and asbestos, "the growth in products
liability filings in federal courts . . . does not appear to have been rapidly accelerating or
explosive"); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 20-26
(1986) (noting that the number of tort claims only increased 23.7% during the period 1975 to
1985 when products liability claims are excluded). Boyle also is consistent with a crude antiindividual plaintiff, pro-corporate defendant ideology.
128. Cf Zatko v. California, 112 S. Ct. 355, 357 (1991) (per curiam) (stating that Court
denied in formna pauperisstatus to petitioner "[t]o discourage abusive tactics that actually hinder us from providing equal access to justice for all").
129. For arguments why an increase in the number of federal judges is not a viable solution
to the increase in judicial workload, see REPORT OF THE FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra
note 88, at 6-8; Rehnquist, A Pleafor Help, supra note 87, at 4.
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Sound reasons, however, militate against blind application of the deference doctrine to the executive branch's immigration decisions and
against use of the plain meaning approach in the interpretation of the

immigration laws. Most importantly, the vulnerability of noncitizens in
the political process make these default principles problematic when applied to immigration law.
A.

The Deference Doctrine and Immigration

Consistent with its general practice, the Court generally avoids
wrestling with the specifics of the matter under scrutiny when reviewing
agency immigration decisions. Even before Chevron, courts historically
treated the executive branch's immigration decisions in a highly deferential fashion.13 The so-called plenary power doctrine precluded judicial
review of decisions of Congress and of the executive branch, the branches
of government with "political" authority."' Although the doctrine is
much-criticized,13 2 the courts still selectively invoke the doctrine to
shield the executive branch's immigration decisions from meaningful judicial review. 33 In recent years, the Supreme Court, with one significant
exception, consistently has deferred to the executive branch's judgment
in immigration matters.13 4 This is consistent with developments in the
federal appeals courts, which, since Chevron, appear more likely to defer
to the INS's judgment than that of many other agencies. 135
130. See, eg., INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 143-46 (1981) (per curiam); see also Peter H.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 14-18 (1984) (discussing judicial deference to executive branch's immigration decisions).
131. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80
(1976). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of PlenaryPower:
Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-60 (1990)
(discussing history and impact of plenary power doctrine). The Court first invoked the doctrine in the late 1800s to preclude judicial review of racist immigration laws. See, e.g., Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-32 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
581, 609-11 (1889).
132. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitutionand United States Sovereignty: A Century of
ChineseExclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 861-63 (1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principleof Plenary CongressionalPower, 1984 Sup. Cr. REV.
255, 260-78.
133. See, eg., INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988); Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792; Mathews,
426 U.S. at 80.
134. See infra note 219 (discussing Cardoza-Fonseca);infra text accompanying notes 213449 (discussing recent immigration decisions).
135. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1022 (analyzing data for 1984-85
showing that 83% of INS rulemakings reviewed by courts were affirmed in toto, a rate higher
than that for many other agencies); see, eg., Furr's/Bishop's Cafeterias, L.P. v. INS, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25214 (10th Cir. Oct, 9, 1992) (relying heavily upon Chevron and deferring to
INS's construction of the INA); El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office of Immigra-
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Chevron proponents, as well as the Court itself, rationalize deference
on the grounds that administrative agencies are politically accountable

through election of the President.136 Assuming the general validity of
the theory that administrative agencies are politically accountable,137 it
surely does not apply to the actors entrusted with making immigration

decisions. In large part, this is because "aliens" are lawfully excluded
from the political process. 13 Even if a majority of the voting public ob-

jects to the executive branch's immigration policies and practices, most
citizens are not likely to feel their interests being directly affected. Thus,

few might be expected to mobilize politically to change how two relatively obscure administrative agencies, the INS and the Executive Office
for Immigration Review, treat noncitizens seeking to immigrate to the
United States. 139 Instead, the President, and hence the Attorney Gen-

eral, might only be expected to be subject to distinctly anti-immigrant
political pressures, expressed by a vocal minority of citizens calling for
increased enforcement efforts based on the belief that they are directly
affected by immigration. Such pressures are more likely to surface when
(as often happens during a recession) noncitizens are blamed for displacing American workers."

This section analyzes some of the other reasons why the executive
tion Review, 959 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Chevron and upholding Attorney General's construction of INA). But cf CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE
REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND AccouNT 212 n.10 (1991) ("Bent upon relieving the
harshness of deportation orders, appellate judges have consistently distorted the immigration
laws. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has numerous times ruled that deportation orders must
be reopened, even though such orders can only be reversed for abuse of discretion. It has also
equated sexual abuse by a soldier with political persecution.") (citations omitted); Johnson,
supra note 6, at 355-59 (discussing court of appeals authority taking "hard look" at BIA asylum decisions). The BIA, nonetheless, has complained of a lack of deference to its decisions.

See In re Cerna, No. 3161, app. at 11 (BIA Oct. 7, 1991) (interim decision) (stating that "we
are not left with the sense in many instances that deference, substantial or otherwise, was
accorded our interpretation of the relevant laws and regulation").
136. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 31, at 517-18; Starr, supra note 26, at 308, 312; see also
supra note 23 (quoting Chevron's discussion of political accountability of administrative
agencies).
137. Many commentators have seriously questioned this theory. See, e.g., THEODORE J.
LOWI,

THE END OF LIBERALISM 143-45 (1969); PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 4-21 (1981); see also JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131 (1980) (referring to "'faceless bureaucrats'. . . that... are neither elected nor reelected, and are controlled only spasmodically by

officials who are"); Merrill, supra note 26, at 996 ("[lIt is simply unrealistic, given the vastness
of the federal bureaucracy, to expect that the President or his principal lieutenants can effectively monitor the policymaking activities of all federal agencies.") (footnote omitted).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 206-12.
139. See infra text accompanying notes 206-12.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 206-12.
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branch's immigration decisions, particularly adjudications in deportation
proceedings, may not always be worthy of deference by the judiciary.

1. The Status Quo
In evaluating whether the judiciary customarily should defer to the
executive branch's action in immigration matters, one must understand
the role of the various agencies involved in the administration of the nation's immigration laws.
The Attorney General heads the two primary agencies entrusted
with immigration-related matters, the INS and the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR).1 41 In public statements about immigration

law and policy, the Attorney General, consistent with his role as the nation's chief law enforcement officer, generally emphasizes the need to halt
"illegal" immigration. 4 2 This is understandable in light of the demand
by some for increased immigration enforcement.143
141. See INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 3.0 (1992).
142. See, e.g.,Administration'sProposalson Immigration and Refugee Policy, JointHearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,Refugees andInternationalLaw of the House Comm on
the Judiciaryand Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981) (testimony of Attorney General William French
Smith) ("We have lost control of our borders. We have pursued unrealistic policies. We have
failed to enforce our laws effectively."); Barr Vows to Defend Border Integrity, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1992, at A24 (reporting that Attorney General Barr told local law enforcement officials that he wants "to get tough on illegal immigrants who are 'crashing in the back door' ");
Ronald J.Ostrow, Action Urged on Stalled Immigration Reform; Meese Links Illegal Aliens,
Drug Traffic, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1986, at A23 (quoting Attorney General Edwin Meese III
as advocating immigration reform because "[i]llegal immigration is contributing to the drug
problem"); Ronald J. Ostrow, FasterDeportation of CriminalsSought, L.A. TIMES, June 24,
1992, at A3 (reporting that Attorney General William Barr announced various steps to ensure
deportation of "criminal aliens"); see also WILLIAM F. SMITH, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 193-200 (1991) (stating that "immigration problem at bottom requires an end to illegal immigration"). Political pressures apparently explain Attorney General Barr's unsuccessful attempt to withdraw from a settlement agreed to by the INS that
would require it to notify noncitizens of their rights and allow them to consult with counsel.
See Judge Approves Rights Settlement, Despite Government's Objections, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1092, 1092-93 (1992); Susan Freinkel, How a 'Landmark Collapsed" S.F. RECORDER,
Aug. 18, 1992, at Al.
143. See, e.g., Major Garrett, Bush CampaignMay Find Free Trade is a Hard Sell, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at All (reporting that, at behest of Patrick Buchanan, Republican
platform seeks provision of "tools, technologies and structures necessary to secure the border"); Ralph Z. Hallow, Melting Pot Gets Fuller: Immigration Pace Changing A Nation,
WASH. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at Al (quoting Democratic Presidential candidate Bill Clinton
as expressing support for "bill to expand and improve our border patrol to stop the flow of
illegal immigration"); JUDY KEEN, Buchanan Would Fence Out Mexican Illegals, USA ToDAY, Dec. 24, 1991, at A4 (reporting that Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan
stated that he would consider building fence at border with Mexico to stop illegal immigration); Henry Muller & John F. Stacks, "There is a Limit to What We Can Absorb," TIME,
Nov. 18, 1991, at 54 (interview with California Governor Pete Wilson in which he states that
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The Attorney General delegates much of the authority bestowed

upon him by the INA to the INS. 1" Headed by a Commissioner ap-

pointed by the President,145 the INS has district offices throughout the
country. Among other duties, these offices adjudicate claims submitted
for benefits, such as visa petitions and applications for adjustment of sta-

tus.146 INS asylum officers also may decide asylum claims filed with the
47

agency by persons who allegedly fear persecution in their native lands. 1
Another side of the INS is much more visible to the general public.
Immigration inspectors staff ports of entry to examine documents of persons seeking entry into the United States.14 The Border Patrol, the enforcement arm of the INS, attempts to maintain the integrity of the
borders by preventing unauthorized entry into this country.1 49 Although
the INS has service as well as enforcement functions, the agency fre-

immigrants are costing state more in welfare payments, health care and public school costs,
than they are paying in taxes); D'Jamila Salem, Where the CandidatesStand On: Immigration,
L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1992, at A20 (reporting that, among other measures, Democratic Presidential nominee Bill Clinton favors strengthening Border Patrol to reduce illegal immigration);
Rogers Worthington, Diverse Group Backs Duke's Narrow Pitch, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1991, at
19 (noting that "[o]ne of [David] Duke's issues is immigration and a fear that the U.S. is
becoming a Third World nation"); see also EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, 621-43 (1981) (summarizing often blatantly
anti-immigrant political party platforms from 1848 to 1964). Two Presidential candidates in
the 1992 campaign expressed the view that increased immigration enforcement efforts would
be part of their immigration policy, although President Bush focused on enforcement to a
greater degree than Bill Clinton. See Bush, Clinton Differ on Immigration, 69 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1030, 1030-31 (1992).

144. See INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988).
145. See INA § 103(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1988).
146. See THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND
POLICY 102-04 (2d ed. 1991).

147. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 to .24 (1992). See generally David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum

Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1294-1305
(1990) (discussing changes to regulations creating asylum officer position in INS).
148. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 146, at 102-03.
149. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1986) ("The

mission of the Border Patrol as the mobile, uniformed, enforcement arm of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service is to ensure that the entry of persons into the United States... is
controlled ... by preventing entry without inspection as well as detecting and apprehending
illegal aliens within the United States."). The Border Patrol recently has been the subject of
shocking claims of abuse. See, eg., AMERICAS WATCH, BRUTALITY UNCHECKED: HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES ALONG THE U.S. BORDER WITH MEXICO 9-43 (1992) (providing compre-

hensive report of shootings, use of lethal force, physical abuse, and racially discriminatory
conduct by Border Patrol); James Bornemeir, OAS Asked to Condemn U.S. Treatment of Illegal Migrantsat Border, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at A3 (reporting that human rights group
asked Organization of American States to condemn "violent and inhumane" enforcement tactics used by Border Patrol and chronicling incidents); Patrick J. McDonnell, Border Patrol
Agent Chargedin Murder is Linked to Drug Theft, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at A3 (reporting
that Border Patrol agent was charged with first degree murder in connection with shooting of
Mexican.national); Sebastian Rotella, Border Officer PleadsNot Guilty in Beating Case, L.A.

1993]

THE REHNQUIST COURT & IMMIGRATION

447

quently has been criticized for overemphasizing enforcement at the expense of immigrants' rights."' This criticism has been directed most
forcefully at the treatment of persons seeking asylum in the United
States.11
Another adjudicatory arm of the Attorney General in immigration
TIMES, July 31, 1992, at A3 (reporting indictment of Border Patrol agent for beating and
severely injuring United States resident).
150. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 146, at 102 ("INS was once respected as a
relatively well-run and efficient administrative agency, even by those who disagreed with many
of the policies carried out. But those days are long in the past."); MILTON D. MORRIS, IMMIGRATIoN-THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY 87-88 (1985) ("In recent years, few agencies

of the federal government have been as vigorously or persistently criticized as those engaged in
enforcing immigration policy. The INS in particular has been a target of widespread criticism,
even among public officials."). The United States Commission on Civil Rights stated that
"[the root of the problems encountered by United States citizens and residents in the service
side of INS stem in large part from the conflicting missions of INS-service and enforcement."
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN
IMMIGRATION 40 (1980); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION MANAGEMENT: STRONG LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS NEEDED TO ADDRESS SERIOUS
PROBLEMS 5 (1991) (expressing similar concern); WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 93-94, 178 (1931) (rec-

ommending that administration and enforcement of immigration laws be separated to avoid
conflicting duties); SUSAN G6NZALES BAKER, THE CAUTIOUS WELCOME: THE LEGALIZATION PROGRAMS OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL AcT 133-35 (1990) (con-

cluding that competing missions of INS impeded implementation of legalization program
under IRCA); HARWOOD, supra note 2, at 25 (noting that in fiscal year 1983, 60% of INS
budget went to enforcement functions and 9% went to service functions); NORMAN L.
ZUCKER & NAOMI F. ZUCKER, THE GUARDED GATE 160-61 (1987) ('[P]ervading the [INS]
is the basic law-enforcement mentality found in the Border Patrol, a mentality at odds with the
application-of-justice approach that refugee decisions require.").
The Attorney General and the General Accounting Office (GAO) have been vocal at
times in criticizing INS operations. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION
MANAGEMENT: STRONG LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS NEEDED TO ADDRESS
SERIOUS PROBLEMS 3-10 (1991); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE LACKS READY ACCESS TO

ESSENTIAL DATA 3-14 (1990); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUSTICE ISSUES 14-15 (1988)

(concluding that INS fails to maintain adequate statistics to determine whether immigration
reform under IRCA is working); Jerry Seper, 2 Senior PostsAdded to Aid INS Operation, L.A.
TIMES, March 4, 1991, at A3 (reporting Attorney General Thornburgh's "continued displeasure" with "operation of INS" and GAO report criticizing management of INS). For an interesting bird's-eye critique of the INS bureaucracy, see Weston Kosova, The INS Mess, NEW
REPUBLIC,Apr. 13, 1992, at 20, 20-25.
151. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF
STANDARDS UNCERTAIN-FEw DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED 2-4 (1987) [hereinafter
GAO, UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN] (concluding that immigration
agencies failed to apply uniform standard in evaluating whether applicant established "wellfounded fear of persecution" and that asylum decisions are not always documented); REFUGEE
REP., Dec. 30, 1991, at 12 (presenting INS statistics showing approval and denial rates for
June 1983 to March 1991 for asylum applications filed with INS district directors which suggest that foreign policy motivates decisionmaking); Johnson, supra note 6, at 384-50 (arguing
that evidence exists that executive branch is influenced by President's foreign policy in deciding asylum claims); Martin, supra note 147, at 1305 (presenting statistics showing that INS
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matters, the EOIR exists by virtue of regulation.' 5 2 It houses the immigration court and the administrative appeals tribunal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Once part of the INS, the immigration court
and BIA were removed from the INS in 1983 and reconstituted as the
EOIR. 5 3 They remain, however, under the authority of the Attorney
General.
One of the BIA's functions is to decide appeals of denials by the
immigration court of relief from deportation or exclusion, including
claims for asylum. 54 The Attorney General appoints the five Board
members, who serve without fixed terms. 5 The BIA therefore lacks
true independence from the Attorney General. One might suspect the
chief law enforcement officer's zeal to some degree influences the
BIA.' 6 Political pressures emanating from the Attorney General may
be reflected in the aggregate pattern of the BIA's asylum decisions,

which appear roughly consistent with the President's foreign policy
district directors' grants and denials of asylum applications suggest disparate treatment based
on nationality of applicant).
152. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.0 (1992) (providing that the Attorney General can delegate authority
to the EOIR).
153. See 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038 (1983) (amending 8 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 100) (final rule). Before
the separation, some claimed that immigration judges felt subtle pressures from the INS. See,
e-g., Asylum Adjudication: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 259-68 (1981) (statement of Ralph
Farb, former BIA member); Maurice A. Roberts, Proposal. A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 7-14 (1980) (former BIA chair); see also William Robie,
A Response to Professor Verkuil, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1365, 1366 (1992) (observing as Chief
Immigration Judge that, before separation in 1983, independence of immigration judge was
compromised because court was part of INS, and that separation afforded immigration judges
"opportunity ... to exercise their independence").
154. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1992); see also id. § 3.1(a)(3) ("Board members shall perform the
quasi-judicial function of adjudicating cases coming before the Board.").
155. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1992); ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 146, at 111-12 & n.ll.
The Attorney General also may ultimately review BIA decisions, although he infrequently
does so. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1992). But see infra text accompanying notes 280-325 (discussing INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992), in which Attorney General reversed BIA twice in
one matter).
156. Indeed, the BIA currently includes three members formerly employed by the INS
(David Milhollan, Mary Maguire Dunne, and Michael J. Heilman), one member who headed
the Immigration and Extradition Unit, Criminal Division, Department of Justice (James P.
Morris), and one member who formerly served as an attorney for two federal agencies (Fred
W. Vacca). The composition suggests that the Board may be sympathetic to the enforcement
priorities of the Attorney General, who appointed them, and the INS. See supra text accompanying notes 144-53; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of 'Persecution'in United
States Asylum Law, 3 INTr'L J. REFUGEE L. 5, 8-10 (1991) (suggesting that in interpreting
"persecution on account of... political opinion" in "narrow and technical" manner, BIA may
be concerned with rising number of asylum applications). I thank George J. Terwilliger, III,
Acting Deputy Attorney General, for providing me with biographical sketches of the Board
members, which are on file with the North CarolinaLaw Review.
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prerogatives. 157
Finally, the INA and its implementing regulations afford the State
Department a role in certain immigration decisions. 158 For example, the
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs of the State Department has the opportunity to submit an opinion on the legal sufficiency of
each asylum application. 5 9 This input has been criticized because, while
the State Department generally is concerned with the foreign policy implications of asylum decisions, 160 the Refugee Act bars the consideration
of such concerns in the process. 16 ' Fears of impermissible bias find substantiation in the close correlation between the State Department advi162
sory opinions and the BIA's asylum decisions.
2.

The Call for Greater Independence in Immigration Adjudication

As mentioned previously, the EOIR adjudicates claims to relief
from deportation and exclusion. 1 63 Within the EOIR, the immigration
courts conduct hearings and the BIA decides appeals from immigration
court rulings. 16 Deportation orders of the Board may be appealed to the
federal courts of appeals. 16 Under certain circumstances, judicial defer157. See Johnson, supra note 6,at 336; see also ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 146, at
739 n.26 .noting lack of certainty in available data, but acknowledging that "there is certainly
room for substantial concern" about bias in asylum decisions). The INS, EOIR, and the Department of State recently settled a class action alleging that those agencies discriminated
against asylum seekers from El Salvador and Guatemala. See American Baptist Churches v.
Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see also Carolyn P. Blum, The Settlement of
American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh: Landmark Victoryfor CentralAmerican AsylumSeekers, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 347, 355 (1991) (discussing terms of the settlement and its
implications).
158. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 146, at 115-17.
159. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.11(a) (1992); see also Martin, supra note 147, at 1311-13 (describing Department of State's changing policies in providing advisory opinion on asylum
applications).
160. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 147, at 1331-34 (noting charges of political bias in asylum
adjudication due to reliance upon advisory opinions and recommending that State Department
be removed from process). In addition, the State Department recently expressed concern with
the number of Haitians granted asylum by the INS. See, e.g., Susan Beck, Cast Away, AM.
LAW., Oct. 1992, at 51; Howard W. French, Flight of Haitians Suddenly Resumes, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 1992, at Al.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 199-201.
162. See GAO, UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN, supra note 151, at
22-23 (showing that during one year, final agency adjudications of asylum claims agreed with
Department of State's opinion 96% of time).
163. In addition, the INS has an Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) that decides appeals
of certain INS decisions. See ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 146, at 113-14 (discussing
difficulty in determining which orders should be appealed to BIA or AAU).
164. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(b), 242.21 (1991); see also ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note
146, at 107-14.
165. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1988). Judicial review of exclusion decisions (that
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ence to BIA decisions might be warranted. Under the present administrative framework, however, it often is not.
Commentators long have noted that the BIA is in need of greater
independence from the Attorney General. Evidence suggests that such
independence is particularly lacking in asylum adjudications.1 66 A
number of proposals have been made to ensure that immigration adjudi67
cation is performed independently of the Attorney General's influence.
The evolution of the views of Maurice Roberts, retired Chair of the
BIA,168 on the need for reform of the administrative structure is telling.' 69 In 1977, Roberts called upon Congress to enact a statute expressly creating the Board, rather than allowing its existence to rest on a
regulation in place at the discretion of the Attorney General. 70 He concluded that "the Board's relationship to the Department [of Justice is]
that of an acknowledged bastard, whose presence cannot be realistically
denied but whose legitimacy is rendered questionable by its lack of any
7
statutory recognition."'1
' He further suggested that Board members be
appointed by the President and confirmed with the advice and consent of
is, decisions to exclude persons from entering the country) may be obtained through habeas
corpus proceedings in federal district court. See id. § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1988).
166. See Deborah Anker, DeterminingAsylum Claims in the United States: An Empirical
Case Study, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE (forthcoming 1992) (empirical study of one
immigration court concluding: (1) that ad hoc rules and standards, ideological preferences,
and impermissible political judgments influenced asylum decisions; (2) that there is appearance
of partiality by judges who often question applicant in manner similar to government attorney;
(3) that serious problems exist concerning interpretation of foreign languages; (4) that immigration judges refuse to consider objective evidence of persecution but instead rely on personal
political judgments; and (5) that immigration courts suffer from bureaucratic delays and inefficiencies); see also Carolyn P. Blum, License to Kill: The Principleof Legitimate Governmental
Authority to "InvestigateIts Enemies", 28 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 719 (1992) (showing apparent inconsistency in BIA rulings on issue whether governmental actions amount to persecution); Johnson, supra note 6, at 343-48 (presenting statistical and other evidence of foreign
policy bias in EOIR rulings); Derek Smith, Note, A Refugee By Any Other Name: An Examination of the Board of Immigration Appeals' Action in Asylum Cases, 75 VA. L. REV. 681
(1989) (reviewing BIA rulings and reaching similar conclusion); cf.Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections on the FederalAdministrativeJudiciary,39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1345-47 (1992) (noting
that Administrative Law Judges under Administrative Procedure Act possess greater "decisional independence" than "administrative judges" in EOIR).
167. The most far-reaching proposal was a call for consolidation of all immigration responsibilities into a new Agency for Migration Affairs. See COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF INT'L
MIGRATION AND Coop. ECONOMIC DEV.,UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION: AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE 27-30 (1990).

168. Roberts was recently honored for his years of immigration service in Festschrift: In
Celebrationof the Work of Maurice Roberts, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 199 (1991).
169. It should be noted that Roberts expressed these views before formation of the EOIR in
1983. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53 (describing reorganization).
170. See Maurice A. Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A CriticalAppraisal, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 43-44 (1977).
171. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
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the Senate. 172 Because "personal attitudes may have a crucial effect in
the decision-making process," Roberts advocated the careful selection of
Board members.173
Three years later, Roberts endorsed a more far-reaching proposal

calling for the creation of an Article I immigration court. 174 The reason
for his change of heart was that "[ilt is becoming increasingly apparent
that the present system of decision-making under the immigration and
nationality laws simply isn't working." 17 The nub of the problem is that
the Department of Justice, including the Attorney General, tends to focus on enforcement issues. 1 76 Truly independent decisionmakers are
lacking. Roberts's cure was that "adjudicators must be completely separated organizationally from enforcement officials, so that their independence from prosecutorial influence, direct or indirect, is not only actual
' 77
but perceived to be so.'
Despite such trenchant criticisms, significant changes have been
slow in coming. Though separate from the INS, the EOIR continues to
operate under the direction of the Attorney General. The lack of independence under the current regime raises serious questions about the
7
EOIR's impartiality.1 1
3.

The "Independent" Agency Example

Besides the Article I court advocated by some, the present-day federal bureaucracy provides many different examples of administrative
structures far more independent than the INS and EOIR. The so-called
"independent" agencies vary in nature, but they share the characteristic
that their members may not be removed by the President.179 Decisions
172. Id. at 44.
173. Id. at 31.
174. See Roberts, supra note 153, 18-20; see also U.S. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION

248-49 (1981) (making similar recommendation); Peter J. Levinson, A Specialized Courtfor Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 644, 651-54 (1981) (same).
175. Roberts, supra note 153, at 2.
176. See id. at 3-6; see also supra text accompanying notes 141-51 (discussing similar
concerns).
177. Roberts, supra note 153, at 16 (footnote omitted).
178. For a review and analysis of immigration adjudication concluding that the BIA probably should remain under the supervision of the Attorney General but with increased safeguards ensuring greater independence, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the
Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1297,
AND REFUGEE POLICY, FINAL REPORT

1398-99 (1986); see also Martin, supra note 147, at 1344-46 & n.265 (reaching similar conclusions with respect to asylum adjudication).
179. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 257, 259-63 [hereinafter Verkuil, Purposes& Limits]; see also LANDIS, supra note 98, at
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generated by such agencies are more worthy of deference than are those
180
of the INS and the EOIR.

Adjudication is a well-accepted function of independent agencies,
such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade
Commission."' 1 Indeed, Professor Verkuil proposed "that independent
agencies are best designed to adjudicate." 182 To ensure impartial decisionmaking, administrative adjudication generally is independent of the
policy-making authority. 183 For example, the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration sets and enforces health and safety standards,
while an independent agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, adjudicates challenges to the standards. 184 Mine

Safety and Health Administration standards are reviewed by the independent Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. 8'

Even though debate continues about whether independent agencies
are truly insulated from political pressures,' 8 6 the independent agency
model offers significantly more assurance of impartiality than the present

immigration system, which vests ultimate decisionmaking authority in
S11(describing purpose of creating independent agencies). But see Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Cr. REv. 41, 81-82 (outlining reasons why independent agencies cannot be rationalized by their alleged insulation from political pressure).
180. But cf Verkuil, Immigration Procedures,supra note 43, at 1196-97 (suggesting that
legislative proposal calling for creation of independent agency for immigration adjudication is
misplaced).
181. See Verkuil, Purposes& Limits, supra note 179, at 263-64.
182. Id. at 278.
183. See Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 965, 966-97 (1991).
184. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988).
185. See 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1988).
186. See Miller, supra note 179, at 82-83; see also WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE
REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (1967) (former Securities and Exchange Commission chairman
stating that "[g]overnment regulatory commissions are often referred to as 'independent' agencies, but this cannot be taken at face value by anyone who has ever had any experience in
Washington"); Thomas 0. McGarity, PresidentialControl ofRegulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 443, 443-44 & n.4 (1987) (discussing President Reagan's increased
centralization of control over independent agencies); Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 156-72 (1991) (discussing Presidential oversight over Environmental
Protection Agency).
Some also have claimed that independent agencies violate the separation of powers, See
Miller, supra note 179, at 41. But see Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the FourthBranch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 578-80 (1984). In light
of recent decisions, it seems unlikely that the Court would invalidate a traditional independent
agency on separation of powers grounds. See generallyDean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court
andthe Separation of Powers. A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 668,
710-61 (1990) (analyzing the Court's recent separation of powers decisions).
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the Attorney General.18 Particularly because of the persistent concern
with the conflicting functions of the INS, as well as continuing doubts
about the independence of the BIA, 188 complete separation of policy
making and adjudication is particularly well-suited for the administration of the immigration laws. In any event, immigration adjudications
are not made by anything resembling an independent agency. Only Congress can change that fact.
4. Conclusion
Some commentators, in reaction to Chevron and perceiving a need
to police political partisanship, have called for the reversal of the Chevron
presumption and for rigorous judicial review of agency decisions. 89 The
Supreme Court, however, has opted for deferential review. Alternatives
to the two extremes exist. Courts should not review agency action in a
vacuum. Nor should they disregard the structure of the particular administrative system that produced the decision. In its four most recent
immigration decisions, however, the Court seemed more concerned with
establishing rules that would decrease litigation and appeals than about
whether those decisions were the accurate result of impartial
decisionmaking.190
When reviewing the executive branch's immigration decisions, the
Court should consider that, unlike some agencies, the INS consistently
has been criticized for abuse, ineptitude, and overemphasis on enforcement with a concomitant lack of sensitivity to the delicate life and liberty
interests at stake, particularly in deportation proceedings. For many reasons, including language and cultural barriers exacerbated by the sheer
complexity of the immigration laws and administrative procedures, immigrants are particularly vulnerable to the strong-arm tactics of the INS.
Trends in BIA decisions, as well as the administrative structure, suggest
187. This is not to suggest that deference should only be afforded those decisions made by
an independent agency. The Court, perhaps correctly in some instances, has applied the deference principle to the review of actions of agencies of all types. See supra text accompanying
notes 23-44. The Court, however, should be much more careful in its deference analysis in
order to ensure that there is at least a modicum of impartiality-sufficient to afford adequate
assurance of compliance with the statute at issue-in an adjudication before deferring to an
administrative ruling.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 152-78.
189. See, eg., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 144-47 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter
the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421,465-69 (1987). For arguments that Chevron should not
mean automatic deference by the courts, see Johnson, supra note 6, and Maureen B. Callahan,
JudicialReview of Agency Legal Determinations in Asylum Cases, 28 WILLIMETTE L. REV.
773 (1992).
190. See infra text accompanying notes 213-449.
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that careful judicial review is needed to ensure compliance with the law
and to ferret out impermissible bias from the process.
B.

The Plain Meaning Doctrine and Immigration

Against a backdrop of divergent approaches to statutory interpretation, 191 the Court addressed a series of immigration cases last term dealing with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), the
comprehensive statute regulating immigration.192 The Act has been
amended almost annually, with three important recent revisions being
the Refugee Act of 1980,193 the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA),194 and the Immigration Act of 1990.191 The voluminous
legislative history of the INA and its many amendments make it clear
that Congress passed each of these laws for distinctly different and often
conflicting reasons, in response to demands from many different constituencies, and to remedy very different problems. For example, the IRCA,
among other things, created amnesty and agricultural worker programs;19 6 the Refugee Act primarily dealt with the admission of refugees; 197 the Immigration Act of 1990 made it easier to deport and
exclude immigrants convicted of certain crimes and created a brand new
"temporary protected status" in this country for certain persons who flee
civil strife.19 In short, although all were amendments to the same statute, each amendment had very different purposes.
As one might expect, the legislative history to some amendments
suggests that Congress acted with a specific purpose. For example, Congress designed the Refugee Act to overhaul the asylum provisions of the
INA and to conform United States law to international law. 199 Although
the "plain meaning" of the text does not expressly state, there is little
191. See supra text accompanying notes 45-78.
192. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.). For a description of developments and proposals culminating in the INA, see
HUTCHINSON, supra note 143, at 251-313.
193. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
194. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
195. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
196. See IRCA §§ 201, 301-305, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394-3404, 3411-3434 (1986) (codified as
amended in part at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1160-1161, 1188, 1255a (West 1970 & Supp. 1992)).
197. See generally Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A LegislativeHistory of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981) (discussing legislative history of Refugee Act in detail).
198. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 302, 303, 505-515, 104 Stat.
4978, 5030-5038, 5048-5053.
199. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-41 (1987) (discussing Refugee Act's
attempt to conform domestic law to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, openedfor accession Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267); INS v. Stevic,
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doubt that both a desire to ensure adherence to international law and the
past treatment of refugees in a manner inconsistent with that law fueled
passage of the Act.2 °° Similarly, although not spelled out in the statutory
text, there can be little doubt from the legislative history that, as mandated by international law, Congress designed the Act to remove the
President's foreign policy concerns from individual asylum decisions.2" 1
1. Discretion and the INA
One substantive theme to the INA is particularly relevant to the
special impact on immigrants resulting from plain meaning interpretation. The law is well-known for the considerable discretion delegated to
the Attorney General over many immigration decisions, discretion that is
equalled in few administrative schemes. 2 2 Although the plain meaning
of the statute seems to afford unlimited discretion, until recent years, the
pertinent agencies have tended to impose common-sense limits on that
discretion.20 3 Before the ascendancy of the plain meaning doctrine, the
courts generally refused to read the plain meaning of "discretion" in the
467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984) (same); see also INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 729 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part) (same).
200. For an exhaustive analysis of the legislative history of the Refugee Act on this point,
see Anker & Posner, supra note 197, at 43-64.
201. See, e.g., S. RP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980) (directing the Attorney
General to establish a new uniform asylum procedure); H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1979) (stating that definition of refugee "eliminates the geographical and ideological
restrictions now applicable" to refugee admissions); see Johnson, supra note 5, at 289-94, 32635.
202. See Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1987) ("By statutory enactment,
Congress has delegated its unusually broad dominion in the immigration field to the Attorney
General."); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 965-67 (1lth Cir. 1984) (en banc) (referring to the
INA's "sweeping delegations of congressional authority" to the Attorney General), aff'd, 472
U.S. 846 (1985); see, e.g., INA § 244(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988))
(affording Attorney General discretion to grant relief of suspension of deportation); id.
§ 245(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1988)) (affording Attorney General discretion to grant relief of adjustment of status).
203. See, eg., In re Edwards, No. 3134, slip op. at 6-11 (BIA May 2, 1990) (interim decision) (extensively reviewing facts and circumstances in exercise of discretion on claim for suspension of deportation); In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 474 (BIA 1987) (ruling that favorable
exercise of discretion in grant of asylum to "refugee" is warranted absent "most egregious of
adverse factors"); In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978) (listing factors to be
considered in exercise of discretion on suspension claim). See generally HENRY J. FRIENDLY,
THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STAN-

5-6, 13-26 (1962) (advocating articulation of standards by agencies to afford predictability and intelligibility to agency decisions). But cf Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d
1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) (The court reviewed the exercise of discretion and
emphasized that the "power to reopen a case and grant an adjustment of status is a power to
dispense mercy. No one is entitled to mercy, and there are no standards by which judges may
patrol its exercise."). Presumably in response to the Court's plain meaning methodology, however, the BIA recently has tended to interpret the INA in plain meaning fashion. See Matter
DARDS
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INA as unlimited when to do so would be inconsistent with the statute as
a whole, or might raise grave constitutional concerns. 2" Plain meaning
interpretation threatens such sensible results.

A plain meaning tack would limit judicial policing of agency action
unnecessarily. "Discretion" in the plain meaning world need not be limited by Congressional purpose or any other non-textual constraints.

Even if not spelled out in the text of the INA, Congress obviously passed
the law's amendments with specific purposes in mind. Its many provisions should be read as a whole to impose reasonable limits on the dele-

gations of facially-unlimited discretion to the executive branch. Plain
meaning interpretation, by eliminating relevant gloss on the statutory

language, distorts the language in the immigration laws, leaving us with
sterile words divorced from meaning. For that reason alone, immigra-

tion law, similar to other areas of substantive law,205 is not a good candidate for plain meaning interpretation.
2.

Overriding Judicial Interpretations of the INA

To further complicate matters, the evils of plain meaning interpretation of the immigration laws cannot be cured as easily as the weaknesses
in the judicial construction of ordinary statutes directly impacting the
public at large. Change in the immigration laws is constrained by the
simple fact that the Constitution has been interpreted to allow "aliens" to
be barred from voting.20 6 Consequently, one cannot expect Congress to
of A- A-, No. 3176, 1992 BIA LEXIS 14 (BIA May 15, 1992) (interim decision); Matter of K-,
No. 3163, slip op. at 8-10 (BIA Nov. 5, 1991) (interim decision).
204. See, eg., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 857 (1985) (limiting "discretion" in parole
provision of INA to bar discrimination on basis of race or national origin); United States v.
Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199-202 (1957) (limiting Attorney General's "discretion" in requiring information from deportable "alien" under INA to avert serious constitutional questions);
Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 519 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that BIA may rely only
upon "legitimate" concerns in exercising discretion to deny asylum); Wong Wing Hang v.
INS, 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.) (when exercising discretion with respect to
suspension of deportation, INS may not weigh "'considerations that Congress could not have
intended to make relevant' ") (quoting United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessey, 180
F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, C.J.)).
205. See, e.g., Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 76, at 698-706 (criticizing plain meaning interpretation of Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976); Edward R. Becker & Aviva
Orenstein, The FederalRules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "PlainMeaning"
Jurisprudence,the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions
for the Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 857, 864-68 (1992) (criticizing
plain meaning interpretation of Federal Rules of Evidence).
206. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976) (noting in conclusory fashion that "aliens" cannot vote); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1973) ("This
Court has never held that aliens have a constitutional right to vote .... Indeed, implicit in
many of this Court's voting rights decisions is the notion that citizenship is a permissible criterion for limiting" right to vote.); Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the People" Alien Suffrage in
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feel the political heat to cure the shortcomings of the Supreme Court's
plain meaning interpretations of the INA, as defined by the Supreme
Court.20 7 Because voters may not feel personally affected by plain meaning interpretation of the INA, they lack the concrete incentive to mobilize as a political constituency on such issues. This is true even if a
majority of the voters support the immigrants' position.
Only when some citizens believe that immigration has some concrete impact on their lives are they likely to mobilize politically to change
the immigration laws. One therefore would more likely expect Congress
to be pressed to crack down on "illegal" immigration during times of
relatively high unemployment, when a portion of the public may feel directly affected by the presence of noncitizens in this country.20 8 Particularly in difficult economic times, some citizens historically have been
susceptible to nativist cries that immigrants threaten "American jobs."2 "9
Special-interest groups, such as organized labor, may play on such fears
German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J.INT'L L. 259, 291-310 (1992) (outlining history
of denial of suffrage to "aliens" in United States and observing that although United States
Constitution is "oblique" on the question of "alien" suffrage, including Article I's language
that members of House of Representatives shall be "chosen ... by the People of the several
States," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, "it appears to be settled doctrine that [under the federal
Constitution], alien suffrage is entirely discretionary"). For the classic treatment of the arguments in favor of suffrage in the face of denial of the right by every state, see Gerald M.
Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1092,
1115-36 (1977). Because "aliens" are disenfranchised, the Court has treated them as a discrete
and insular minority for equal protection purposes, thus subjecting to strict scrutiny any law
employing an "alienage" classification. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); see also ELY,
supra note 137, at 148-49, 151, 161-62 (advocating strict scrutiny of "alienage" classifications).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 141-51 (discussing political pressures on Attorney
General to limit "illegal immigration").
208. See, e.g., Tracy Wilkinson, CandidatesTough on Immigration, Cot. 19, 1992, at A3
(noting that Democratic and Republican candidates for Senate in California advocated increased border enforcement); James Bornemeier, Poll Says Majority Favors U.S. Immigration
Freeze, L.A. TIMEs (Southland ed.), May 20, 1992, at A16 (reporting poll showing sentiment
to limit "illegal" immigration); see also Martin, supra note 147, at 1269 (noting that "as a
matter of practical politics" public probably favors "control over the entry of aliens" over "the
promise of refuge to the persecuted"); Peter H. Schuck, The Emerging PoliticalConsensus on
Immigration Law, 5 Geo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 21-25 (1991) (arguing that one component of
"emerging political consensus on immigration law" is "enhanced enforcement"); supra text
accompanying notes 141-51 (discussing INS emphasis on immigration enforcement).
Although the Refugee Act of 1980 demonstrates that not all immigration legislation is
pro-enforcement, much immigration legislation in the 1980s focused at least in part on efforts
to reduce "illegal" immigration. See, eg., Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,
§ 503, 104 Stat. 4978 (amending INA § 287(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)) (enhancing INS enforcement authority); id.§ 541 (increasing size of Border Patrol); Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986).
209. See generally HIGHAM, supra note 2, at 68-77 (noting the connection between economic downturns and increases in sentiment against immigrants).
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in the political process.21 0
This is not to suggest that noncitizens should be afforded the right to
vote or that Congress cannot restrict immigration if a majority of the
voters so desire. The point instead is that similar to laws affecting children, criminal defendants, and other disenfranchised groups, immigrants

are especially vulnerable in the political process. In light of the political
realities, Congress cannot be expected to overrule the courts' plain meaning interpretations of the INA, even ifa majority of the public thinks the
interpretationunreasonable,unwise, and unfair.2 1' The limited political
210. See generally GWENDOLYN MINK, OLD LABOR AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: UNION, PARTY, AND STATE, 1875-1920 (1986) (discussing
history of organized labor's positions on immigration).
211. See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Decisions,supra note 22, at 358-59 ("Congress will generally not override Supreme Court statutory decisions unless a politically salient
group presses for an override and unless other relevant groups, especially government officials
and political party leaders, acquiesce in the override.") (footnote omitted). Indeed, Professor
Eskridge partly attributed the overriding of Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967), which interpreted the "psychopathic personality" basis for exclusion under the INA to include homosexuality, to the increased political strength of the organized gay and lesbian community, not the
influence of immigrants. See Eskridge, OverridingSupreme Court Decisions,supra note 22, at
357-59, 411-12.
Of course, this does not mean to suggest that immigrants and refugee rights groups lack
any political power. Indeed, at various times such groups have played a prominent role in
molding and enacting legislation-the Refugee Act of 1980 being a particularly striking example. Some also have argued that political pressures mounted by such groups hinder INS enforcement efforts. See HARWOOD, supra note 2, at 168-69. Nonetheless, although immigrant
groups have some sway in the political process, that input is limited by the fact that their
constituents lack direct access to the ballot box. For the argument that the relatively small
group of putative "refugees" enjoys far less political support than immigrants and potential
immigrants as a whole (who often have the support of business interests desirous of cheap
migrant labor), see John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control,
36 U. MIAMI L. Rlv. 819, 846 (1982). Scanlan also argues that the concern with the numbers
of immigrants coming to the United States may adversely affect the treatment of refugees. Id.
It is true that Congress has overridden a few Supreme Court immigration decisions to the
benefit of immigrants. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-603, § 315(b), 100 Stat. 3359, 3439-3440 (1986) (overruling INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S.
1843 (1984)); Eskridge, OverridingSupreme Court Decisions,supra note 22, at 344 tbl. 4 (noting that 3% of Congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions from 1967-90 were immigration cases, which placed immigration in a tie for 11th out of 22 subject matter categories of
Supreme Court decisions overridden by Congress). Professor Eskridge's empirical study
shows that "noncitizens" gained from such action in two percent (two cases) of the total
number of cases that were overridden within 10 years of the Court's decision. Id. at 348 tbl. 7.
The study further shows that, from 1978 to 1984, 80% of the Supreme Court decisions (four
out of five cases) in which noncitizens lost were not overridden by Congress. Id. at 351 tbl. 9.
Given the limited number of Congressional overrides of Supreme Court immigration decisions,
Professor Eskridge was unable to formulate any generalized conclusions. See id. at 376.
Even assuming that "aliens" have enjoyed some success in overriding Supreme Court
decisions, most immigration matters are finally decided in the lower courts, and Congress
generally is unaware of lower court interpretations of the laws. See id. at 415-16. Thus, immigrants evidently will be subject to the plain meaning interpretations of those courts. Moreover,
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clout of immigrants and the general dearth of interest in immigration
matters because of the lack of direct personal stake in such issues, militate against Congressional action. This suggests that plain meaning interpretation places a burden on immigrants not imposed on other interest
groups. Courts should properly consider this fact when interpreting the
immigration laws.2 12
C. Conclusion
Unlike other bodies of law administered by different agencies, the
deference and plain meaning doctrines are not well-suited to reviewing
the executive branch's immigration decisions or interpreting the INA.
Even though the voting public may disagree with the INS or BIA's treatment of noncitizens or with judicial interpretation of the INA, such
events do not directly and palpably affect the polity in a way that might
be expected to spark political action. It therefore seems unlikely that
voters will mobilize around such issues. Under the Rehnquist Court's
regime, even if contrary to public sentiment, the INS and BIA's actions
and the courts' plain meaning interpretations of the INA are likely to go

unchecked.
VI.

IMMIGRANTS IN THE OCTOBER

1991 TERM

Usually, the Supreme Court tackles the esoteric immigration laws in
at most one case each year. In the October 1991 term, however, the
Court decided four immigration cases within a two-month period.2 13
the default principles endorsed by the Supreme Court are designed to reduce further appellate
review. See supra text accompanying notes 79-129. In light of these facts, the ability to override few Supreme Court decisions sheds little light on the political power of immigrants to
change the immigration laws.
212. Cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ... curtail[ing]
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
213. In addition, in United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 548-50 (1991), the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held that an exemption to the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) shielded from disclosure the identities of persons returned to Haiti who were
interviewed by the State Department. See supra note 7 (discussing executive branch's treatment of persons fleeing Haiti). The State Department claimed that the interviews demonstrated that the Haitian government had not persecuted citizens returned there. See Ray, 112
S. Ct. at 544. To test the accuracy of that assertion, a lawyer and three Haitian asylum-seekers
requested the identities of persons interviewed and planned to contact them. Id. at 544. Based
on a FOIA provision that allowed withholding of materials if disclosure "would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988), the State Department refused to identify the individuals. See Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 544-45. The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the public interest in determining the truthfulness
of the assertions of the State Department outweighed the privacy interests. Ray v. United
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This extraordinary occurrence produced results generally in keeping with
broader developments in the Rehnquist Court's approaches to deference
to administrative agencies and plain meaning statutory interpretation. In
each case, the Court effectively deferred to the INS or BIA. With one

notable exception, the Court viewed statutes and regulations through a
plain meaning lens. In the exceptional case, the Court abandoned plain

meaning methodology in order to defer to INS's judgment.
A.

Asylum and Withholding of Deportation
As amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, the INA defines a "refu-

gee" eligible for asylum as "any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality.., and who is unable or unwilling to return...
because of persecution or a well-founded fear ofpersecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particularsocial group, or
political opinion. '
The Attorney General or, more accurately, his
delegatee, has the discretion to grant asylum to a "refugee." 2'15 To be
entitled to a related form of relief known as withholding of deporta-

tion, 216 the applicant must establish a clear probability of persecution, a
standard more exacting than the well-founded fear standard applicable to
asylum.21 7 Unlike asylum cases, the Attorney General lacks discretion
to deport persons who have established the necessary persecution,2 18

making withholding of deportation a mandatory remedy when the applicant satisfies the requisite burden.

The Court's two most recent asylum-related decisions reflect the rise
to dominance of the deference and plain meaning doctrines.2 19 In evaluStates Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549, 1556 (11th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court reversed.
Ray, 112 S. Ct. at 547-50. In weighing the privacy and public interests, the Court emphasized,
in deferential tones, that there was no evidence "that tends to impugn the integrity of the [State
Department] reports. We generally accord government records and official conduct a presumption of legitimacy." Id. at 550. In deferring to the State Department's judgment, the
Court failed to acknowledge its potential conflict of interest in asylum matters. See supra text
accompanying notes 158-62.
214. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (1988) (emphasis added); see INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
215. See INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988); see, e.g., In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467,
474 (BIA 1987); see also Deborah E. Anker, DiscretionaryAsylum: A Protection Remedy for
Refugees Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 49-65 (1987) (discussing limits
on discretion).
216. See INA § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988).
217. See Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 431; INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 413-30 (1984).
218. See Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 429-30 n.9, 440-41, 444; Stevic, 467 U.S. at 426 &
n.20. This is true so long as the applicant does not fall within one of the exceptions enumerated in the statute. See INA § 243(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1988).
219. As in the four immigration decisions last term, the deference and plain meaning doctrines intersected in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). The Court's resolution of
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ating the decisions, it is noteworthy that, according to INS statistics, asylum applications increased dramatically in recent years. 220 That, in turn,
increased the number of appeals of BIA asylum and withholding of deportation decisions in the federal courts.
1. INS v. Elias-Zacarias
Two masked guerrillas armed with machine guns came to the home
the issues in Cardoza-Fonseca,however, was directly contrary to the Court's recent methodology. In rejecting the BIA's conclusion that the well-founded fear of persecution standard applicable to asylum was identical to the clear probability standard for withholding of
deportation, see supra text accompanying notes 214-18, the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Stevens, reviewed the Refugee Act's legislative history, the United Nations Protocol Relating

to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, and a handbook interpreting the
Protocol, the

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979). See Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. at 427-43. The Court further recognized, but found it unnecessary to apply, "the
longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor
of the alien," and stressed the all-important life and liberty interests at stake. Id. at 449-50
(citations omitted). The Court found that Chevron did not require deference to the BIA's
interpretation because "[t]he question whether Congress intended the two standards to be
identical is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide. Employing traditional tools of statutory construction, we have concluded that Congress did not intend the two
standards to be identical." Id. at 446 (footnote omitted); see also supra text accompanying
notes 30, 51, 75-77 (discussing Justice Stevens' approach to Chevron deference and statutory
interpretation).
Arguing that the plain meaning of the statute clearly answered the interpretive question,
Justice Scalia objected to the majority's reliance upon extraneous materials and emphasized
that "ij]udges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent."
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see also Eskridge,
New Textualism, supra note 22, at 650-56 (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca). In Justice Scalia's view, because the INS interpretation was contrary to the statute's
plain meaning, Chevron was inapplicable. See Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); supra text accompanying notes 31, 54-59 (discussing Justice Scalia's views about
Chevron deference and statutory interpretation).
As suggested by the four immigration decisions last term, Justice Scalia appears to have
convinced the Court of the validity of his views expressed in Cardoza-Fonseca. See also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1401-02 (1992) (Kennedy, J.) (holding that because "agency interpretation [was] not in conflict with the plain
language of the statute, deference [was] due"); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,
291-92 (1988) (Kennedy, J.) (stating that deference should be given to agency regulations that
do not conflict with plain meaning of statute).
220. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., 1989 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
xxx-xxxi (1990); see also JOHN H. FRYE, III, SURVEY OF NON-ALU HEARING PROGRAMS IN
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 4 (1991) (finding that EOIR processes largest volume of admin-

istrative adjudications by non-administrative law judges, amounting to about 152,000 annually
or 44% of total). INS officials, however, recently stated that fewer asylum applications than
expected have been filed with the INS. See INS, Advocates Dispute Asylum Statistics, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1065, 1065-66 (1992).
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of eighteen-year old Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias in Guatemala. 22 1 Because Elias-Zacarias refused to join their forces, the guerrillas promised
to return. 22 Fearing that the guerrillas would kill him, he fled the country.22 3 The explanation offered by Elias-Zacarias for his actions was
straight-forward: "[I]f you join the guerrillas... then you are against
the government. You are against the government and if you join them
then it is to die there. And, then the government is against you and
'224
against your family."
Finding that testimony insufficient, the immigration court and BIA
denied Elias-Zacarias' claims for asylum and withholding of deportation. 225 Though affirming denial of withholding of deportation, the
226
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the asylum claim.
The court reasoned that the guerrillas' threat constituted "persecution
.. 'on account of political opinion' because the person resisting forced
recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile to the persecutors
227
and because the persecutors' motive ...is political.,
221. See Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992). Some
of the thoughts about Elias-Zacarias are borrowed from Deborah E. Anker et al., The
Supreme Court's Decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias: Is There Any "There" There?, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES

285 (1992), which I co-authored.

222. Zacarias,921 F.2d at 847.
223. Id.
224. INS v. Elias-Zacarias,112 S. Ct. 812, 819 n.5 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
App. to Brief in Opposition 5A); see also DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 7, at 613 (acknowledging that guerrillas in Guatemala engage in forced recruitment and that Guatemalan
security forces are guilty of the "majority of the major human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and disappearances [apparently based on the] belief, whether factual
or based on spurious information, that the victims were in some way supportive of or sympa.
thetic to the guerrillas").
225. Zacarias,921 F.2d at 847.
226. Id. at 852.
227. Id. at 850 (citations omitted).
The INS previously had succeeded in convincing at least one court of appeals to adopt a
stringent "on account of" requirement. See Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 290 (5th
Cir. 1987) (affirming BIA denial of relief), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987). The facts of
Campos-Guardado show the requirement's potentially harsh results:
Ms. Campos testified about incidents of violence in El Salvador, focusing on one
particular episode.... [When visiting her uncle, chairman of a local agricultural
cooperative formed as a result of controversial land reform], an older woman and
two young men with rifles arrived and knocked down the door. They dragged Ms.
Campos, her uncle, a male cousin and three female cousins to the rim of the farm's
waste pit. They tied all the victims' hands and feet and gagged the women. Forcing
the women to watch, they hacked the flesh from the men's bodies with machetes,
finally shooting them to death. The male attackers then raped the women, including
Ms. Campos, while the woman who accompanied the attackers shouted political slogans. The assailants cut the victims loose, threatening to kill them unless they fled
immediately. They ran and were taken to a hospital in San Salvador. Ms. Campos
suffered a nervous breakdown and had to remain in the hospital 15 days.... [When
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The Supreme Court reversed. 22 8 Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, framed the question as "whether a guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a person into performing military service necessarily constitutes 'persecution on account of... political opinion.' ,229 The answer
was an unequivocal no.
The Court treated the BIA's decision as a factual one that, as the
INA provides, could not be disturbed "if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole."23
It stressed the narrowness of the substantial evidence standard of review:
"[T]o obtain judicial reversal of the BIA's determination, [an asylum applicant] must show that the evidence.., presented was so compelling that
no reasonablefactfinder could fail to find the requisitefear of persecution."2'3 1 Applying this standard, the Court held that Elias-Zacarias
she later visited her home], two young men arrived at the door ... Ms. Campos
immediately recognized one of them as one of her assailants ....[ie later sought
her out several times and threatened to kill her and her family if she revealed his
identity.
Id. at 287; see also ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 146, at 811 n.36 (referring to CamposGuardado as "stunning example of a nearly inexplicable haid-line decision, using highly restrictive 'on account of' doctrine"); Aleinikoff, supra note 156, at 8, 25 (criticizing CamposGuardado in similar manner).
228. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 817. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, which included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas.
229. Id. at 814 (emphasis in original).
230. See id. at 815 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1988)). Some courts of appeals have
treated the substantial-evidence standard as requiring more careful scrutiny, with correspondingly less deference, than the abuse-of-discretion standard applicable to judicial review of other
BIA decisions. See, eg., Melendez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 216-18 (2d
Cir. 1991); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282 n.8 (9th Cir. 1984). Others have

applied the standard more deferentially. See, eg., Balazoski v. INS, 932 F.2d 638, 643 (7th
Cir. 1991); M.A. v. United States INS, 899 F.2d 304, 309 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Doe v.
INS, 867 F.2d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1989); McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 1986); see
also Martin, supra note 147, at 1316 ("Whatever the precise [standard of review] formula, the
actual vigor of scrutiny covers a wide range, from highly deferential to highly demanding.")
(footnote omitted).
231. Elias-Zacarias,112 S.Ct. at 817 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized elsewhere
in the opinion that the BIA's decision could "be reversed only if... a reasonable fact-finder
would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed," id. at 815 (citing NLRB
v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939)), and that the evidence
must "compel" the conclusion "that Elias-Zacarias had a well-founded fear that the guerrillas
would persecute him because of... political opinion." Id. at 815 n.1 (emphasis in original).
In the single case cited to support these deferential rearticulations of the substantial evidence standard, the Court had held that the NLRB's factual determination was not supported
by substantial evidence and emphasized that the standard requires "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Columbian Enameling,
306 U.S. at 300 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The
1938 ConsolidatedEdison case, in turn, has been employed to interpret the substantial evidence
standard in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a practice supported by the APA's
legislative history. See Breyer, supra note 57, at 852-53 (outlining pertinent legislative history).
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failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion "with the degree of clarity necessary" to justify reversal of
the Board's ruling.2 3 2

The Court rejected the conclusion that resistance to the leftist guerrillas' conscription efforts constituted political persecution.23 3 It first cast

doubt on whether Elias-Zacarias satisfied the threshold prerequisite of
expressing a "political opinion" through his conduct. According to Jus-

tice Scalia, even a sympathizer might refuse to join the guerrillas "for a
variety of reasons-fear of combat, a desire to remain with one's family
'
and friends, a desire to earn a better living in civilian life." 234
Although

not deciding whether neutrality might constitute a political opinion,2 35
the Court speculated that a decision to remain neutral in the midst of
hostilities might be based on "indifference, indecisiveness and risk-ad-

verseness," rather than adherence to political belief.2 36 It was not sufficient that Elias-Zacarias feared that if he joined the guerrillas the
Guatemalan government would retaliate in the harshest ways against
him and his family.2 37 The Court further emphasized that the record
lacked evidence suggesting that the guerrillas attributed any political
In light of his views about the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, see supra
text accompanying notes 54-59, it seems curious for Justice Scalia to consider Columbian Enameling, which relied on ConsolidatedEdison, in analyzing the substantial evidence standard
under the INA of 1952, rather than the APA of 1946. It is, however, consistent with his
interpretation in a lke fashion of similar language in different statutes. See, e.g., Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2037 (1992) (interpreting "relating to" language
in Airline Deregulation Act; as the Court previously had interpreted similar language in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act).
Moreover, Justice Scalia's articulation of the substantial-evidence standard differs radically in tone from that of another former administrative law professor, Justice Frankfurter:
Reviewing courts must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate the
conventional judicial function. Congress has imposed on them responsibility for assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable grounds. That responsibility is not
less real because it is limited to enforcing the requirement that evidence appear sub-

stantial when viewed, on the record as a whole, by courts invested with the authority
and enjoying the prestige of the Courts of Appeals. The Board's findings are entitled
to respect; but they must nonetheless be set aside when the record before a Court of
Appeals clearly precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair estimate
of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters
within its special .competence or both.
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951).
232. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. at 816.
233. Id at 815.
234. Id at 815-16.
235. See id. at 816 ("[W]e need not decide whether the evidence compels the conclusion
that Elias-Zacarias held a political opinion.").
236. Id.
237. Id
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2 31

views to Elias-Zacarias based on his refusal to join.
Though ruminating on the subject, the Court did not rest its holding
on whether Elias-Zacarias expressed a political opinion. The Court instead pointed to the lack of evidence showing that the guerrillas had a
motive to persecute him for his political views. That burden was not
satisfied by the fact that the guerrillas' recruitment efforts were designed
to field an army designed to overthrow the government. 239 Employing
the plain meaning technique, 24 the Court found that
[t]he ordinary meaning of the phrase "persecution on account
of... political opinion".., is persecution on account of the
victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's. If a Nazi regime
persecutes Jews, it is not, within the ordinary meaning of language, engaging in persecution on account of political opinion;
and if a fundamentalist Moslem regime persecutes democrats, it
is not engaging in persecution on account of religion.2 4 '
Consequently, the "generalized 'political' motive" of the guerrillas failed
to convince the Court that Elias-Zacarias established a "'well-founded
fear' [of persecution on account of] political opinion. "242
The Court held that the applicant must demonstrate a nexus between the persecutor's threatened persecution and the applicant's political opinion.243 In other words, the evidence must show that the
persecutor intended to persecute the applicant because of his or her political views. This bright-line motive requirement necessarily will reduce

the number of persons eligible for asylum. 2' Despite requiring evidence

238. Id.; see infra note 279 (discussing the imputed political opinion doctrine).
239. Elias-Zacarias,112 S. Ct. at 816.
240. See id. ("In construing statutes, 'we must, of course, start with the assumption that
the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' ") (citations
omitted).
241. Id. (emphasis in original). It would appear that each asylum applicant in Justice
Scalia's hypotheticals might be eligible for asylum, one based on "persecution on account of
... religion" and the other based on "persecution on account of... political opinion." See
supra text accompanying note 214 (quoting the INA's definition of "refugee").
242. Elias-Zacarias,112 S. Ct. at 816.
243. Id. at 816-17.
244. See Aleinikoff, supra note 156, at 20-21; see also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court
Limits PoliticalAsylum Claims, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 23, 1992, at A20 (discussing claims of immigration experts that Elias-Zacariaswill adversely affect thousands of asylum claims). This is
starkly illustrated by a court of appeals' reversal of its position taken before Elias-Zacariasthat
was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of EliasZacarias. See INS v. Canas-Segovia, 112 S. Ct. 1152 (1992). Although originally finding that
the asylum had established persecution, see Canas-Segovia v. INS, 919 F.2d 717 (9th Cir.
1990), the court on remand held that the asylum applicant had not established "persecution on
account of... religion," despite the fact that he was a Jehovah's Witness who refused to join
the Salvadoran army for religious reasons and feared persecution by the military because of his
refusal to join. See Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1992) ("In light of Elias-
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of the persecutor's motive, the Court granted some latitude to the asylum

applicant in satisfying that evidentiary'burden. The applicant need not
proffer "direct proof of [the] persecutor's motives;"24 however, because
the statute so requires, he "must provide some evidence of it, direct or
circumstantial." 4 6 Elias-Zacarias failed to do so and the Court upheld
the BIA's decision.24 7

Emphasizing that Elias-Zacarias faced "a well-founded fear that he
will be harmed, if not killed, if [deported] to Guatemala," Justice Stevens
dissented. 24 He suggested that because the disputed question was legal
rather than factual (whether, under the uncontroverted facts, Elias-

Zacarias feared "persecution on account of... political opinion"), the
BIA's decision should have been reviewed more carefully.24 9 Justice Stevens then moved on to address the substantive issues.

As in previous attacks on plain meaning methodology, 250 Justice
Stevens challenged the majority's political opinion dicta as a "narrow,
grudging construction of the concept of 'political opinion' " inconsistent
with the "basic approach" to the interpretation of the INA's asylum provisions in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,in which the Court considered everything from legislative history to international law. 2 1 According to
Justice Stevens, "reasoning [similar to that in Cardoza-Fonseca] should

resolve any doubts concerning the political character of an alien's refusal
to take arms against a legitimate government in favor of the alien." 2 2
Zacarias'sadoption of a motive requirement, Canas-Segovia can no longer prove religious persecution.") (citing Elias-Zacarias,112 S. Ct. at 816-17); see also Abedini v. INS, 971 F.2d 188,
192 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that although "Iranian government's prosecution of individuals who propagate Western culture could be labeled a 'political act,' ... [t]hat does not
mean . . . that Iran's prosecution of individuals amounts to persecution") (citing EliasZacarias,112 S. Ct. at 816); Saleh v. United States Dep't of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.
1992) (affirming BIA denial of asylum and withholding of deportation to Yemen national fearing punishment under harsh laws motivated by religion, and citing Elias-Zacariasfor proposition that generalized political motive of persecutors is insufficient to establish political
persecution).
245. Elias-Zacarias,112 S. Ct. at 816.
246. Id. at 817 (emphasis in original).
247. Id.
248. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined in the dissent.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The question of law that the case presents is whether
respondent's well-founded fear is a 'fear of persecution on account of ... political opinion'
within the meaning of" INA.) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
251. Elias-Zacarias,112 S. Ct. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)); see also supra note 219 (discussing Cardoza-Fonseca).
252. Elias-Zacarias,112 S. Ct. at 819 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In light of the Guatemalan
government's questionable human rights record, some might object to Justice Stevens' characterization of it as a "legitimate" government. See, e.g., AMERICAS WATCH & PHYSICIANS FOR
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Defining political opinion broadly to include negative conduct ("staying
home on election day,.... refusing to take an oath of allegiance, or...
refusing to step forward at an induction center") as well as affirmative
actions, 2 3 Justice Stevens attacked the majority's suggestion that refusal
to join the guerrillas failed to constitute expression of a political opinion.
In Justice Steven's view, Elias-Zacarias expressed support for the government and antipathy toward the guerrillas.25 4
Justice Stevens concluded that, based on the guerrillas' threat, EliasZacarias possessed a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of...
political opinion. '25 5 "[T]he statute does not require that an applicant
for asylum prove exactly why his persecutors would act against him
.... "256 Because Elias-Zacarias expressed a political opinion and the
guerrillas threatened to harm him unless he changed those views, Justice
Stevens believed that he satisfied the statute's "on account of"
requirement.25 7
HUMAN

RIGHTS,

GUATEMALA:

GETING AWAY WITH MURDER

(1991);

AMERICAS

WATCH, MESSENGERS OF DEATH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA, NOVEMBER 1988-FEBRUARY 1990 (1990).

253. Elias-Zacarius,112 S. Ct. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even if the refusal is motivated by nothing more than a simple desire to continue living an ordinary life with one's
family, it is the kind of political expression that the asylum provisions of the statute were
intended to protect.").
254. Id. at 819 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The statute speaks simply in terms of a political opinion and does not require that the view be well developed or elegantly expressed.").
255. Id. at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted from a Ninth Circuit opinion,
stating that
[i]t does not matter to the persecutors what the individual's motivation is. The guerrillas in El Salvador do not inquire into the reasoning process of those who insist on
remaining neutral and refuse to join their cause. They are concerned only with an
act that constitutes an overt manifestation of a political opinion. Persecution because
of that overt manifestation is persecution because of a political opinion.
Id. at 819 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287
(9th Cir. 1985)) (footnote omitted).
Justice Stevens differentiated Elias-Zacariasfrom a case in which a government seeks to
conscript an individual for military service. Id. at 819 n.6 (Stevens, J. dissenting). In a cryptic
footnote, he appears to distinguish "illegitimate" (the Afghanistan government while under
Soviet occupation) from "legitimate" governments (El Salvador); those who flee conscription
by "illegitimate" governments are eligible for relief, while those who flee service in the armed
forces of "legitimate" governments are not. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing BIA decisions making this distinction). Such distinctions have been criticized as inviting impermissible
foreign policy judgments into the asylum process. See Aleinikoff, supra note 156, at 16-18.
257. Elias-Zacarias,112 S. Ct. at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At the same time, Justice
Stevens made it clear that even if Elias-Zacarias established "persecution on account of...
political opinion," he was not automatically entitled to asylum and that the agency had discretion to grant or deny relief. Id. at 817-18 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The BIA, however,
has substantially narrowed its discretion and established a rule that it rarely will deny asylum
on discretionary grounds. See In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 474 (BIA 1987) ("ruling that,
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Elias-Zacariasclearly reflects the plain meaning and deference doctrines at work. As suggested by the literalist approach, the Court ignored the plight of Elias-Zacarias and the many others like him who
have fled war-torn Central America in fear for their lives. Although it
was undisputed that if deported Elias-Zacarias faced a well-founded fear
of persecution-political or otherwise-Justice Scalia disregarded the
fact that Elias-Zacarias fled a politically-charged environment marred by
daily violence, callously speculating that he simply may have resisted recruitment for "fear of combat, a desire to remain with [his] family and
friends, [or] a desire to earn a better living in civilian life."2 8 Indeed,
Justice Scalia appeared to relish finding Elias-Zacarias to be ineligible for
relief.
The Court's plain meaning interpretation of the Refugee Act unfortunately overlooks the heavy evidentiary burden on asylum applicants,
who often have fled their native lands with little more than the clothes on
their back. For obvious reasons, it is difficult to establish the intent of
persecutors, who often are short on words, rarely state their true motivations, and historically have been known to engage in mass terrorism with
little regard for the individual's political views.2" 9 Put bluntly, the

Court's plain meaning reading of the INA's text was not only naked of
context and devoid of reality, but also indifferent to the harshness of its
impact.
Moreover, as Justice Stevens observed, Elias-Zacarias'splain meaning approach is wholly inconsistent with the multifaceted (if not freewheeling) approach of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, which included
consideration of legislative history, Congress's purpose, and international
law, all of which were relevant to Congress in passing the Refugee
Act."26 The majority failed to reconcile Cardoza-Fonseca'sliberal interpretation of the well-founded fear of persecution standard with EliasZacarias'snarrow "on account of" construction. Consideration of extrajudicial materials was particularly appropriate because the broad language of the statute did not inexorably lead to the conclusion that EliasZacarias was ineligible for relief. Fairly read, the language was at best
ambiguous on the point in question. Contrary to the statutory canon
that ambiguities in deportation statutes be interpreted in favor of immiabsent "most egregious of adverse factors," a refugee is entitled to favorable exercise of
discretion).
258. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. at 816.
259. See, eg., AMNESTY INT'L, KAMPUCHEA: POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT AND TORTURE
16-18 (1987) (describing often indiscriminate human rights violations by communist government of Kampuchea).
260. See supra note 219.
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grants,2 61 the Court interpreted this ambiguity against the asylum262

seeker.
A reasonable interpretation of the Refugee Act of 1980 would have
been based, at least in part, on evidence of Congressional directive. The
Court failed to consider the humanitarian purposes behind Congress's
passage of the Refugee Act, which amended the INA to provide for asylum for the first time in American law.2 6 The legislative history further
reveals that the Refugee Act was designed to conform United States law
with international law, 2" specifically the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.265 International law, in turn, suggests that
nations should be liberal, not grudging, when looking to the motives behind a persecutor's threats.266
Despite the holding of Elias-Zacarias,one would hope that the INS,
BIA, and the courts of appeals will take note of the Supreme Court's
point that the applicant need not offer direct evidence of the persecutor's
motives. 267 As fact-finders do in making the difficult inquiry into the
"intent" of persons in other contexts,2 68 immigration judges should
weigh circumstantialevidence and the totality of the circumstances in
deciding whether reasonable inferences, often based on patterns and
261. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449-50 (1987) (citing authority); see also
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:

RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY

STATE 166-67, 187 (1990) (discussing statutory canon that laws be interpreted in favor of
discrete and insular minorities); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1032-34 (1989) (same). For discussion of the selective use of
canons of statutory construction by the Rehnquist Court, see infra note 371.
262. But cf Aleinikoff, supra note 156, at 27-28 (advocating that BIA generally should
grant asylum to those who have established likelihood of persecution if deported).
263. See generally Anker & Posner, supra note 197 (discussing the legislative history of the
Refugee Act of 1980).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201.
265. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor accession Jan.

31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
266. See Aleinikoff, supra note 156, at 11 ("The history of [the relevant treaties] ... provides no support for a narrow reading of the grounds of persecution, but rather displays an
intent to write a definition of refugee broad enough to cover then-existing victims of persecution."); see also Walter Kalin, Refugees and Civil Wars: Only a Matter of Interpretation?,3
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 435, 449 (1991) ("For courts or officials it is very often impossible to
determine the intentions of authorities of a foreign State. Even if this can be done, the question
arises as to whose intention is decisive: internationally relevant actions of States often cannot
be reduced to a decision of an individual person .... ").
267. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992).
268. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982) (equal protection); Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 165 (1979) (First Amendment). Circumstantial evidence, missing from
the record in Elias-Zacarias,could include reports from reputable human rights organizations.
These reports might establish that guerrilla organizations persecute those who refuse to serve
in their forces because they impute to them certain political views, such as sympathy for the
government. See infra note 279 (discussing imputed political opinion doctrine).
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practices of conduct, may be made about the persecutor's motive. Obviously, not every Jew in Hitler's Germany should have been forced to bear

the extraordinary, generally insurmountable burden of establishing that
the Nazi government singled out that particular individual for religious
persecution. In fact, INS regulations acknowledge that, regardless of the
particular situation of the individual, heinous persecutors sometimes target entire classes of people for persecution. 6 9
By employing a plain meaning approach, Elias-Zacariasreaches a
result quintessentially deferential to the BIA. The Court applied the substantial-evidence standard of review because in its estimation, the BIA
decision was a factual one. But as Justice Stevens and the parties viewed
it,2 0 the question in dispute was a legal one: on the factual record before
the Court, did Elias-Zacarias establish the statutory prerequisite of "persecution on account of . . . political opinion"? Despite Chevron, the
Court has been willing at times to subject "legal" interpretations of agencies to more demanding scrutiny than mere fact-findings.2 7 1 Such scrutiny was warranted in Elias-Zacarias.
But even assuming that the Court applied the correct review standard, it re-articulated the substantial-evidence standard in a way most
deferential to the decisions of the BIA. z72 The Court essentially approached the case as simply another "review of agency action" case. No
particular attention was paid to the nature or purpose of the particular
statute being applied, to the evidence of bias by the INS and the BIA in
asylum decisionmaking, or to the delicate life and liberty interests at
stake.
Most importantly, the Court failed to address facts that seriously
undermine deferral to the BIA, particularly the Board's inconsistent application of the same statutory language depending on the nationality of
the applicant. Specifically, the Board in the past was willing to grant
asylum to persons who resisted conscription into Afghanistan's Soviet269. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(A) (1992) (providing that asylum applicant need not
prove that he or she has been singled out for persecution if it can be shown that there is a
pattern and practice of persecution of similarly situated persons).
270. See Brief for Petitioner, 9-11, INS v. Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 90-1342);
Brief for Respondent, 6-9, Zacarias (No. 90-1342); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 18 n.13,
Zacarias(No. 90-1342); see also Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d
1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (treating similar question as "legal" in nature).
271. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987); see also Japan Whaling
Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (reviewing agency interpretation
as "purely legal question of statutory interpretation"). But see Merrill, supra note 26, at 986
(criticizing Cardoza-Fonsecaon this point and discussing inconsistency in caselaw about review of "pure" questions of law versus application of law).
272. See supra note 231; supra text accompanying notes 230-32.
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backed army27 3 while rejecting those, such as Elias-Zacarias, who fled a
United States-supported regime in Central America under remarkably
similar circumstances.274 Even under Chevron's reign, the Rehnquist
Court generally has refused to defer to inconsistent statutory interpretations by agencies in adjudications.27 5 That, however, was not its inclination in Elias-Zacarias.
One can only hope that the Court's deferential approach in EliasZacariasdoes not signal a return to an era of executive branch domination over immigration matters.2 76 The horrendous treatment of immigrants at various times in American history shows the need for
meaningful judicial review of the executive branch's treatment of refugees. 277 The Court's deferential approach, however, undoubtedly will
tend to discourage appeals and encourage courts of appeals to defer to
agency decisions with a minimum of review.
Elias-Zacarias,of course, did not change any of the INA's judicial
review requirements. The court must review the record as a whole to
ensure that the agency's legal conclusions are consistent with the mandate of the INA, as amended by the Refugee Act. Nor can the court
defer to the agency's fact findings, unless, as the statute requires, they are
"supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. '2 78 Whether the agencies and the lower
courts will adhere to these standards, in light of the heavy deference
overtones in the Court's opinion, remains to be seen.279
273. See In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982); see also In re Izatula, No. 3127 (BIA
1990) (interim decision) (recognizing that refusal to serve in Afghanistan military prior to the
withdrawal of Soviet forces could serve as the basis for granting asylum).
274. See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Immigration Lawyers Association In Support
of Respondent, 8-9, Zacarias(No. 90-1243) (outlining inconsistencies in detail).
275. See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2524, 2534 (1991); EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1234 (1991); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216-17 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Tihe principles announced in an
adjudication cannot be departed from in future adjudications without reason.").
276. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35 (discussing plenary power doctrine). EliasZacarias,however, already has been cited by reviewing courts affirming BIA decisions for the
proposition that the substantial evidence standard is a very deferential one. See, eg., Ravindran v. INS, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 24113 (Ist Cir. Sept 30, 1992); Nathan v. INS, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25207 (10th Cir. Sept. 29, 1992) (unpublished mem.); Castillo-Bendana v. INS, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 20222 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1992); Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 163 (7th
Cir. 1992); Abedini v. INS, 971 F.2d 188, 191 (9th Cir. 1992); Kyambadde v. INS, No. 919505, 91-9506, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16046, at *5 (10th Cir. July 6, 1992); Klawitter v. INS,
970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992); Ahmadi v. Board of Immigration Appeals, No. 91-1823,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12332, at *9-10 (4th Cir. June 1, 1992); Narayan v. INS, No. 91-70034,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7109, at *5-6 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 1992).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 130-35.
278. INA § 106(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § l105a(a)(4) (1988).
279. Besides adopting broad plain meaning and deference rules applicable to asylum cases,
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In terms of black-letter asylum law, the Court's decision in EliasZacariastells us very little. The only "holding" of the case is that an

unfortunate young Guatemalan failed to provide sufficient evidence to
justify reversal of the BIA's finding that he did not establish a "wellfounded fear of persecution on account of... political opinion." Numerous questions remain unanswered. Nevertheless, the decision offers some

troubling insights into the Rehnquist Court's mindset about judicial review of BIA asylum rulings. According to the Court, the INA should be
interpreted like any other law, and the BIA's asylum rulings deserve the
same deference as that of any other agency. The Court is unwilling to

inquire further, and neither should the lower courts. Such a result tends
to minimize review costs, discourage litigation, and reduce appeals of

asylum decisions. At the same time, it sanctions deportation of Central
Americans such as Elias-Zacarias to countries where they have every reason to believe that they will be persecuted.
2. INS v. Doherty

Joseph Patrick Doherty, once a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), was convicted in absentia in the United Kingthe majority opinion included disturbing dicta concerning the interpretation of the asylum

provisions of the INA. The Court suggested that neutrality never may constitute the expression of a political opinion, despite acknowledging that such speculation was completely unnecessary to its holding. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992). The Court's dicta,
therefore, should not be read as silently overruling well-established lower court precedent that,
for asylum purposes, affirmative conduct evidencing neutrality in certain circumstances may
constitute a political opinion. See, eg., Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1,3 (1st Cir. 1990);
Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984). As the Court emphasized,
the record in Elias-Zacariaswas somewhat opaque about whether the applicant held a political
opinion of any sort. The BIA, however, citing Elias-Zacarias,has held that a former guerrilla
who received a series of death threats upon leaving the group failed to establish that he expressed a political opinion. Therefore, the applicant could not demonstrate a "well-founded
fear of persecution on account of... political opinion." See In re R- 0-, No. 3170 (BIA Apr.
22, 1992) (interim decision).
Further, the Court cryptically placed in question whether the imputation of a political
opinion to Elias-Zacarias by the guerrillas satisfies the "persecution on account of... political
opinion" requirement. Elias-Zacarias,112 S. Ct. at 816 ("Nor is there any indication (assuming, arguendo, it would suffice) that the guerrillas erroneously believed that Elias-Zacarias'
refusal [to join] was politically based."). As recognized in the lower courts, the "imputed
political opinion" doctrine works as follows: when persecutors for some (perhaps erroneous)
reason impute a political opinion to an asylum-applicant, the imputation may support a claim
of "persecution on account of... political opinion." See, e.g., Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d
1, 4 (1st Cir. 1990); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1985); see also
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, supra note 219, 11 80-83
(1979) (stating that government's persecution of persons to whom it attributes political views
different from those of the government constitutes persecution on account of political opinion).
Despite the dicta in Elias-Zacarias,the doctrine has remained viable in at least one court of
appeals. See Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1992).
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dom of killing a British soldier in battle.2 8 ° Ruling that Doherty's crimes
constituted "political offenses" precluding extradition under the applicable treaty, the district court rejected the attempt of the United States to
extradite Doherty to the United Kingdom. 2 8' Unwilling to abandon the
effort to return Doherty to England, the INS instituted deportation proceedings. With the approval of the immigration court and the BIA, Doherty agreed to be deported to Ireland, rather than the United Kingdom,
and to waive any claim to asylum and withholding of deportation.2 82 Because he believed that Doherty's deportation to Ireland "would be prejudicial to United States' interests," Attorney General Edwin Meese
reversed the BIA's ruling.2 8 3
On remand, the BIA granted a motion to reopen deportation proceedings so that Doherty would be permitted to apply for asylum and

withholding of deportation.284 A new Attorney General, Richard
Thornburgh, once again reversed.2 85 Addressing Doherty's asylum
claim, he emphasized that United States foreign policy mandated Doherty's return to the United Kingdom and justified a negative exercise of
discretion.2 86 The Attorney General further concluded that Doherty was

ineligible for withholding of deportation because of his PIRA activities.2 87 In denying those claims, the Attorney General admittedly did

not consider the possible political persecution that Doherty might suffer
if deported to the United Kingdom.288
280. 908 F.2d 1108, 1110-11 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
281. See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
282. See Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1111-12.
283. See id. at 1112; see also 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1992) (authorizing Attorney General review). Unlike the highly unusual intervention in Doherty, the Attorney General reviews relatively few cases and usually only resolves legal questions. See, e.g., In re Belenzo, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 374 (Att'y Gen. 1981).
284. Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1112; see 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1992) (authorizing motion to reopen
deportation proceedings).
285. See Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1113.
286. See id. at 1119-21. Attorney General Thornburgh emphasized that" 'it is "the policy
of the United States that those who commit acts of violence against a democratic state should
receive prompt and lawful punishment." . . . Deporting [Doherty] to the United Kingdom
would unquestionably advance this important policy.' " Id. (citation omitted); see supra text
accompanying note 214 (quoting asylum provisions of INA delegating discretion to Attorney
General to grant asylum to "refugee").
287. See Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1116-17. The Attorney General based his conclusion on the
finding, without a hearing, that Doherty had committed a "serious nonpolitical crime outside
the United States," INA § 243(h)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1988), and engaged in
political persecution, see id. § 243(h)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(A). See Doherty, 908 F.2d
at 1116-17.
288. See Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1114-15. These claims are not frivolous on their face. The
Department of State has acknowledged that British courts have convicted PIRA members of
alleged terrorist offenses based on coerced confessions and false evidence and that the right to
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-

versed.2" 9 Finding that through passage of the Refugee Act, "[Congress
made it clear that factors such as the government's geopolitical and foreign policy interests were not legitimate concerns of asylum," the court
held that the Attorney General improperly considered foreign policy in

finding Dohertyperse ineligible for asylum.29 The court also found that
because of the mandatory nature of withholding of deportation, the Attorney General lacked discretion to deny Doherty the opportunity to ap-

ply for such relief.291
The Supreme Court, in a decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed.292 A majority of the Court joined only one portion of the
Chief Justice's opinion,2 93 which in large part recounted the teachings of
the Court's precedents on motions to reopen.2 94 Because of the fragmented nature of the opinion, Doherty held only that the Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying reopening on the ground that
Doherty "failed to adduce new material evidence or... to satisfactorily
explain his previous withdrawal of" his asylum and withholding of deportation claims.2 95 In so holding, the Court emphasized that the Attorney General acted within "the broad discretion vested in him by the

applicable regulations.

'296

Through this reasoning, the Court declined

to decide whether the Attorney General properly found Doherty ineligible for relief and, more specifically, whether foreign policy might be

weighed in the exercise of discretion on an asylum claim.297
jury trial has been suspended for certain "terrorist-related" offenses in Northern Ireland. See
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 7, at 1326-27.
289. Doherty, 908 F.2d at 1122.
290. Id. at 1119. In so doing, the court emphasized that the Attorney General may not
weigh "'considerations that Congress could not have intended to make relevant' " when exercising discretion on an asylum claim. Id. at 1117-18 (quoting Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360
F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966)) (quoting United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessey, 180
F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950)).
291. Id at 1117. The Second Circuit affirmed Attorney General Meese's conclusion that
United States foreign policy concerns precluded Doherty's deportation to Ireland. Id at 1113.
292. INS v. Doherty, 112 S.Ct. 719 (1992). Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 721.
293. Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined Part I of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, the only part that commanded a majority. Id.
294. Id. at 724-25. The Court discussed the precedents set by INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94,
99 n.3, 104-05, 107-08 (1988), INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446, 449-50 (1985), and INS
v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 n.6 (1984).
295. Doherty, 112 S.Ct. at 725.
296. Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
297. Id. at 724. In arguing to the Supreme Court, the INS unequivocally insisted that,
even if the applicant has established a well-founded fear of persecution, the Attorney General
may deny asylum because of United States foreign policy. See Official Testimony of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States, INS v. Doherty, at 25, . 20-25 (Oct. 16,
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A motion to reopen is a privilege bestowed by regulation, rather
than a statutory right. 298 The regulation grants the administrative agent
the authority to determine whether "evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or
presented at the former hearing."2 99 According to the Court, the Attorney General's "'broad discretion' " on motions to reopen 300 was justified
on the ground that such motions
are disfavored for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing, and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. . . . This is especially true in a deportation
proceeding where, as a general matter, every delay works to the
advantage of the deportable
alien who wishes merely to remain
30 1
in the United States.

The Court previously had recognized three justifications for denial
of motions to reopen, with BIA denial on any of these grounds reviewed
for abuse of discretion: "[1] failure to establish a prima facie case for the
relief sought, [2] failure to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence, and [3] a determination that even if these requirements were satisfied, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionarygrant of relief
which he sought. ' 30 2 In Doherty, however, the Court extended the abuseof-discretion standard to rulings on motions to reopen to apply for a
mandatory form of relief (withholding of deportation), as well as a discretionary one (asylum).30 3
1991) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review Association). Congress, however, clearly
intended the Refugee Act to eliminate foreign policy from asylum decisionmaking. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 434-35 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 427 (1984); Johnson, supra note 6, at 291-92 n.47; Martin, supra note 147, at 1261-62; Schuck, supra note 208,
at 7; see also Anker, supra note 215, at 6-16 (discussing limited nature of discretion on asylum
claims).
298. See Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 724.
299. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987).
300. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 724 (quoting INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985)).
301. Id. at 724-25 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Note that this is not necessarily
true if the immigrant is barred from employment, see infra text accompanying notes 380-449
(discussing INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 551 (1991)), or remains in detention, see infra text accompanying note 325, while proceedings are pending.
302. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 725 (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988)) (emphasis added).
303. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 214-20 (discussing asylum and withholding of
deportation).
In Part II of his opinion, which was joined only by Justices White, Blackmun and
O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that neither the Attorney General's refusal to
deport Doherty to Ireland nor the change in Irish extradition law that ensured his return to
the United Kingdom constituted "new material evidence" necessary for reopening. See Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 725-26 (plurality opinion). In reaching that conclusion, the plurality further emphasized that
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In a concurring and dissenting opinion, 3" Justice Scalia agreed that
the Attorney General had the discretion to conclude that "Doherty is a
sufficiently unsavory character [so as] not to be granted asylum in this
country," and so could refuse to reopen the proceedings to allow Doherty to apply for asylum. 05 Withholding of deportation, however,
stood on different footing.30 6 Although a decision on a motion to reopen
is discretionary, "[e]ven discretion .. has its legal limits. ' 30 7 The critical distinction to Justice Scalia between Doherty and previous reopening
decisions was that the latter involved attempts to apply for discretionary,
not mandatory, relief.30 Doherty therefore should be 30given
the opportu9
nity to present the withholding of deportation claim.
Doherty is an extraordinary case with a legally and factually com[t]he BIA is simply a statutory creatureof the Attorney General,to which he has delegated much of his authorityunder the applicablestatutes. He is the final administrative authority in construing the regulations, and in deciding questions under them.
...The mere fact that he disagrees with a conclusion of the BIA in construing or
applying a regulation cannot support a conclusion that he abused his discretion.
Id. at 726-27 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying notes 152-78 (discussing BIA's lack of independence).
In Part III of the opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy argued that the
Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in finding, as grounds for denying reopening,
that Doherty waived his claims for relief "by withdrawing them at the first hearing to obtain a
tactical advantage." Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 727.
304. Doherty, 112 S.Ct. at 728 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part). He was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter.
305. Id. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
306. See id. at 728 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
307. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
308. See id. at 729-30 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(stating "'in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary (asylum, suspension of
deportation, and adjustment of status, but not withholding of deportation), the BIA may leap
ahead ...and simply determine that even if they were met, the movant would not be entitled
to the discretionary grant of relief' ") (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988))
(emphasis in original). In this analysis, Justice Scalia emphasized that Congress amended
§ 243(h) of the INA to conform domestic law to the United States obligations under the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. See id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
309. Id. at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that by withdrawing his claims, Doherty
waived them. Because the waiver was conditioned on deportation to Ireland, the Attorney
General's rejection of Doherty's deportation to Ireland constituted material "new evidence" to
Justice Scalia. See id. at 732-33 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Scalia thought it arbitrary to allow the Attorney General to consider evidence
proffered by the INS for the first time on appeal while at the same time precluding Doherty
from applying for asylum because of an alleged procedural default. Id. at 733-35 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia would have remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Doherty committed a "serious nonpolitical crime" making him ineligible for withholding of de-
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310
plex set of circumstances rarely, if ever, duplicated in an asylum case.
The Court held only that, in large part because of his initial agreement to

deportation, Doherty failed to establish that the Attorney General
abused his discretion in denying a motion to reopen. Nevertheless, the
Court's reasoning in Doherty has some troubling implications.

Using plain meaning analysis, the Court summarily concluded that
the regulation bestows not simple "discretion" but "broad discretion" on
the Attorney General on motions to reopen. 3 11 That conclusion, consistent with the Rehnquist Court's docket-clearing mindset, severely limits
review on such motions. Moreover, the Court held that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to denials of motions to reopen even if
it precludes a hearing on a claim for relief that Congress expressly made
mandatory. 3 12 The Court effectively allowed the Attorney General,
under circumstances strongly suggesting political maneuvering, to exercise discretion granted by a regulationto deny an immigrant the opportunity to apply for relief. That relief, however, was mandatory under a
statute passed by Congress. Congress understandably could not have envisioned that the Attorney General could lawfully circumvent its express

directive.3 13
In utilizing a plain meaning approach, the Court reached a result
portation. Id. at 735-36 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)

(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1988)).
310. The case also is extraordinary in the amount of press attention that it attracted, see,
e.g., James Barron, I.R.A. FugitiveSent to Belfastfrom US.Jail,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1992, at
Al; Wade Lambert, The Drawn-OutCase of an Irish GuerrillaReaches High Court, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 17, 1991, at 1, as well as the political interest that it sparked, see, ag., S. Con. Res. 62,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (entitled "Relating to Political Asylum to Joseph Patrick Doherty," Brief for Amici Curiae Members of the United States Senate and Members of United
States House of Representatives in Support of Respondent, Doherty (No. 90-925) (joined by
132 members of Congress); Brief of Amici Curiae, Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice,
908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990) (Nos. 88-4084, 89-4092) (joined by 46 members of Congress).
311. In response to that signal, lower courts and the BIA have cited Doherty for the proposition that great deference to the BIA's rulings on motions to reopen is warranted. See Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1992); Wijeratne v. INS, 961 F.2d 1344,
1347-48 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Caelho, No. 3172 (BIA April 30, 1992) (interim decision).
312. In so doing, the majority effectively ignored what it recognized in INS v. Stevie, 467
U.S. 407, 413, 425-26 (1984): that the Refugee Act expressly amended the INA to make
withholding of deportation a mandatory remedy in order to comply with international law and
eliminated any and all discretion to deny relief to an applicant who has established a clear
probability of persecution. See supra text accompanying notes 214-20.
313. Of course, the Attorney General may promulgate and apply reasonable regulations
governing the procedure for applying for mandatory relief without reopening every matter in
which the applicant seeks to apply for withholding of deportation. But, when the circumstances suggest that the agency is exercising discretion under a procedural regulation that
appears designed to avert Congressional mandate, denial of the opportunity to apply for such
relief is most problematic.
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deferential to the INS. Similar to the approach in Elias-Zacarias, 14 the
Court treated the Attorney General's ruling in Doherty as simply another
"review of agency action" case. The numerous procedural red flags
made it clear that Doherty deserved much more than the Court's cursory
treatment. Doherty is unlike any other case addressed by the Supreme
Court involving a motion to reopen in that it is the only one in which the
Attorney General personally intervened on one, much less two, occasions.315 This is not a situation in which it can be said with much confidence that the courts should defer to the Attorney General's expertise.
Having lost in the attempt to extradite Doherty to the United Kingdom, 3 16 the Attorney General reversed the BIA in order to return Doherty. To do so, the Attorney General expressly invoked foreign policy
desires as the rationale for Doherty's deportation. Such motivations,
however, violate the neutral aspirations of the Refugee Act. 17 Employing the familiar deference theme, the Court ignored the possibility that
the Attorney General's foreign policy interests motivated his narrow
reading of the applicable regulations and statutes. 3 18 The clear potential
for bias, particularly when combined with the gravity of the life and liberty interests implicated in an asylum and withholding of deportation
decision, justified much more than simple deference.319 In light of such
facts, the Attorney General's extraordinary intervention cried out for rigorous, not passive, review.
The Doherty Court's deferential approach to the Attorney General's
decisions through transformation of discretion to broad discretion in the
motion to reopen regulation is ominous. In that vein, in agreeing with a
unanimous Court on denial of the motion to reopen to apply for asylum,
Justice Scalia found it sufficient to justify the exercise of discretion that
Doherty was an "unsavory character, ' 320 a conclusory characterization
made without a hearing. The BIA, however, has narrowed its discretion
significantly and never has claimed the authority to deny asylum on such
amorphous impressions. 32 ' Read literally, Doherty suggests that the
314. See supra text accompanying notes 221-79.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 280-88.
316. See supra text accompanying note 281.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201.
318. The Court further ignored evidence that the Executive Branch's asylum decisions as a
whole reflect bias of that sort. See generally Johnson, supra note 6, at 320-60 (reviewing asylum decisions of the executive branch and concluding that "[foreign policy bias ... permeates" such decisions).

319. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
320. INS v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719, 730 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part,
dissenting in part).

321. See In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 473-74 (BIA 1987).
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facially open-ended delegations of discretion to the executive branch so
322
common to the INA should be construed virtually without limits.
Even though such a reading would be contrary to the clear weight of
authority, 323 the Court suggested that the plain meaning of "discretion"
is "unlimited discretion."
Perhaps most distressing is Doherty's bottom line. Joseph Patrick
Doherty's simple desire to avoid return to the United Kingdom resulted
in a procedural morass with clear political overtones in which he was
denied a hearing on his claims for relief. At no time did any agency hear
evidence of Doherty's claims of alleged political persecution. Nor did the

Attorney General appear particularly concerned with that possibility.
Rather than recognizing that Doherty's life and liberty were at issue in
the administrative proceeding, the Court implied that immigrants generally engage in dilatory tactics to delay their deportation.3 2 4 In light of
the fact that Doherty remained imprisoned during eight years of extradition and deportation proceedings, 325 there was little evidence supporting
such a claim.
All in all, Doherty would appear to have limited precedential value.
It remains to be seen how the Court, and the lower courts, vill approach
similar questions in the future. Doherty's strong plain meaning and deference themes send ominous signals about how this Court will apply
those doctrines to immigration law. The decision also shows that, despite the most obvious danger signs of impermissible bias, the Court will
not heighten its review of agency action. An agency decision is an
agency decision is an agency decision ....
B.

(No) Attorneys' Fees for Refugees: Ardestani v. INS

Charges persist that the INS engages in tactics with the impact, and
perhaps the intent, of deterring immigrants, particularly asylum-seekers,
from pursuing their claims to relief from deportation. 26 For example, in
Commissioner,INS v. Jean,32 7 the Court found that the INS, in defend322. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05.
324. See Doherty, 112 S. Ct. at 724-25; supra text accompanying note 301.
325. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 205 (2d Cir. 1991), cert dismissed, 112 S. Ct.
1254 (1992).
326. See supra text accompanying notes 130-90.
327. 496 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1990) (holding that INS was required to pay attorneys' fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act in class action). As the district court summarized,
[t]he government took an unusually unwavering and litigious position throughout
the litigation. Many of the government's contentions and litigating postures were

unwarranted and unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. The government used all of
its considerable resources in opposing Plaintiffs' contentions at every turn. From
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ing its detention policies toward Haitian asylum-seekers and expedited

exclusion proceedings, asserted wholly unjustified legal positions that required nearly ten years of litigation. Some have even claimed that the
INS resists the vast majority of asylum applications without regard to the
merits of individual claims.328 One way of curbing such bureaucratic
abuse might be to require the INS to pay the attorneys' fees of the applicants when its opposition is wholly unfounded. In Ardestani v. INS,3 29
however, the Supreme Court limited the ability to use fees as a deterrent
to INS misconduct.

Rafeh-Rafie Ardestani, an Iranian woman of Bahai faith, sought
asylum in the United States.330 The State Department concluded that
Ardestani's asylum application established a "well-founded fear of persepre-trial discovery, through trial and successive appeals, the government moved for
stays of Court Orders, forced repeated applications for emergency relief, put Plaintiffs in a posture requiring a brief on all pleaded issues, on every motion, and opposed, in fact as well as law, each and every important issue asserted by Plaintiffs.
Louis v. Nelson, 646 F. Supp. 1300, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 1986); see also Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d
759, 762 (11th Cir. 1988) (describing case as a "long, complex, and bitterly contested lawsuit").
The executive branch's course of conduct in litigation involving Haitians seems to have
been undeterred by the attorneys' fees award in Jean. The United States recently sought monetary sanctions under Rule 11 from plaintiffs' attorneys, including Yale Law School Professor
Harold Hongju Koh, for filing an action challenging the executive's interdiction and repatriation of Haitians, and sought a $10 million bond as security for the action, the largest ever in
the Second Circuit. See Marcia Chambers, Sua Sponte, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 15; see
also Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327,
1338-53 (1986) (suggesting that Rule 11 sanctions chill vigorous advocacy, particularly in civil
rights actions). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately ruled in favor of plaintiffs. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1367 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
113 S.Ct. 52 (Oct. 5, 1992).
328. See John P. Stern, Note, Applying the EqualAccess to JusticeAct to Asylum Hearings,
97 YALE L.J. 1459, 1471 (1988) (describing pattern of "vigorous opposition [by INS] to adjudicated asylum claims, often irrespective of the merits").
329. 112 S.Ct. 515 (1991). Ardestani is indicative of the Rehnquist Court's hostility the
toward awarding of attorneys' fees, a practice designed to encourage certain types of litigation.
See also, City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S.Ct. 2638 (1992) (rejecting multiplier of fees for
risk assumed by attorney in environmental case); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey,
111 S.Ct. 1138 (1991) (holding that expert witness fees were not recoverable as part of "reasonable" attorneys' fee); Schultz v. Hembree, 968 F.2d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J.)
(reversing attorneys' fees award and emphasizing that "[w]e live in a society which, unfortunately, sanctions the view that litigation is a proper response to many of life's hard knocks"
and criticizing "[l]awyers capitalizing on this phenomenon"). The logic of Ardestanihas been
applied to bar recovery of attorneys' fees under the EAJA in other types of administrative
proceedings. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Reilly, 966 F.2d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(environmental proceeding under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); Dart v. United
States, 961 F.2d 284, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (export-control proceeding under Export Administration Act).
330. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 517.
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cution on account of... religion" if deported to Iran.331 Nonetheless,
the INS denied her application and sought to deport her. 332 The immigration court granted Ardestani asylum.3 3 3 Finding that the INS's opposition was not "substantially justified," the immigration court awarded
Ardestani the modest sum of approximately $1,000 in attorneys' fees
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).33 4 The BIA reversed,3 35
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.33 6
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, also affirmed.33 7 The Court focused almost exclusively on the relevant language of the EAJA:
[A]n agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall
award, to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees
and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with
that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency
finds that the position of the agency was substantially338justified
or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
The EAJA further defines "adversary adjudication" as "an adjudication
under section 554 of this title. ' 339 Section 554 outlines the formal adjudication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 3 ° The
Court held that a deportation proceeding, which is not governed by the
'
APA, was not an adversary adjudication "under section 554. 341

In reaching that conclusion, the plain meaning approach carried the
331. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 158-62 (discussing State Department
advisory opinions on asylum applications).
332. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 517. The INS argued that because Ardestani stayed in Luxembourg for three days while en route to the United States, she established "safe haven" there.
Id. The BIA, however, has held that even firm resettlement in a country does not render a
person per se ineligible for asylum. See In re Soleimani, No. 3118, at 6-7 (BIA July 13, 1989)
(interim decision).
333. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 517.
334. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988).
335. Ardestani, 112 S. Ct. at 517. The BIA vacated the decision and denied the award on
the ground that the Attorney General has declared that deportation decisions are not within
the scope of the EAJA. Id.
336. Ardestani v. INS, 904 F.2d 1505, 1515 (11th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 515 (1991).
337. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 521. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or
decision in the case. Id. at 517. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the
circuits. Id. at 518 & n.1.
338. Id. at 518 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988)) (emphasis added).
339. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1988) (emphasis added).
340. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1988).
341. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 519.
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day. Because the APA does not apply to deportation proceedings,

342

the

Court reasoned that they are not adversary adjudications "under Section
554," even though they are similar in most salient respects to APA-sanctioned proceedings. 343 The relevant statutory language-"an adjudication under section 554"-was "unambiguous" according to the Court.344

Though emphasizing that the "starting point" is the language of the statute,34 5 the Court admitted that "'under' has many dictionary meanings

and must draw its meaning from its context. ' 346 Without inquiry into
the relevant context, the Court relied on the Act's "most natural reading" and observed that six courts of appeals had concluded that "the

plain and ordinary meaning of 'under' "in the EAJA is that the proceedings must be governed by the APA.34 7
A majority of the Court expressly endorsed a potent version of the
plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation: "The 'strong presumption' that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional
intent is rebutted only in 'rare and exceptional circumstances,'. . . when
a contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed. ' 34 8 The Court con-

cluded that the EAJA's legislative history failed to "overcome the strong
presumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used. ' 349 Although admitting that Congress's

only intent in defining adversary adjudications might have been to limit
recovery of fees "to trial-type proceedings in which the Government is
342. See id. at 518-19 (relying on Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955), which held
that the APA does not apply to immigration proceedings).
343. Id. at 519. The Court reached its conclusion even though the Attorney General in
1983 promulgated regulations that made deportation proceedings closely conform to the
APA's formal adjudication procedures. Id. (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 8038-40 (1983)); see also
FRYE, supra note 220, at 30 (noting that in light of fact that EOIR adjudications are similar to
formal adjudications under APA, there is no "obvious reason" why they should not be subject
to §§ 556 and 557). The Court also rejected Ardestani's argument that deportation proceedings fall "under section 554" for EAJA purposes because, like APA adjudications, they must
be determined on the record after a hearing. Ardestani, 112 S. Ct. at 519; see INA § 242(b), 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988) (detailing proceedings to determine deportability).
344. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 519.
345. Id. (citations omitted).
346. Id.
347. Id. The Court also observed, as a lower court had recognized in other contexts, that
"'under' means 'subject [or pursuant] to' or 'by reason of the authority of,'" id. (quoting St.
Louis Fuel & Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1989)), and that "under" was
used in other sections of the EAJA to serve as a cross-reference to other sections of the Act.
Id. at 519 n.2 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)(2), (c)(2), (d) (1988)).
348. Id. at 520 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987), and Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). That presumption apparently would be overcome when adherence to the literal language would
produce an absurd result. See supra text accompanying note 59.
349. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 520 (citations omitted) (quotation marks in original deleted).
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represented,"3 5 the Court found that the EAJA's legislative history
lacked any "conclusive statement" about the reference to section 554.351

The Court was not swayed by the statement in the Conference Committee Report 3 2 that adversary adjudications are those as "defined under"
the APA, nor by a change in a draft of the EAJA defining "adversary

adjudication" as "an adjudication subject to section 554" to "an adjudication under section 554. ''353 Consequently, the Court literally interpreted the statutory text.

In accepting a plain meaning interpretation, the Court admitted that
"[t]he clearly stated objective of the EAJA is to eliminate financial disin-

centives for those who would defend against unjustified governmental action and thereby to deter the unreasonable exercise of Government
authority. 3' 5 4 Furthermore, the Court returned to the context ignored
by its plain meaning tack and candidly acknowledged that
[wJe have no doubt that the broad purposes of the EAJA would

be served by making the statute applicable to deportation proceedings. We are mindful that the complexity of immigration

procedures, and the enormity of the interests at stake, make
legal representation in deportation proceedings especially important. We acknowledge that Ardestani has been forced to
shoulder the financial and emotional burdens of a deportation
hearing in which the position of the INS was determined not to
350. Id.
351. Id. (emphasis added).
352. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Seass. 23 (1980).
353. Ardestani, 112 S. Ct. at 520.
354. Id. at 521 (citing the note following 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 12 (1980); S. REP. No. 253, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980)); see Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990) ("[The specific purpose of the EAJA is to

eliminate for the average person the financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions.") (citation and footnote omitted). The fact that this "purpose" is part of the
law passed by Congress tends to alleviate separation of powers objections to its consideration
in interpreting the Act, ard also helps avoid the confusion evident in National Centerfor
Immigrants' Rights. See infra text accompanying notes 403-11, 422-33. The plain meaning
adherents' refusal to consider congressional purpose raises an interesting question in instances
in which Congress states in the law itself the purposes of the enactment. See, eg., Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (listing one purpose of act as
"respond[ing] to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant
civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination");
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988) (providing that "[f]or the
purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained," a corporate insider must forfeit profits from a purchase and sale of the corporation's securities occurring within a six month period). Having received bicameral approval, statutory purposes of
this type fail to raise separation of powers concerns and generally should stand on a different
footing from extrapolated purposes. See infra text accompanying notes 380-449 (discussing
Court's faulty use of purpose in INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
551, 558 (1991)).
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be substantially justified.355

Nevertheless, the Court adamantly refused to depart from a literal reading of the statute and instead left any perceived defect in the law, or the
Court's interpretation, for Congress to remedy.3 56 Finally, to lend

credence to the plain meaning reading, Justice O'Connor invoked the
statutory canon calling for narrow interpretations of waivers of sovereign
immunity.3 5 7

Justice Blackmun dissented and emphasized the practical dimensions of the case: Ardestani had been subjected to "the ordeal of a depor-

tation hearing" despite the fact that the INS could not even defend its
opposition to her claim to asylum.3"'

Besides disputing the statute's

"purportedly 'plain' meaning, 35 9 Justice Blackmun claimed that the majority abandoned the teaching of the Court's 1989 decision in Sullivan v.
Hudson 3 --"that the EAJA must be construed 'in light of its purpose to
diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against,
governmental action.' ,,361 He further argued that the statutory language-"under section 554"-might reasonably be read to mean an adju-

dication "as defined in"or "within the meaning of section

554. "1362

To

355. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 521 (emphasis added).
356. See id. (observing that Congress amended EAJA to overrule a court of appeals decision and extend its coverage to specific statutes).
357. Id. at 520 (citations omitted).
358. Id. at 521-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens joined the dissent. Id. at 521
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun recognized the particular context in which the
EAJA was being applied:
The alien's stake in the proceeding is enormous (sometimes life or death in the asylum context); the legal rules surrounding deportation and asylum proceedings are
very complex; specialized counsel are necessary but in short supply; and evidence

suggests that some conduct on the part of the Government in deportation and asylum proceedings has been abusive.
Id. at 522 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf.Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2853
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that, in advocating that Roe v. Wade
be overruled, dissent failed to recognize the impact on a woman denied an abortion). See
generally Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 163952 (1990) (discussing various meanings of "context" and its importance to judicial
decisionmaking).
359. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 522 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
360. 490 U.S. 877 (1989). In Sullivan v. Hudson, a 5-4 majority, in an opinion again by
Justice O'Connor, held that the EAJA applied to proceedings for social security disability
benefits in which the government was not represented by counsel, although the Act expressly
provides that fees may be awarded in an "adversary adjudication" in which the "position of
the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise." Id. at 892 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(C) (1988)). Rejecting a plain meaning approach, the Court adopted "the most
reasonable interpretation of the statute in light of its manifest purpose." Id. at 890.
361. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 522 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Sullivan, 490 U.S. at
890).
362. Id. at 523 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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clarify any ambiguity, Justice Blackmun would have looked to the legislative history to determine the interpretation that best served the EAJA's
deterrent purpose.3 63
Justice Blackmun's reading of the legislative history revealed that
Congress, when drafting the statutory language, focused on adversary
proceedings in which the government was represented by counsel, 3 4
with not even remote hinting that deportation proceedings are not covered. 365 The reference to section 554 simply was "a convenient way to
signal... the essential and uncontroversial characteristics of an 'adjudication.' "366 Beyond support in the legislative history, the deterrent purpose of the EAJA would be furthered by its application to deportation

proceedings.367 The nature and complexity of the deportation process, as
well as the immigrant's disadvantaged place in the administrative proceedings, make the need for counsel especially acute.36 8
Out of the Court's four immigration decisions last term, Ardestani
perhaps best illustrates the rise of plain meaning statutory interpretation.
'369
By adhering to the nearly impregnable plain meaning "presumption,
the Court upheld the executive branch's interpretation of the law, even
though it appeared plainly contrary to Congressional purpose and legis363. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
364. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing H.R. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
21, 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5010, 5012).
365. Id. at 524 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
366. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
367. Id. at 525 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
368. In Justice Blackmun's words:
[U]njustified INS deportation proceedings are a classic example of a situation in
which persons "may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved" and the "disparity
between the resources and expertise of these individuals and their government." An
alien facing deportation generally is unfamiliar with the arcane system of immigration law, is often unskilled in the English language, and sometimes is uneducated; for
these reasons, "deportation hearings are difficult to fully comprehend, let alone conduct, and individuals subject to such proceedings frequently require the assistance of
counsel." In many areas, competent counsel is difficult to obtain. Evidence indicates
that the INS has engaged in abusive litigation tactics.
Finally, the stakes for the alien involved in deportation proceedings-particularly in asylum cases-are enormous.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Castro-O'Ryan v. United States
Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing
special need for legal representation in deportation proceedings). The available empirical evidence verifies the common sense assumption that asylum applicants with counsel are more
likely to obtain relief than those from the same country, but without representation. See U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: APPROVAL RATES FOR SELECTED APPLICANTS 2-4
(1987).
369. Ardestani, 112 S. Ct. at 520.
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lative history. Even the majority with great candor conceded that appli-

cation of the Act to deportation proceedings would further the law's
purpose of deterring litigation abuse by the federal government. None-

theless, because the lack of availability of attorneys' fees may discourage
the few experienced immigration attorneys from representing future applicants, Ardestani may tend to reduce the filing of asylum claims,3 70 a
result in keeping with the general thrust of the Rehnquist Court's reform
efforts. In a similar vein, there will be no litigation over attorneys' fees

(and no need for the further "waste" of judicial and litigants' time and
resources) in deportation proceedings.
Despite adhering to plain meaning principles, the majority curiously

invoked a statutory canon to fortify its plain meaning conclusion, while
simultaneously ignoring a competing canon of construction. 1 ' Invoca-

tion of a statutory canon seems inconsistent with the plain meaning approach, 37 2 but this occurrence is not unusual. The Court in the October
1991 term repeatedly invoked the sovereign immunity canon relied upon
in Ardestani,37 3 despite the ready availability of other potentially applica-

ble ones. 374 Assuming that canons may modify the plain meaning of a
statute, the Court failed to observe an equally, if not more compelling,
370. See supra note 329.
371. As Llewellyn observed, "there are two opposing canons on almost every point." Karl
N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutesare to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950); see also POSNER, supra
note 57, at 282 (mentioning similar problems in use of canons and that "they are very difficult
to weigh against each other") (footnote omitted). See generallySymposium: A Reevaluation of
the Canons of Statutory Interpretation,45 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1992) (discussing, sometimes
critically, Llewellyn's views on canons). For example, while willing to invoke the sovereign
immunity canon, see United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1014-15 (1992)
(Scalia, J.) (relying on canon of narrow construction of waivers of sovereign immunity), Justice
Scalia lambastes other canons. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of ContemporaryLegal
Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 581-86 (1989-90) (criticizing interpretive canon that
"remedial statutes are to be liberally construed"); see also Scalia, supra note 57, at 13 (recognizing that canons of statutory construction "leav[e] it to the judge to pick that one which
produced the result he desired").
372. For a thoughtful analysis of the use of canons by the Rehnquist Court, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: ClearStatement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 611-29 (1992).
373. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (1992); Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1014-15.
374. See United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. at 1641 (White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("It is axiomatic that a statute should be read as a whole.") (citation omitted); Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1019-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming that "Court's love
affair with the doctrine of sovereign immunity" led to conclusion contrary to text, legislative
history, and policy of Bankruptcy Code); see also POSNER, supra note 57, at 280 (arguing that
canon that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be narrowly construed is not "interpretive at
all" but is a "presumptionD based on substantive policy").
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3 7 5 the Court in Ardestani
canon. As it had failed to do in Elias-Zacarias,
never mentioned "the longstanding principle of construing any lingering
ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien," a principle acknowledged as recently as 1987.376 This suggests that the use of canons
is not entirely objective.
As we shall see, the rigid interpretive approach of Ardestani is
starkly at odds with the liberal method followed by INS v. National
Centerfor Immigrants"Rights, Inc. 37 7 The common denominator in the
two decisions is deference to the executive branch. The INS is shielded
from exposure for asserting unfounded positions and in effect the Court
defers to, if not sanctions, that conduct. In light of the INS's frivolous

opposition to Ardestani's asylum claim, which even the Department of
State endorsed,378 deference to the INS is wholly unjustified. Ardestani
permits the continuation of adamant resistance by the INS and the executive branch to the claims of many asylum-seekers. 379 By justifying deference through plain meaning statutory interpretation, the Court glossed
over such subtleties, reached a result plainly contrary to Congressional
purpose, and allowed a valid claim of administrative abuse to go unredressed and undeterred.
C. Unemployment as a Bond Condition: INS v. National Center for
Immigrants' Rights, Inc.
In one way, INS v. National CenterforImmigrants'Rights,Inc.38 ° is
the most "exceptional" of the four immigration decisions from last term.
In that case, the Supreme Court abandoned the plain meaning principle.
The Court, however, did so in order to defer to the INS's interpretation
of a regulation. NationalCenterfor Immigrants'Rights' selective departure from plain meaning principles suggests, therefore, that the Rehnquist Court is more concerned about deferring to the executive branch's
immigration decisions than about plain meaning interpretation of
statutes.
Section 242(a) of the INA authorizes the INS to detain immigrants
while deportation proceedings are pending. 38 1 The INS in the 1980s
375. See supra text accompanying notes 221-79.
376. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449-50 (1987) (citations omitted).
377. 112 S. Ct. 551 (1991); see infra text accompanying notes 380-449 (discussing
decision).
378. See supra text accompanying note 331.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 326-28.
380. 112 S.Ct. 551 (1991).
381. See INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1988). That section provides, in pertinent part,
that
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often aggressively exercised this authority, and, consequently, its deten382 Crittion policies were challenged regularly, often by asylum-seekers.

ics claimed that, consistent with INS intent, immigrants kept in
detention for lengthy periods often lose hope, abandon colorable claims
to relief provided for by the INA, and "consent," in the loosest sense of

the word, to immediate deportation. a83
The INA gives discretion to INS district directors to determine con-

ditions for release of immigrants from detention on bond. 384 Few regulations limit that discretion. a 5 Consistent with the practice generally
followed in criminal proceedings, 386 the INS until recently established
bond at an amount designed to ensure the immigrant's appearance at
deportation proceedings.3 87 INS v. National Center for Immigrants'
Rights, Inc. 388 involved a challenge to a regulation that marked a change
in direction in the INS use of the bond system.
[p]ending a determination of deportability in the case of any alien ... , such alien
may... be arrested and taken into custody .... [A]ny such alien taken into custody
may, in the discretion of the Attorney General... (A) be continued in custody; or (B)
be released under bond ... containingsuch conditions as the Attorney General may
prescribe; or (C) be released on conditional parole.
Id. (emphasis added).
382. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 559-67 (9th Cir. 1990)
(affirming detailed findings by district court that INS through pattern and practice of conduct

interfered with detained Salvadorans' rights to apply for asylum and to counsel); see also Flo-

res by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1365 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (invalidating INS regulation that required detention of immigrant children unless an adult relative or
legal guardian assumed custody), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1261 (1992). The INS, surprisingly
enough, admits that it has employed detention in an effort to reduce the number of asylum
applications filed in southern Texas. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., supra
note 220, at xxx.
383. See, eg., ABA COORDINATING COMM. ON IMMIGRATION LAW, LIVES ON THE LINE:
SEEKING ASYLUM IN SOUTH TEXAS 5-13 (1989) (discussing the impact of stringent measures
taken by INS in South Texas, including detention of Central Americans and rapid processing
of asylum claims); LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & HELSINKI WATCH, MOTHER OF

EXILES: REFUGEES IMPRISONED IN AMERICA 3-62 (1986) (compiling interviews of asylumseekers detained by INS describing basis for claims of persecution and negative impact of
detention on pursuing claim).
384. See INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 103.6 (1992).
385. Consequently, critics claim that the INS has engaged in a pattern of arbitrary treatment in the setting of bond. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 150, at 10407, 113-14; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INS DELIVERY BONDS: STRONGER INTERNAL
CONTROLS NEEDED 3 (1988); see also Janet A. Gilboy, Setting Bail in DeportationCases: The
Role of Immigration Judges, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 348-49, 392 (1987) (concluding that
immigration court is not in ideal position to set bond designed to assure appearance at deportation proceedings).
386. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 12.1-12.3,
at 596-613 (2d ed. 1992).
387. See infra text accompanying notes 445-48.
388. 112 S. Ct. 551 (1991).
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The Attorney General in 1983 promulgated a regulation, pursuant
to INA section 242(a), that provided in pertinent part that "[a] condition
barring employment shall be included in an appearance and delivery
bond in connection with a deportation proceeding or bond posted for the
release of an alien in exclusion proceedings, unless the District Director
determines that employment is appropriate. ' 389 While the title of the
regulation-"Condition against unauthorized employment"-is limited,
the regulation's text bars any employment by all immigrants.39 0 The National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., among others, challenged the
regulation on statutory and constitutional grounds.39 1 After lengthy and
circuitous proceedings, including an abbreviated trip to the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's invalidation of the regulation.392
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice
Stevens, reversed.39 3 The Court framed the "narrow question of statutory construction" as whether section 242(a) of the INA barred a regulation conditioning release of an immigrant from detention on not
engaging in" 'unauthorized employment.' ,,34 The INS contended that,
as the title suggests, the regulation only prohibits employment by persons
who lack work authorization. 395 Despite often slavish adherence to the
plain meaning of the law,396 the Court readily embraced the INS interpretation and held that the title of the regulation modified "employment"
in the text to mean "unauthorized employment., 397 That interpretation
389. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1992).
390. Id. (emphasis added); see National Ctr.for Immigrants' Rights, 112 S. Ct. at 556.
391. National Ctr.for Immigrants' Rights, 112 S.Ct. at 554.
392. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1374 (9th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 551 (1991). The district court initially entered a preliminary injunction
barring enforcement of the regulation, which was affirmed in part by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. National Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.
1984). The district court on remand invalidated the regulation, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, 791 F.2d 1351, 1356 (9th Cir.
1986), vacated and remanded, 481 U.S. 1009 (1987). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act IRCA). INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 481 U.S. 1009, 1009-10
(1987). The district court on remand held that IRCA did not confer upon the Attorney General the authority to impose a blanket no-work rider on bond and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d at 1351-52, 1359-74.
393. INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 551, 559-60 (1992).
394. Id. at 553 (quoting Petition for Certiorari I). Plaintiffs mounted a facial challenge to
the regulation, and the Court did not address the possibility that it might be improperly applied. Id. at 555. Because the court of appeals had not decided any of the constitutional
challenges to the regulation, neither did the Supreme Court. Id.
395. Id. at 556.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 45-78, 221-79, 326-79.
397. National Ctr.for Immigrants' Rights, 112 S.Ct. at 556-60.
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was supported by the fact that the regulation authorized the district director to permit employment by an immigrant 398 and also was supported
by extra-textual sources, such as INS responses to comments made when
the rule was promulgated 399 and internal INS office instructions. 4° To
buttress departure from the plain meaning approach, the Court invoked
the deference principle. Based on a petition for certiorari filed by the
INS in the case in 1986,11 the Court labeled the agency's interpretation
as "consistent" and therefore entitled to deference.40 2
The Court distinguished previous decisions that restricted the Attorney General's discretion under other provisions of the INA. It first distinguished United States v. Witkovich,4 °3 in which the Court eschewed a
literal interpretation of the INA to avoid harsh results contrary to the
legislative history and raising serious constitutional questions. 4 0 4 From
this case, in which the Court "define[d] the scope of the Attorney General's discretion" by considering the purpose of the INA as a whole.4 °5
The Court further rejected the Ninth Circuit's reading of Carlson v. Landon" 6 as only affording the Attorney General the discretion over detention "to protect the Nation from active subversion." 0 7 With remarkably
398. Id. at 556 & n.3.
399. Id. at 556 & n.4. In the promulgation process, the INS represented that, because the
regulation would not affect them, permanent resident aliens might work while released on
bond. See id.
400. See iL at 556 & n.5 (quoting INS OperatingInstructions 103.6(i) (1983) which provides that "[i]ndividuals maintaining a colorable claim to U.S. Citizenship and permanent resident aliens, authorized to work in the United States ...shall not be subject to this general
prohibition until such time as a final administrative determination of deportability has been

made").
401. See id. at 556 & n.2; see also supra note 392 (outlining procedural history of case).
The Court further observed that there was no evidence in the record that the INS had applied
the regulation to bar "authorized" employment or that the individual plaintiffs were authorized to work in the United States. National Ctr.for Immigrants'Rights,112 S.Ct. at 556-57 &
n.6.
402. National Ctr.for Immigrants' Rights, 112 S.Ct. at 556 ("[A]n agency's reasonable,
consistently held interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference.").
403. 353 U.S. 194 (1957). Witkovich involved the statutory authority of the Attorney General "to require deportable aliens to provide the INS with information about their 'circumstances, habits, associations and activities, and other information deemed fit and proper.' "
National Ctr.for Immigrants'Rights,112 S. Ct. at 557 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 242.3(c)(3) (1956)).
Justice Frankfurter, although admitting that the statute "appear[ed] to confer upon the Attorney General unbounded authority," rejected the "tyranny of literalness" because "a restrictive
meaning must be given if a broader meaning would generate constitutional doubts." Witkovich, 353 U.S. at 199.
404. National Ctr.for Immigrants'Rights, 112 S.Ct. at 557-58.
405. Id. at 558.
406. 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952) (upholding detention of deportable members of the Communist party on ground that they posed a threat to national security).
407. National Ctr.for Immigrants'Rights, 112 S.Ct. at 558.
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little discussion, the Court summarily concluded that the "stated and actual purpose of the no-work bond conditions was 'to protect against the
displacement of workers in the United States.' "Ios That policy, the
Court reasoned, is consistent with a "primary purpose" of the INA, 4 9
which Congress reinforced in 1986 through passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act.410 The Court cited a snippet of legislative his-

tory in support of its conclusion about a "primary purpose" of the
INA. 41
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the blanket no-work
regulation failed to provide for the individual bond decisions mandated
by the INA.41 2 Although recognizing that consideration of an individual's case was necessary to the proper exercise of discretion, the Court
found that measure present in the system in place. 4 13 The Court based
that conclusion on a variety of considerations left unmentioned by the
text of the regulation: the Attorney General interpreted the regulation as
applying only to unauthorized employment; 414 INS internal instructions
stated that the regulation would not apply to persons with a "colorable
claim of U.S. citizenship"; 415 the INS represented that asylum applicants
would not be subject to the regulation; 41 6 and the Solicitor General represented in a brief that the INS will determine early in the proceedings
whether an "alien" is authorized to work.41 7' The Court read this myriad
408. Id. (quoting 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142 (1983) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In
promulgating the regulation, the INS stated that "unauthorized work is a continuing violation
of the immigration laws. Unauthorized work is in direct contravention of one of the 'dominant
purpose[s] of the immigration laws,' which is 'to protect American workers.'" 48 Fed. Reg. at
51,142 (alteration in original) (no citations in original).
409. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 112 S.Ct. at 558 (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984)).
410. See id. at 558 n.8.
411. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1952) (discussing safeguards for American labor)).
412. Id. at 558-59.
413. Id. (emphasizing that absent some degree of individual decisionmaking, "legitimate
exercise of discretion is impossible"); see, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983);
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
414. National Ctr.for Immigrants' Rights, 112 S.Ct. at 559.
415. Id.; see supra note 400 (quoting INS OperatingInstructions).
416. NationalCtr.for Immigrants' Rights, 112 S.Ct. at 559 (quoting 48 Fed. Reg. 51,142,
51,143 (1983), which permits a district director to authorize employment for an asylum applicant who has filed a non-frivolous application); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a) (1992) (requiring
INS to authorize temporary employment to asylum applicant unless application is "frivolous"). But if, as the Supreme Court apparently authorized, the Attorney General may promulgate regulations to protect "American jobs," it is unclear why he could not lawfully bar
employment by asylum applicants.
417. National Ctr.for Immigrants' Rights, 112 S.Ct. at 559 (citing Brief for Petitioners at
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of extra-textual evidence as "substantially narrow[ing] the reach of the

regulation."41
As with the other immigration decisions, the holding of National

Centerfor Immigrants' Rights, at least on its face, is limited. Nevertheless, as in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,the Court went far beyond the plain
meaning of the regulation in its interpretation. Unlike Cardoza-Fonseca,
however, NationalCenterfor Immigrants'Rights employed extra-textual

sources to allow the INS to circumvent the plain meaning of its own
regulation. Indeed, the Court went to extraordinary lengths to consider

so-called congressional purpose, legislative history, and numerous other
extraneous sources to uphold a regulation promulgated pursuant to a

broad delegation of authority. Furthermore, the Court identified a purported "primary" purpose of the INA and read the exercise of administrative discretion bestowed by the regulation to be consistent with that

purpose.419 This eclectic mode of interpretation, of course, is anathema
to plain meaning doctrine. 420 At the same time, however, the Court interpreted the INA's delegation of the detention power to the Attorney
" '
General quite broadly, as the plain meaning approach might dictate.42
The plain meaning doctrine criticizes reviewing a law's legislative

history to determine its "purpose," a particularly apt criticism in evaluating National Centerfor Immigrants' Rights.42 The Court clearly over-

stated the holding of Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,423 the only case it cited for
418. Id. at 559. Additional provisions, such as administrative and judicial review of bond
conditions, id. (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.18, 242.2 (1992)), and the ability to seek temporary work
authorization, id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii) (1992)), in the Court's view, enhanced the
process available to ensure an individualized bond decision.
The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion. Id. at 559-60.
419. See supra text accompanying notes 408-11.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 45-78.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 403-11.
422. See supra text accompanying notes 45-78. As the Supreme Court has observed,
[a]pplication of "broad purposes" of legislation at the expense of specific provisions
ignores the complexity of the problems Congress is called upon to address and the
dynamics of legislative action. Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out
some vague social or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply
on the means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the legislation may
reflect hard-fought compromises.
Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1986) (Burger, C.J.); see
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam); Continental Air Lines, Co.
v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Starr, J.). But see Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) (emphasizing "well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on
that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute"); United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (applying similar principle).
423. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
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the "purpose" of the INA, which merely decided that the National Labor Relations Act covered undocumented workers. Although stating
that "[a] primary purpose in restrictingimmigration is to preserve jobs
for American workers,"'42 4 the Court in Sure-Tan further acknowledged

that "'[t]he centralconcern of the INA is with the terms and conditions
of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.' "425 Sure-Tan thus stands for no less a proposition
than that the INA's purposes are multi-faceted and are specific to the
particular statutory provisions under scrutiny. The broad brush approach of National Centerfor Immigrants' Rights failed to account for

such nuances.
To further document a "primary purpose" of the INA, Justice Stevens cited a two-paragraph discussion out of a 328-page House report

concerning "Safeguards for American Labor."426 It seems ill-advised to
divine on such shaky grounds a primary purpose of a complex statutory

scheme amended almost annually since its enactment in 1952, which reflects the delicate balancing of a diversity of conflicting interests. To boil
down the INA to a single "primary purpose" is nearly impossible,4 27 just
as it would be to perform the same feat for the Internal Revenue Code or
the Bankruptcy Code. For example, as the Supreme Court suggested,

the Immigration Reform and Control Act, in amending the INA, in-

cluded certain provisions hailed by some as an effort to protect American
jobs by providing for the imposition of sanctions on employers who employ undocumented labor.4 2 8 That Act, however, also created amnesty

and Special Agricultural Worker programs offering benefits to eligible
immigrants. 429 As is true of many laws, including the many other
424. Id. at 893.
425. Id. at 892 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1979)).
426. See National Ctr.for Immigrants'Rights, 112 S. Ct. at 558 n.8 (citing H.R. REP. No.
1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1952), reprintedin 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653).
427. See Roberts, supra note 153, at 4 (stating that in INA and "patchwork of amendments
which followed, Congress has reflected no clear immigration policy") (footnote omitted).
428. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. 99-603, title I,
§ 101(a), 100 Stat. 3360 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a (West 1970 and Supp.
1992)).
429. See IRCA §§ 201, 301-05, 100 Stat. 3360 (1986); see also G6NZALES BAKEIZ, supra
note 149, at 51-52 ("Like any major policy reform, IRCA legalization is filled with compromises, tradeoffs, and ironies."). IRCA has at least three "purposes," including "to control
illegal immigration to the U.S., make limited changes in the system for legal immigration, and
provide a controlled legalization program for certain undocumented aliens who have entered
this country prior to 1982." H.R. REP. No. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1986), reprintedin
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649. For a discussion of the many compromises in IRCA and the
often conflicting purposes of the law, see Bill Ong Hing, The Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Community-Based Organizations, and the Legalization Experience: Lessons for the
Self-Help Immigration Phenomenon, 6 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 475-91 (1992) (Appendix B).
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amendments to the INA,4 3 ° the legislation reflects the balancing of many
interests and great care should be taken in deriving a "primary purpose"

for any specific provision, much less the Act as a whole.43 1 This is not to
claim that reliance on congressional purpose and legislative history is per
se inappropriate. Much greater care, however, was necessary than the
Court was willing to supply.4 32
What is the explanation for this seemingly inexplicable deviation
from plain meaning principles? It could be explained by shifting coalitions on the Court, particularly the fact that Justice Stevens, the author

of the unanimous opinion, advocates a traditional approach to statutory
interpretation.4 3 3 What seems odd is that plain meaning's strongest supporter, Justice Scalia, failed to quibble with the interpretive mode employed by the majority.43 4 Perhaps that occurrence is explained by the
fact that the result was plainly deferential to the executive branch.

One might ask whether it matters what the Court considered in interpreting the regulation because the Attorney General could always rewrite the regulation to limit its reach to be consistent with the
representations made to the Court. Although that might be true, the
Attorney General should have been forced to promulgate the narrower

regulation in light of the INS's spotty record in enforcing immigration
laws and regulations4 35 and its failure to honor representations made to
430. See, e.g.,

CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRO-

ACT OF 1990 § 1.02, at 7 (1991) (observing
that Immigration Act of 1990 has "humanitarian" and "excessively severe" components and
that "[m]any practitioners and scholars will regard the statute as a mixed bag of beneficial and
punitive provisions").
431. Reliance on purpose was not the Court's only plain meaning sin. In departing from
plain meaning principles, the Court allowed the regulation's title to modify the text. It previously had considered the title of a statute in its interpretation when the text was ambiguous.
See, eg., Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 723 (1989) (resolving ambiguity by examining the
title of statute); FrC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 388-89 (1959) (finding the title "a
useful aid" in resolving an ambiguity); see also United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 610,
631 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The title of an act cannot control its words, but may furnish
some aid in showing what was in the mind of the legislature."). In the case before the Court,
however, the plain meaning of the regulatory text was unambiguous and contrary to the title.
See Llewellyn, supra note 371, at 403 (mentioning canon of statutory interpretation that
"[t]itles do not control meaning" of text). The Court thus distorted the rule of its previous
cases to accommodate the case at hand.
432. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 22, at 684-90.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 75-77; see also Easterbrook, supra note 65, at
802 (noting that institutional nature of Court necessarily leads to some inconsistency in
decisions).
434. See The Supreme Court-LeadingCases, 105 HARV. L. REv. 177, 419 (1991) (statistical breakdown showing that Justice Scalia wrote 18 of the 47, or almost 40%, of the concurring opinions filed in the October 1990 Term).
435. See supra text accompanying notes 130-90.
CEDURE: SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT, IMMIGRATION
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the Court.4 36 In any event, a narrowed regulation, in my view, still exceeded the authority delegated by the statute due to inconsistency with
the INA's provision of a variety of types of relief from deportation available to immigrants as well as the legislative history concerning the scope
of the Attorney General's detention power.
In that vein, a different result might have been reached if the Court
had reviewed the no-work regulation in light of the long-standing INS
practice of employing bond to ensure appearance at deportation proceedings437 and the adverse impact of the regulation on the pursuit of claims

to relief provided for by the INA.4 3 8 Moreover, the legislative history to
the detention and bond provision of the INA, which was incorporated
into the Act from a predecessor law, 439 reflects Congressional concern
with detaining and deporting Communists and criminals and ensuring
the appearance of persons at their deportation proceedings." 0 There is
no indication in the legislative history of concern with immigrants displacing domestic workers while on bond during the pendency of their
deportation proceedings.
Although caution was called for, the Court blindly accepted the INS
representation that the purpose of the regulation was to protect "American jobs," despite the impact of the regulation of discouraging noncitizens pursuing benefits provided to noncitizens by the INA." 1 As
Maurice Roberts points out:
No one can deny that detention, often prolonged, of an alien in
deportation proceedings pending hearing and final determination of the charges can be a potent factor in influencing the
alien not to contest the charges. For one thing, many aliens
who are the subjects of deportation proceedings are not persons
436. See infra note 443 and accompanying text.
437. See infra text accompanying notes 443-48.
438. Even plain meaning adherents might permit such an approach. See, eg., United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (Scalia, J.) ("A
provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme... because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect
that is compatible with the rest of the law . . ").
439. Section 242(a) of the INA regarding detention originally was included in the Internal
Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, Title 1 (Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950),
§ 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010-12, and later carried forward to the INA. See H.R. REP. No. 1365,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1711-13.
440. See S. REP. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-8 (1950); H. R. REP. No. 1192, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9 (1949). The Ninth Circuit relied on this legislative history to invalidate the
regulation. See National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1358-59
(9th Cir. 1990).
441. See, eg., INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988) (suspension of deportation); id. § 245, 8
U.S.C. § 1255 (adjustment of status of nonimmigrant to that of person admitted for permanent
residence).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

of independent means. If they cannot work pending final determination, they cannot support their families, and cannot even
earn the money needed to pay counsel. While many are clearly

deportable, others may have a tenable defense to the charges or
may be eligible for one or another of the many forms of discre-

tionary relief from deportation. The statutes and regulations
are highly complex, and the related administrative and judicial
decisions come in torrents. Without representation by a skilled
professional, an alien in deportation proceedings is severely

handicapped. In addition, the prospect of prolonged detention
may in itself be a sufficient inducement to throw in the towel.
The INS can hardly be unaware of these factors in imposing

blanket "no work" conditions in the bonds of aliens who are
likely to appear when wanted....

In my estimation, it is an

abuse of governmentalpower to use detention, or the threat of
detention, as a lever to force an undocumented alien to give up
an open course which the alien might otherwise be free to pursue.

The detentionpower was not designed by Congress to enable the
INS to exert such leverage.442

Through ignoring plain meaning teachings,443 the Court in National
442. Maurice A. Roberts, Some Thoughts on the Wanton Detention of Aliens, 5 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 225, 235 (1991) (emphasis added). A recent study revealed that 78% of those held
in detention by the INS lacked representation by counsel. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICIES AFFECT INS DETENTION EFFORTS

45 (1992).
443. This is not the first time that the Court has departed from the plain meaning approach
to defer to the INS. In Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), the Court accepted the Solicitor
General's admission that the INA conferral of facially unfettered discretion to the Attorney
General, see INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5)(A) (1988) (providing that Attorney
General may "in his discretion" parole into the country an "alien" applying for admission
"under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed
strictly in the public interest"), does not permit invidious discrimination on the basis of race or
national origin by the Attorney General. By accepting this admission, the Court avoided the
constitutional challenges. See Jean, 472 U.S. at 855-57; see also Motomura, supra note 131,
547-48, 590-613 (criticizing Jean because statutory manipulation allowed the Court to avoid
addressing continuing vitality of plenary power doctrine). Although he failed to restrict the
INS's discretion in any formal way, the Attorney General represented to the Court that it was
limited. The Court's acceptance of this representation has nothing to do with the INA's text
and amounts to little more than taking the INS's word that the law will be applied equitably.
Since Jean v. Nelson, claims have persisted that the executive branch's treatment of the Haitians has been affected by their race and nationality. See James Harney, Critics of U.S. Policy
See Racist Overtones, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 1992, at 2A; supra note 7.
The INS theoretically would be bound by representations made to the Court in National
Centerfor Immigrants' Rights. If, as the logic of Chevron suggests, however, an agency may
change its interpretation of the law, see supra text accompanying notes 223-44, it follows that
it may change the interpretation of a regulation. Moreover, the executive branch does not
always honor representations made in immigration litigation, even those made to the Supreme
Court. See, eg., Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1356-57 (2d Cir.)
(noting change in Haitian interdiction program contrary to representations made to the Court
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Centerfor Immigrants'Rights was able to follow its custom of deferring
to the INS's judgment. The Court's conclusory assertion that it would
defer to the agency's "consistent" interpretation of the regulation is as
questionable as its reliance on the INA's "primary purpose" in justifying
its holding." Even assuming that the interpretation of the regulation
was consistent,4 5 the agency practice in applying the statute authorizing
the regulation most definitely was not. In 1974, over two decades after
the INA's enactment, the Attorney General recognized that a no-work
condition had never before been employed in a bond issued in connection
with deportation proceedings." 6 A predecessor regulation afforded discretion to impose a no-work condition in individual cases, but not one
presumptively applicable to all cases.' 7 The blanket no-work condition
therefore was a novel use of the discretion delegated by the INA to the
Attorney General and, at a minimum, warranted further study rather
than simple deference." 8
In evaluating the propriety of deference, the INS's long record of
heavy-handed enforcement tactics also should weigh heavily against it." 9
Considering that fact, the Court's deference to the agency's interpretation of the bond regulation is highly inappropriate. Once again, the
Court evaluated INS conduct without regard to its context or a realistic
appraisal of the relatively weak adversary position of many immigrants.
The Court never considered the undisputed impact of the regulation on
immigrants seeking to pursue their rights. Intent on deferring to the
INS, the Court searched for kernels of evidence supporting deference
when more searching inquiry into the purpose and impact of the regulation was justified. Put most bluntly, the analysis shows a Court willing to
subvert plain meaning teachings to reach a result deferential to the
agency.
In sum, the approach of National Center for Immigrants' Rights
when convincing it to deny petition for writ of certiorari in related case), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 52 (Oct. 5, 1992).

444. See supra text accompanying notes 401-02. Recall that the Court completely failed to
mention, much less discuss, the inconsistency of the BIA interpretation of the statutory language at issue in Elias-Zacarias. See supra text accompanying notes 273-75.
445. In fact, the Court might have treated the INS interpretation as a "litigating position,"
a category of agency interpretations exempt from the deference doctrine. See supra text accompanying note 40.
446. See In re Toscano-Rivas, 14 1. & N. Dec. 523, 550 n.2 (AG 1974) (ruling that regulation was necessary in order to impose no-work condition in bond). See generally Roberts,
supra note 442, at 227-34 (tracing history of conditions placed on bonds by INS).
447. See INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 112 S. Ct. 551, 554 (1992).
448. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-57

(1983).
449. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
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stands in stark contrast to Elias-Zacariasand Doherty, in which the
Court employed the plain meaning approach and deferred to the executive branch. To some degree, the Court is ready and willing to abandon
plain meaning principles to justify deference to the executive branch in
immigration matters. At least in NationalCenterfor Immigrants'Rights,
the deference presumption trumped plain meaning methodology.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Long denied the most basic protections of the Constitution, immigrants now find themselves subject to the same general rules of the game
that the Rehnquist Court applies to others in the administrative process.
A potent form of deference to the conduct of administrative agencies,
often combined with plain meaning statutory interpretation, has proved a
windfall for the executive branch when it comes to immigration. Application of those doctrines has meant not only that the Attorney General,
with control over the INS and BIA, has virtually unfettered discretion
over immigration law and policy, but also that the immigrant has limited
recourse to the courts for review of immigration decisions.
This judicial hands-off approach may augur a return to the days of
the plenary power doctrine when the Supreme Court refused to question
this nation's blatantly racist treatment of Chinese immigrants, now
clearly a dark chapter in our immigration past. Over the years, plenary
power was superseded to some extent by more careful review by the Judiciary of the executive branch's immigration decisions. With the Court's
movement toward deference to the executive branch in immigration matters, however, we move toward completion of the circle and return to
where the journey began. A return to plenary power, of course, would be
the ultimate in docket clearing and caseload reduction.
It is true that the Court in the four immigration cases decided in the
October 1991 Term never expressly invoked the plenary power doctrine.
Nonetheless, the Court unquestionably expanded the cloak of immunity
shielding executive branch prerogative over immigration matters. The
Court did so despite the fact that the INS, under the direction of the
Attorney General, time and again has been accused-and found by
courts to be guilty--of engaging in abusive tactics against immigrants.
Similarly, the independence of the BIA remains in doubt. By applying
the deference and plain meaning doctrines, the Court erroneously
avoided examining such fundamental questions as the merits of the decision being reviewed, the intricacies of the statute being administered (including reliable evidence of the purposes of Congress in passing specific
provisions of the law), the appearance of undue partiality by the agency
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entrusted with decisionmaking, and the nature of the interests implicated
by the agency ruling.
At the beginning of this Article, I mentioned that, because of their
symbolic value, some Supreme Court decisions become larger than life.
To some, the mere fact that immigrants lost four consecutive cases in two
months says enough. At a minimum, however, the decisions send a clear
signal to the executive branch that its judgment in immigration matters
rarely will be disturbed, and instruct the lower courts to exercise great
restraint before disturbing the executive branch's immigration decisions.
Although advocates of refugee rights will adeptly attempt to navigate
carefully around these decisions, their clear message-that when the executive branch and the immigrant disagree, the executive branch
prevails-may be difficult to rebut. That message, which almost inevitably will tend to reduce immigration litigation and appeals, may be precisely the one that the Court wanted to send.
Such messages are not limited to immigration law. Besides pursuing
ideological goals, the Rehnquist Court seeks to establish generally applicable, inflexible rules and strong presumptions that reduce litigation and
judicial workload. This appears particularly true with respect to the
more "typical" and "trivial" statutory interpretation and administrative
action cases, that sometimes involve complex substantive issues that may
be bland to all but the experts. Concerns with the "crisis" caused by the
"litigation explosion" are very real to the current Court, which through
doctrinal developments in a variety of substantive areas has sought to
reduce litigation and appeals. By creating default principles that facilitate decisionmaking, the Court undoubtedly will "reform" the litigation
process in the federal courts. Part of the reformation unfortunately may
mean that broad efficiency concerns with docket management prevail
over justice in the individual case.
Assuming that the deference and plain meaning doctrines make
sense when applied to other bodies of law, this is not the case with respect to immigration. Unlike other political constituencies, immigrants
lack the raw political power to serve as a check on agency misconduct or
to override the plain meaning interpretations of the immigration laws by
the courts. This is true even if a largely apathetic public, which often is

not directly impacted, is appalled at the treatment of immigrants by the
INS and BIA and the courts' plain meaning interpretation of the INA.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has ignored the political realities of the
situation.
Where are we left? The immigrant has little chance of prevailing in
the political marketplace to correct the heavy-handed policies, practices,
and decisions of the executive branch and to remedy deficiencies in the

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

courts' plain meaning interpretation that guarantees deference to agency
action. Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements, the immigrant often will have little hope of securing meaningful
judicial review of INS and BIA decisions. For those reasons, INS v.
Elias-Zacarias,a5 0 INS v. Doherty,4"' Ardestani v. INS,4" 2 and INS v, National Centerfor Immigrants' Rights, Inc.453 unfortunately may mark a
watershed with respect to the rights of immigrants. As the Court moves
toward concrete rules, we must remember that bright lines do not neces-

sarily mean fair results.
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